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ABSTRACT 
In Part 1, I study if CEOs with innovative ability impose a cost upon their firms. I find 
that while there is a positive effect of a CEO’s innovative ability on firm innovation, the benefit 
is only when CEO’s innovative ability is useful for the firm. Further, firms with innovator CEOs 
spend more on R&D projects but with lower efficiency and hold more cash but with lower cash 
value compared to firms with non-innovator CEOs. These results suggest that innovator CEOs 
create an overinvestment problem. In Part 2, I study the effects of talent cycling on IPO long-run 
performance and the consequences to the IPO market. Talent cycling in initial public offerings 
refers to the job seeking behavior in high-tech firms where talented patent inventors leave once 
an IPO is successful and then pursue another job at a private firm. In my sample, I find that 36% 
of IPO firms have patent inventors who went to a non public firm within one year after an IPO 
and those inventors are the best talent in the firm. The negative side of talent cycling is that firms 
affected by talent cycling underperform firms unaffected by talent cycling for up to four years 
post IPO, while the positive side of talent cycling is the increase of the probability of an IPO in 
the economy. In robustness tests, I show that talent cycling is different from human capital loss 
and the results are robust to different time periods, such as bubble periods and hot market 
periods. In Part 3, I study the impact of an innovator CEO on the IPO’s underpricing, long-run 
performance, and post-IPO innovation. I find that since CEOs’ innovative ability can reduce the 
information asymmetry in the IPO market, firms led by innovator CEOs experience lower first-
day return (less underpricing) compared to firms led by non-innovator CEOs. Firms with 
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innovator CEOs have greater IPO long-run performance compared to firms with non-innovator 
CEOs. I also find that firms with innovator CEOs have more firm innovation up to four years 
after the IPO compared to firms with non-innovator CEOs. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the last 50 years, many successful businesses have been led by creative genius 
entrepreneurs. Islam and Zein (2018) find that innovator CEOs increase firm innovation for high-
tech firms. Yet, Michael Jeffries, the former CEO of Abercrombie & Fitch (A&F), has five 
patents and was considered one of the greatest CEOs in retail history.1. Jeffries became the CEO 
of A&F in 1992.  During his tenure, A&F’s stock price increased from initial offer price of $16 
per share in October 1996 to an all-time high of $84.23per share by October 2007. However, by 
November 2008 A&F stock price had dropped to a low of $14.64. In 2014 Jeffries finally 
stepped down as CEO and was blamed for the 11 straight quarters of negative company 
comparable-store sales.2 Upon announcement of Jeffries stepping down, A&F stock price 
jumped 8%, the biggest one-day price gain in the past nine months. The Jeffries-A&F example 
raises several questions. Do innovator CEOs matter for less innovative industries? Is there cost 
of having an innovator CEO? Why might there be costs to having an innovator CEO? This paper 
examines these questions. 
Innovation has long been recognized as important because innovation plays a critical role 
in promoting economic growth (Solow, 1957) and increases the probability of a firm’s survival 
(Cefis and Marsili, 2006). Since the CEO is the most important person in an organization 
(Ireland and Hitt, 1999) and research and development (R&D) spending is one of the most 
                                                 
1 https://www.salon.com/2006/01/24/jeffries/ 
2 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-12-09/abercrombie-fitch-ceo-mike-jeffries-to-step-down-
immediately 
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fundamental investment decisions made by firms (Barker and Mueller, 2002), it follows that 
motivating the CEO to pursue firm innovation is an important area of research. Literature shows 
that extrinsic motivations of a CEO pursuing firm innovation, such as standard pay-for-
performance contracts, do not encourage innovation in a firm (Manso, 2011), and performance-
contingent financial incentives can even inhibit innovation (Ariely, Gneezy and Loewenstein, 
2009; Hellmann and Thiele, 2011; Ederer and Manso, 2013). However, intrinsic motivations of 
CEOs pursuing firm innovation, such as their age, education and tenure, can foster innovation in 
a firm (Barker and Mueller, 2002; Wu, Levitas and Priem, 2005). A large literature in economics 
of science shows that people are attracted to pursue innovation by the explicit economic 
incentives, but by their intrinsic motivation, such the personal taste for science and the 
intellectual challenge associated with scientific work (e.g., Sauermann and Cohen, 2010). 
Sunder, Sunder and Zhang (2017) examine the intrinsic motivations by looking at the role of the 
CEO’s personality traits of sensation-seeking on firm’s innovation. They find that CEOs with 
pilot licenses are associated with more firm innovation. 
To examine the effects of a CEO’s innovative ability on a firm’s innovation, I use patents 
and citations to measure a CEO’s innovative ability. Using a sample of 2,134 U.S. public firms 
and 3,952 CEOs from 1992 to 2008 from all industries,3 I find that firms with innovator CEOs 
who have at least one patent experience more innovation compared to firms with non-innovator 
CEOs. CEOs with greater innovative ability spur more innovation to firms. However, CEOs with 
innovative ability in the innovative industry lower firm innovation compared to less innovative 
industry, suggesting the potential overinvestment problem. Innovator CEOs spur firm innovation 
only when CEOs’ innovation is useful for the firm. That is, a CEO’s innovative ability impacts 
                                                 
3 There are 340 CEOs (9.9%) that are also patent inventors in the sample. 
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firm’s innovation only when the CEO’s patent and the firm belong to the same industry 
classification. I also find that the effect of innovator CEOs on firm stock performance and firm 
innovation is a long-run effect. Specifically, firms with innovator CEOs have greater abnormal 
buy-and-hold stock return starting the third year of hiring innovator CEOs compared to firms 
with non-innovator CEOs. CEOs’ innovation ability can impact firm innovation in the long-run 
but the effects of CEOs’ innovative ability on firm innovation decrease over time. 
However, such characteristics that benefit corporate innovation may not be without a 
cost. Prior research finds that a CEO’s personal characteristics can lead to distortions in 
corporate investment policies (Malmendier and Tate, 2005a; Malmendier and Tate, 2005b), 
overinvestment problems (Campbell, Gallmeyer, Johnson, Rutherford and Stanley, 2011) or 
value-destroying investments (Goel and Thakor, 2008). If CEOs with innovative ability have 
passion and interests in investing in innovation, they might pursue their own interests and 
overinvest in R&D projects. Agency theory also suggests that CEOs may overinvest to build 
excessive empires (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen 1986) and entrench themselves (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1989) if they pursue their own interests. Bebchuk and Stole (1993) build a 
theoretical model and assume that the market has incomplete information about the investment 
returns, and if managers signal the market, the investors can observe the level of investments. 
They find that when the investors can only observe the level of the investments, overinvestment 
will occur in the firms. Therefore, CEOs with innovative ability may be more likely to signal 
investment opportunities to the market, and firms led by innovative CEOs are more likely to 
have overinvestment problems.  
I study the potential overinvestment problems that are brought by innovator CEOs. 
Findings indicate that firms with innovator CEOs spend more on R&D projects, but this R&D 
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funding is used less efficiently than firms with non-innovator CEOs. The results are consistent 
with agency theory that innovator CEOs have overinvestment problems. To examine how these 
agency conflicts are manifested in other corporate policies, I further examine the level of cash 
holding and the value of cash holdings for firms with innovator CEOs.4 I find that firms led by 
innovator CEOs hold more cash than firms led by non-innovator CEOs but the cash value is 
lower. Overall, the results suggest that while innovator CEOs spur greater firm innovation, they 
also tend to overinvest in innovation. These results are robust to the alternative CEOs’ innovative 
ability measure, firm innovation measure, and alternative CEO ability measures, such as CEO’s 
past industry working experience and CEO’s general ability index.  
One significant concern with looking at CEOs with innovative ability is that innovative 
firms are more likely to hire CEOs with greater innovative ability, which begs the question of 
whether the results are driven not by CEOs’ innovative ability itself, but other omitted 
characteristics that are associated with innovative firms themselves. To address the potential 
endogeneity, I employ three methods. First, I use two-stage least square (2SLS) regression with 
the CEO coauthors’ ability as an instrumental variable. The CEO coauthors’ ability is a valid 
instrumental variable since the CEO coauthors’ ability is related to a CEO’s innovative ability 
and affects firm’s innovation only through the CEO’s innovative ability. Second, I apply a 
difference-in-difference methodology using CEO exogenous turnover as a shock.5 Third, I use 
the propensity score matching method. Regardless of the methodology used, results indicate that 
a CEO’s innovative ability has a positive impact on firm’s innovation.  
                                                 
4 Cash value captures the value that shareholders place on an extra dollar of cash held by firms. 
5 The results for the difference-in-difference methodology is in the appendix. 
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This paper is related to two other papers: Makri and Scandura (2010) and Islam and Zein 
(2018). Makri and Scandura examine the effects of creative CEO leadership on innovation. They 
find that creative leadership has a positive impact on the quality and quantity of firm innovation. 
My paper differs from Makri and Scandura and Islam and Zein in two ways. First, Makri and 
Scandura use CEO interviews and code information pertaining to leadership style, emphasizing 
developing social and human capital, as a proxy for CEO creative characteristics. This paper uses 
the number of patents and citations to directly quantify CEOs’ innovative ability. While Islam 
and Zein (2018) define innovation using CEO patents, they emphasize the first-hand innovation 
experience of inventor CEOs and define “an inventor CEO” as one that has been awarded at least 
one patent. In addition to using Islam and Zein’s definition, I focus on measuring the innovation 
ability of CEOs by counting patents and citations in each year, up to a given year or in the 
sample period. This allows me the test the incremental benefits or costs of CEOs’ innovative 
ability within the firm. Second, Makri and Scandura (2010) and Islam and Zein (2018) only 
examine CEOs in the high-tech industry. My sample includes firms from all industries. This 
allows me to examine if the effect of CEOs with innovation ability on firm’s innovation is 
greater when the firms are in the industries that need innovation the most. Most importantly, this 
paper is addressing the potential costs, not just the benefits, of having an innovator CEOs.  
This paper contributes to the literature in mainly three ways. First, this paper is 
complementary to a growing body of literature that explores the effects of CEOs on corporate 
innovation. Barker and Mueller (2002) study the impact of CEO characteristics on firm’s R&D 
spending; Custodio, Ferreira and Matos (2017) investigate whether general managerial skills 
spur innovation; Galasso and Simcoe (2011) study CEO overconfidence and firm innovation; 
and Sunder, Sunder and Zhang (2017) examine the effect of CEO sensation seeking on firm 
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innovation. I add to this literature by showing that CEOs’ innovative ability is a significant driver 
of corporate innovation, albeit at the cost of overinvestment, reduced innovative efficiency, and 
excessive cash holdings.  
Second, this paper also complements the literature that studies the impact of CEO 
characteristics on the distortions in corporate investment decisions (Malmendier and Tate, 2005a; 
Malmendier and Tate, 2005b; Campbell, Gallmeyer, Johnson, Rutherford and Stanley, 2011; 
Goel and Thakor, 2008). Weisbach (1995) examines the impact of CEO turnover on firm’s 
investment decisions; Bebchuk and Stole (1993) study CEO investment decisions in the presence 
of imperfect information; and Malmendier and Tate (2005a) investigate the effect of CEO 
overconfidence on corporate investment. I show that CEOs’ innovative ability and intrinsic 
incentives for innovation can also distort corporate investments. Third, this paper uses a new 
proxy of CEO’s ability that can affect firm’s innovation: CEO patents and citations. This new 
proxy is a more direct and effective measure of a CEO’s innovative ability compared to the 
current proxies (e.g. CEO’s education and general ability index (Custodio, Ferreira and Matos, 
2017)).  
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II. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Ever since Schumpeter (1911), one of the most influential economists of the 20th 
century, proposed that technological innovation is the cause of economic growth, the effect of 
innovation on firms’ performance has been studied extensively (Pakes, 1985; Austin, 1993; 
Nicholas, 2008; Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru and Stoffman, 2017). For example, Hall, Jaffe and 
Trajtenberg (2005) find that innovation, measured by patents and citations, significantly 
positively affects the firm’s market value and one extra citation of a patent increases the firm 
market value by three percent.  
 In addition to the importance of innovation on the firm’s performance, researchers 
document that innovation is affected by stock liquidity (Fang, Tian and Tice, 2014), shareholder 
protection laws (Brown, Martinsson and Petersen, 2013), antitakeover laws (Atanassov, 2013), 
banking competition (Cornaggia, Mao, Tian and Wolfe, 2015), corporate venture capital 
(Chemmanur, Loutskina and Tian, 2014), analyst coverage (He and Tian, 2013) and institutional 
ownership (Aghion, Van Reenen and Zingales, 2013). However, innovative work is person 
centered (Mumford, Scott, Gaddis and Strange, 2002). Innovative people, the most direct 
influence of firm’s innovation, are seldom studied. Moreover, innovative work often needs 
collaboration among people (Abra, 1994; Cagliano, Chiesa and Manzini, 2000) and interaction 
between employees and leaders (Pelz, 1963; Tierney, Farmer and Graen, 1999).6 Furthermore, 
                                                 
6 Specifically, Tierney, Farmer and Graen (1999), focusing on 191 R&D employees of a large chemical company, 
find that the interactions between employee intrinsic motivation and leader intrinsic motive is related to employee 
creative performance. 
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Mumford, Marks, Connelly, Zaccaro and Reiter-Palmon (2000) point out that organizational 
leaders must appraise the works of innovative people. It would be difficult to evaluate the 
innovative ideas if the leader lacks expertise or creative skills (Mumford, Scott, Gaddis and 
Strange, 2002). Therefore, the CEO, the leader of the organization and in charged with 
motivating employees and driving changes within the organization, with innovative ability will 
improve a firm’s innovation. Islam and Zein (2018) also find that innovator CEOs impact firm 
innovation for high-tech industry. 
Hypothesis 1: A CEO’s innovative ability has a positive effect on the firm’s innovation for all the 
industries. 
Mumford (2000) and Redmond, Mumford and Teach (1993) find that CEOs play a key 
role on helping innovative people in the firm meet organizational needs and goals, and further 
CEO expertise and innovative skills are more important when the firm’s tasks become more 
complex (Mumford, Scott, Gaddis and Strange, 2002). Thus, the effect of CEOs with innovative 
ability on firm’s innovation and performance should be larger on firms that need CEOs with 
innovative ability the most. Moreover, Brown, Fazzari and Peterson (2009) document that the 
young high-tech industry accounts for about 75% of the entire U.S. R&D boom, indicating the 
importance of innovation to high-tech industry.  
Hypothesis 2: The effect of a CEO’s innovative ability is larger on the innovative industry 
compared to the less innovative industry.  
 According to agency theories, when CEOs pursue their own interests, the CEOs will 
overinvest to build excessive empires (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen 1986). Also, CEOs 
are interested in investments that require their own specific skills, and making such investments 
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can entrench them since it is costly for shareholders to replace them (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). 
Xuan (2009) also finds that firms with specialist CEOs have a lower investment efficiency.7 
Therefore, firms with innovator CEOs might have a lower innovation efficiency. 
Hypothesis 3: Firms led by innovator CEOs have a lower innovation efficiency. 
 The value of holding cash is to allow a firm to undertake valuable projects when they are 
available (Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach, 2004; Han and Qiu, 2007). Since firms with 
innovator CEOs are more likely to invest in R&D projects (Makri and Scandura, 2010), I expect 
firms led by innovator CEOs to hold more cash compared to firms led by non-innovator CEOs. 
Moreover, since holding more cash can allow CEOs to invest in projects that offer non-pecuniary 
benefits but jeopardize shareholder’s value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), according to agency 
theory, I expect firms with innovator CEOs to hold more cash but have a lower cash value 
compared to firms with non-innovator CEOs. 
Hypothesis 4: Firms led by innovator CEOs hold more cash compared to firms led by non-
innovator CEOs but have a lower cash value. 
  
                                                 
7 Xuan (2009) study the job histories of CEOs and define a specialist CEO as a CEO advanced through the ranks 
from certain divisions in the firm. 
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III. SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION, VARIABLE MEASUREMENTS AND SUMMARY 
STATISTICS 
SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION 
 The data is collected from several difference sources. CEO characteristics are from 
ExecuComp, which provides names, title, and compensation related information for S&P 1500 
firms starting from 1992. Firm financial information is from Compustat, stock returns are from 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), and firm patent data is provided by Kogan, 
Papanikolaou, Seru and Stoffman (2017) from 1975 to 2010. According to Hall, Jaffe, 
Trajtenberg (2001), there is a 2-year lag on average between a patent’s application date and grant 
date with patents being granted eventually. Since the actual timing of innovation is closer to the 
date of application, I use the application year as the relevant year to match this patent dataset 
with other datasets and end my sample period in 2008. As a result, my sample period is from 
1992 to 2008. 
Following many existing studies on innovation (e.g. Sunder, Sunder and Zhang, 2017), I 
exclude financial and utilities firms. I then include all the other industries where the average 
number of patents per firm is at least one. This restriction allows the sample to include firms with 
zero patents but at the same time excludes industries where innovation is not relevant. The 
resulting sample includes 2,134 firms and 3,952 CEOs from 1992 to 2008. 
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VARIABLE MEASUREMENTS 
 This subsection defines the independent variable, dependent variable and control 
variables.  
 
MEASURING CEOS’ INNOVATIVE ABILITY 
To identify innovator CEOs, I first obtain a list of CEO names from ExecuComp 
database, which includes the top paid executives of S&P 1500 firms. Then, I merge CEOs’ 
names with patent inventors’ names by their first, middle and last name. The data for patent 
inventors comes from Harvard Business School (HBS) patenting database constructed by Li, Lai, 
D’Amour, Doolin, Sun, Torvik, Amy and Fleming (2014). HBS patenting database provides 
unique identifiers (variable: Invnum_N) for each patent’s inventors from 1975 through 2010. 
Although CEO’s name is matched to inventor’s name, there is still a possibility that the CEO and 
the inventor are not the same person but just have the same name. In some cases, the CEO’s 
name can be matched to several unique inventors because of the same name. Therefore, I hand 
collect biographical information to ensure I am accurately matching CEOs with inventors. 
 The HBS patenting database contains inventor’s patent assignee names, and ExecuComp 
contains CEO’s company name. If the inventor’s patent assignee name and CEO’s company 
name are the same, it is a one-to-one match, and I identify the patent inventor and the CEO as the 
same person. If the inventor’s patent assignee name and CEO’s company name are not the same, 
it is not a one-to-one match. In this case, I search for the CEO’s biographical information on the 
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internet.8 If the CEO’s past working company name is the same as the inventor’s patent assignee 
name, then I identify the patent inventor and the CEO as the same person. Sometimes, the CEO’s 
biography directly indicates that the CEO invented patents. In that case, I identify the CEO as the 
patent inventor even though the CEO never worked for the patent assignee.9 Using this process, 
my sample has 340 CEOs who are patent inventors (innovator CEOs) and 3,612 CEOs who are 
not patent inventors.10 
 Since HBS patenting database provides each patent’s citations,11 I construct eight metrics 
to measure CEOs’ innovative ability in order to measure the quantity and quality of their 
innovative ability. The first measure (variable: Innovator CEO) is a dummy variable equal to one 
if the CEO had any patents during 1975 to 2010.12 Based on this measure, there are 340 
innovator CEOs in the sample. The second measure (variable: CEO patent) counts the number of 
patents the CEO applied for in a given year.13 The third measure (variable: CEO citation) counts 
the number of citations subsequently received by the patents applied for in a given year. Patent 
citations measure the quality of the patent capturing the technology and economic importance. 
                                                 
8 I first look up the websites providing the most credible and accurate information about the CEO. The first type of 
websites is the company website, Bloomberg CEO Biography and Wikipedia. If the CEO’s biography cannot be 
found on those websites, I will go to other website to find CEO biography. For example, Notable Names Data Base, 
LinkedIn, news information and Forbes website. 
9 This is because the inventor sold the patent to the assignee. Therefore, the patent belongs to the assignee but the 
inventor never worked for the assignee. 
10 I successfully identified 366 CEOs who are patent inventors, but after merging the CEOs database with other 
databases, only 340 innovator CEOs were left in the sample. 
11 HBS patenting database provides design patents as well as utility patents. According to U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO), “a utility patent protects the way an article is used and works, while a design patent 
protects the way an article looks”. Specifically, the utility patent is a trademark protection that makes sure a person 
has full control over his or her invention. A design patent is used when a person creates a new design for an existing 
product. However, the NBER patent database and Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru and Stoffman (2017) dataset only 
provide utility patents. The NBER patent database provides inventor information only from 1975 to 1999 and does 
not provide inventor unique identifier. Kogan et al. dataset does not contain the patent inventors’ information.  
12 Even though my sample period is 1992 to 2008, the HBS patent database has information from 1975 to 2010. So 
if a CEO had a patent in 1985, I recognize this CEO as an innovator CEO. 
13 Patents applied for are generally granted with a two years lag. Thus, date of application is closer to the actual 
timing of innovation than the patent grant date (Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2001). 
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The fourth measure (variable: CEO avg. citation) is the ratio of CEO citation to CEO patent in a 
given year. The second, third and fourth measurements capture CEO’s innovative ability in each 
year. However, CEOs’ innovation ability is also reflected by their past innovation record. When 
a new CEO is announced, the stock market valuing the CEO’s innovative ability will be based on 
the CEO’s cumulative innovation record, not just one year. Therefore, the fifth, sixth and seventh 
measurements of CEOs’ innovation ability are cumulative measures. The fifth measure (variable: 
CEO cumulative patent) is the cumulative number of patents up to that year starting the year the 
first patent was applied for and the sixth measure (variable: CEO cumulative citation) is the 
cumulative number of citations received by the patents up to that year starting the year the first 
patent was applied for. The seventh measure (variable: CEO cumulative avg. citation) is the ratio 
of CEO cumulative citation to CEO cumulative patent. The last measure (variable: CEO total 
avg. citation) is the ratio of CEO total citation over CEO total patent in the sample period. I only 
present the results using the first and seventh measures, innovator CEO and CEO cumulative 
average citation.  
 
MEASURING FIRM’S INNOVATION 
I measure firm innovation using data from Kogan et al. (2017),14 which reports all utility 
patents issued by U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). This patent database provides 
each patent assignee’s CRSP unique identifier (variable: PERMNO), the citations received by 
each patent, the estimated value of the patent in nominal dollars, the patent’s class, the 
application date and the grant date. 
                                                 
14 HBS patent database does not provide patent assignee’s CRSP unique identifier (PERMNO).  
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 I use five metrics measuring the firm’s patenting activity as proxies for the firm’s 
innovation productivity. The first measure (variable: Firm patent) is a simple count of the 
number of patents the firm applied for in a given year. In order to capture the variation of the 
patent’s technology importance, the second measure (variable: Firm citation) counts the number 
of citations subsequently received by the patents that the firm applied for in a given year. I log 
the first two measures due to the skewness distribution. The third measure (variable: Firm avg. 
citation) is the ratio of firm citation over firm patent in a given year. 
 In order to further capture the variation of the patent’s technology importance and adjust 
for citation truncation lags (Hall, Jaffe, Trajtenberg, 2005), I follow Kogan et al. (2017) to 
construct the fourth measure (variable: Citation-weighted firm innovation) using this metric, 
𝜔𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ (1 +
𝐶𝑗
𝐶?̅?
) ,
𝑗∈𝑃𝑖,𝑡
 (1) 
where 𝐶?̅? is the average number of citations received by the patents that were granted in the same 
year as patent j, 𝐶𝑗 is the number of citation received by patent j, 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is the set of patents issued 
to firm i in year t, and 𝜔𝑖,𝑡 is the sum of the weight of citations on each patent plus one for firm i 
in time t. Since 𝜔𝑖,𝑡 is increasing in firm size (Kogan et al., 2017), 𝜔𝑖,𝑡 is scaled by book assets, 
𝑊𝑖,𝑡
𝑐𝑤 =
𝜔𝑖,𝑡
𝐵𝑖,𝑡
 , (2) 
where 𝐵𝑖,𝑡 is book assets of firm i in year t, and 𝑊𝑖,𝑡
𝑐𝑤 is the citation-weighted innovation for firm 
i firm in time t.  
 Citations value the scientific contribution of the patents but not necessarily the value 
added by the patents. For example, a firm invents a patent that generates only a few citations, but 
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that patent restricts the development of its competitors. The patent will have a large value 
impact. Thus, the last measure of firm innovation (variable: Market-value firm innovation) uses 
the patents’ private economic value. Following Kogan at el. (2017), market-value firm 
innovation is constructed using the stock market response to news about the patents.15 The total 
dollar value of innovation produced by firm i in year t is equal to the sum of all the values of 
patents j granted to that firm, 
𝜃𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝑥𝑗
𝑗∈𝑃𝑖,𝑡
 , (3) 
where 𝑥𝑗 is the dollar value of patent j, and 𝜃𝑖,𝑡 is the total dollar value of patents applied by firm 
i in year t. Similar to citation-weighted firm innovation, market-value firm innovation is 
standardized by book assets, 
𝑊𝑖,𝑡
𝑚𝑣 =
𝜃𝑖,𝑡
𝐵𝑖,𝑡
 , (4) 
where 𝑊𝑖,𝑡
𝑚𝑣 is the market-value firm innovation. 
 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
 In order to investigate the effect of an innovator CEO on firm’s innovation, other factors 
that would affect a firm’s innovation must be controlled. In the regression, I control for time-
varying firm characteristics and CEO specific variables. Following the innovation literature, 
controls include firm size, defined as the nature logarithm of total assets, capital intensity, 
                                                 
15 Kogan at el. (2017) provides the dollar value of each patent based on the stock market response to news about the 
patents. 
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defined as the nature logarithm of the ratio of net property, plant, and equipment divided by the 
number of employees, stock return, defined as the firm’s buy-and-hold return over the fiscal 
year, and Tobin’s Q, defined as the natural log of the ratio of market value of assets to book 
value of assets. 
 CEO specific variables include CEO tenure, defined as the number of months a CEO is in 
the firm, CEO age in years, the delta of the CEO’s stock and option portfolio (a proxy for CEO 
pay-performance sensitivity) and the vega of the CEO’s stock and option portfolio (a proxy for 
CEO risk taking incentives). The calculation method for delta and vega is proposed by Core and 
Guay (2002), and the data for delta and vega is provided by Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006). 
The delta is defined as the dollar change in CEO stock and option portfolio for 1% change in 
stock price, and the vega is defined as the dollar change in CEO option holdings for 1% change 
in stock return volatility. I also control for year fixed effects, industry fixed effects and firm fixed 
effects. All control variables are lagged by one year.  
 
SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 Table 1 presents the distribution of innovator CEOs by year and by industry. Panel A 
displays the percentage of innovator CEOs in the sample by year. On average, 9.9% of CEOs in 
the sample are patent inventors. The percentage of innovator CEOs ranges from 6.8% (1993) to 
11.7% (1999). The percentage of innovator CEOs is higher during the technology bubble period, 
suggesting firms in the technology industry are more likely to have innovator CEOs. Panel B 
tabulates the percentage of innovator CEOs by Fama and French 12 industry groups excluding 
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financial firms and utilities.16 Business equipment has the highest percentage of innovator CEOs 
(17.0%), followed by consumer durables (15.0%) and health (14.3%).17 Panel C shows the 
percentage of innovator CEOs in the sample by high-tech industry following the categorization 
in Loughran and Ritter (2004).18 High-tech industries have 18.0% of innovator CEOs compared 
to 7.6% in non-high-tech industries.  
Table 2 provides summary statistics of dependent variables and independent variables in 
the regressions. I divide the sample into two subsamples, non-innovator CEOs and innovator 
CEOs, and report the means, medians, and standard deviations for the variables used in the 
regressions.19 T-tests (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests) are also conducted to test for differences 
between the means (medians) for firms with innovator CEOs and non-innovator CEOs. As 
expected, firms with innovator CEOs have more patents, citations, average citations per patent, 
citation-weighted firm innovation and market-value firm innovation than firms with non-
innovator CEOs. The differences on mean and median are both statistically significant. Also, 
firms with innovator CEOs spend a higher proportion of R&D over total assets than firms with 
non-innovator CEOs.   
Examining innovator CEO’s innovative ability, I find that on average, innovator CEOs 
have 0.82 patents and 12.21 citations per year, and cumulative 9.86 patents and 260.14 citations 
                                                 
16 The Fama and French indsutries are defined in Fama’s website. 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html#Research 
17 The Business Equipment industry might not have the highest percentage of innovator CEO since I exclude some 
sub-industries where the average patent per firm is less than one.  
18 In Loughran and Ritter (2004) appendix D, high-tech stocks are defined as those in SIC codes 3571, 3572, 3575, 
3577, 3578 (computer hardware), 3661, 3663, 3669 (communications equipment), 3671,3672, 3674, 3675, 3677, 
3678, 3679 (electronics), 3812 (navigation equipment), 3823,3825,3826,3827,3829 (measuring and controlling 
devices), 3841, 3845 (medical instruments), 4812, 4813 (telephone equipment), 4899 (communications services), 
and 7371, 7372, 7373, 7374, 7375, 7378, and 7379 (software). 
19 The summary statistics of dependent variables and independent variables in the regressions for the full sample are 
in the apendix Table 1A. 
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up to a given year. Comparing the firm characteristics for firms led by innovator CEOs and those 
led by non-innovator CEOs, I find that firms with innovator CEOs are smaller in size and have 
less capital intensity and higher Tobin’s Q on average. There is no significant difference in stock 
return for firms with innovator CEOs and firms with non-innovator CEOs. Further, innovator 
CEOs have longer tenure, and higher delta and vega values in their compensation packages than 
non-innovator CEOs. There is no significant difference in inventor CEO age and non-inventor 
CEO age.   
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IV. INNOVATOR CEO AND FIRM INNOVATION 
In this section, I first examine the effect of CEOs with innovative ability on firm 
innovation controlling for endogeneity problem. Then, I study the industry innovativeness. Next, 
I examine how innovator CEOs spur firm innovation and the innovation efficiency in the firm 
with innovator CEOs. 
PATENTING ACTIVITY 
OLS RESULTS 
Table 3 presents the effects of innovator CEOs on firm’s innovation. The regression 
model follows: 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡+1
=  𝛼1 +  𝛽1𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽5𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛
′𝑠 𝑄𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽6𝐿𝑜𝑔 (1 + 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑜𝑔 (1 + 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎)𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽9𝐿𝑜𝑔 (1 + 𝑣𝑒𝑔𝑎)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑘 +  𝛿𝑡 +  𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,                                        (5) 
where, 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡+1, is measured by the five methods previously described, 𝛾𝑘, 𝛿𝑡 and 
𝜏𝑡 are year fixed effects, industry fixed effects and firm fixed effects respectively. All other 
variables are as previously defined. 
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 In Panel A, 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 is measured by Innovator CEO, which is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the CEOs had any patent between 1975 and 2010. I find that 
Innovator CEO is positively statistically significant related to firm’s innovation measured in all 
five proxies when the year fixed effects and industry fixed effects are controlled. When firm 
fixed effects are controlled, Innovator CEO is positively statistically significant related to firm’s 
innovation only when firm innovation is measured by firm average citation per patent and 
citation-weighted firm innovation. In Panel B, I find that if CEOs have higher innovative ability 
based on their previous average citations per patent, firms have a greater number of patents, 
citations, average citations per patent and citation-weighted firm innovation when the year fixed 
effects and industry fixed effects or firm fixed effects are controlled. The results suggest a 
positive relationship between CEOs’ innovative ability and firm’s innovation, supporting 
hypothesis one that firms led by innovator CEOs tend to have more innovation for all the 
industries.20  
 Examining the control variables, I find that higher firm innovation is associated with 
bigger firms consistent with Sunder, Sunder and Zhang (2017). Furthermore, as in Hirshleifer, 
Low and Teoh (2012), I find that higher firm innovation is associated with firms with poor stock 
performance and high Tobin’s Q. Vega values is generally positive consistent with Coles, 
Naveen and Naveen (2006). CEO age is negatively associated with firm innovation, suggesting 
that younger CEOs are better in innovation.  
 
                                                 
20 The results of using the other six measures of a CEO’s innovative ability are presented in appendix Table 2A. The 
results are consistent with hypothesis one. 
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ENDOGENEITY 
If highly innovative firms are more likely to hire an innovator CEO, then 𝛽1 in equation 
(5) is biased due to endogeneity. I control for endogeneity in two ways: 1) an instrument variable 
approach, and 2) propensity score matching.21  
 
2SLS RESULTS 
 2SLS (two-stage least square) requires a selection of instrumental variables (IV). 
Successful IV candidates must satisfy two criteria. First, the IV must correlate with CEO 
innovative ability, and second, the IV does not correlate with the error term in equation (5). In 
another words, the IV affects the firm’s innovation only through CEO innovative ability. I 
construct an IV using the coauthor’s information. CEO coauthors’ ability is defined as CEO 
coauthors' average number of citations over average number of patents.22 I do not include any 
patents that the CEO coauthors have with the innovator CEO in the calculation of the IV.23 I 
choose CEO coauthors’ ability as an IV since people with higher innovative ability are more 
likely to work with other people with higher innovative ability. To implement the IV approach, I 
estimate the following first-stage regression: 
                                                 
21 I also employ the difference-in-difference method by using an exogenous shock of CEO turnover to deal with the 
endogeneity issue. The results are presented in the appendix Table 5A. The results are consistent with hypothesis 
one. 
22 CEO coauthors’ average citation is defined as the average citation the coauthor has shared with other authors. 
CEO coauthors’ average patent is defined as the average patent the coauthor shared with other authors. 
23 I also manually check 50 CEOs’ coauthors and find that CEO coauthors and CEOs do not work in the same 
company. Therefore, CEO coauthors and CEOs working in the same company is very rare.  
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𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡
=  𝛼1 +  𝛽1𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑠′ 𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽5𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛
′𝑠 𝑄𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐿𝑜𝑔 (1 + 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑜𝑔 (1 + 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎)𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽9𝐿𝑜𝑔 (1 + 𝑣𝑒𝑔𝑎)𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾𝑘 +  𝛿𝑡 +  𝜏𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖  ,                                           (6) 
where 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑠′ 𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 is firm i CEO coauthors' average citation to average patent. All 
other variables are as previously defined. I drop CEOs that are single authors for all the patents. 
Table 4 presents the first-stage results. I find that CEO coauthors’ ability is significant positively 
related to CEO’s innovative abilities in both Panels A and B.24 Therefore, CEO coauthors’ 
ability is a valid instrumental variable since CEO coauthors’ ability is positively related to 
CEOs’ innovative ability, and CEO coauthors’ ability affects firm’s innovation only through the 
CEO.25 
The second-stage equation estimates the impact of the innovator CEO on the firm’s 
innovation activity: 
                                                 
24 The results of using the other six measures of a CEO’s innovative ability are presented in appendix Table 3A. The 
results are consistent with Table 4. 
25 One concern regarding the IV maybe that CEOs’ free ride and do not really coauthor the patent. To address with 
this concern, I calculate the frequency with which CEOs and coauthors collaborate. Frequently collaborated 
coauthors are the coauthors have more than one patent with the innovator CEO. The results using frequently 
collaborated coauthors are qualitatively similar to the results in Table 4 and available upon request. I also find that 
CEO coauthors’ ability positively impact firm innovation. The results are available upon request. 
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𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡+1
=  𝛼1 +  𝛽1𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦̂ 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽5𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛
′𝑠 𝑄𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐿𝑜𝑔 (1 + 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑜𝑔 (1 + 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎)𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽9𝐿𝑜𝑔 (1 + 𝑣𝑒𝑔𝑎)𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾𝑘 +  𝛿𝑡 +  𝜏𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖 ,                                                (7) 
where 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦̂ 𝑖,𝑡 is the predicted values from equation (6). All other variables 
are as previously defined. 
 Table 4 reports the second stage regression results.26 In Panels A, when a CEO’s 
innovative ability is measured by a dummy variable, there is a significantly positive relation 
between the firm’s innovation and the CEO’s innovative ability, suggesting that firms led by 
innovator CEOs have a greater firm innovation compared to firms led by non-innovator CEOs. 
In Panel B, a CEO’s innovative ability is measured by cumulative average citation. The first-
stage results show a positive relation between CEO coauthors’ ability and CEOs’ innovative 
ability, consistent with the prediction that people with higher innovative ability are more likely to 
work with other people with higher innovative ability. The second-stage results show that CEOs’ 
innovative ability has a positive impact on firm innovation. Overall, the results are consistent 
with hypothesis one that CEOs with innovative ability have a positive effect on the firm’s 
innovation for all the industries.27 
 Consistent with prior literature, Table 4 shows that in general, firm innovation is 
associated with bigger firms, firms with lower stock return, higher Tobin’s Q and younger CEO. 
                                                 
26 Since only the firms with innovator CEOs have a measured of CEO coauthors’ ability, I also run regressions 
excluding firms led by non-innovator CEOs. The results are available upon request.  
27 The results of using the other six CEO innovative measures are presented in appendix Table 4A. 
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I also find that in general lower delta value and higher vega value are associated with higher firm 
innovation consistent with Coles, Naveen and Naveen (2006). 
 
PROPENSITY SCORE MATCHED SAMPLES 
Second, I employ a propensity score matching procedure (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) 
to deal with the endogeneity issue. This methodology allows me to construct a control sample of 
firms that are led by non-innovator CEOs and exhibit no observable differences in firm and CEO 
characteristics relative to the firms that are led by innovator CEOs. Therefore, if firm’s 
innovation is different between the matched firms, the only reason can be due to the fact the 
innovator CEO. 
To implement this methodology, I first calculate the probability (propensity score) from 
the logit regression to construct a nearest-neighbor matched sample for innovator CEOs using all 
the control variables in equation (5). In each year, I choose, with replacement, the non-innovator 
CEOs with propensity scores closest to those of each innovator CEO. After constructing the 
matched sample, I run OLS regression (equation (5)) controlling firm and CEO characteristics, 
year fixed effects and industry fixed effects. The results are presented in Table 5.28 Results 
indicates that innovator CEOs increase firm innovation when measured by patents, citations, 
average citations per patent and citation-weighted firm innovation, suggesting that firms led by 
innovator CEOs experience a greater firm innovation compared to firms led by non-innovator 
CEOs. The results are the same whether there is one or two nearest matching firms. 
                                                 
28 The propensity score matching characteristics are presented in Table 6A. 
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EFFECT OF INDUSTRY INNOVATIVENESS 
I expect that the effect of an innovator CEO on firm’s innovative outcomes should be 
larger for industries that need innovation the most. I follow Hirshleifer, Low and Teoh (2012) to 
identify industry innovativeness. Specifically, I identify an industry as an innovative industry if 
the average citation per patent for the industry is greater than the median average citation per 
patent across all industries, where industries are classified at the four-digit SIC level.29 In my 
sample, the innovative industries have 1,703 innovator CEOs, and non-innovative industries 
have only 101 innovator CEOs. In order to study the impact of CEOs’ innovative ability on 
innovative industries, I include 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 defined as a dummy variable equal to one 
if the firm is in innovative industry and zero otherwise, and the interaction of 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖 
and 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 as additional independent variables. The results are presented in 
Table 6. I find that the coefficients of the interaction term between 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖 and 
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 are negatively significant when firm innovation is measured by firm 
average citation and citation-weighted firm innovation after controlling for endogeneity. The 
results do not support hypothesis two and suggest that innovator CEOs in innovative industry 
lower firm innovation compared to less innovative industry.30 The results also suggest innovator 
CEOs’ potential overinvestment problem since innovator CEOs have a better opportunity to 
                                                 
29 The results are robust to classify industries at the two-digit SIC level. 
30 I also study the impact of CEOs’ innovative ability on the high-tech industry. I follow Loughran and Ritter’s 
(2004) definition of high-tech industry and non-high-tech industry. I find that innovator CEOs impact firm 
innovation for both the high-tech and the non-high-tech industry, suggesting that the potential overinvestment 
problem of innovator CEOs is related to the industry innovativeness and not simply the high-tech industry. The 
results are available upon request. 
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invest in R&D projects in innovative industries compared to less innovative industries and then 
this leads to the overinvestment problem. 
 
THE USEFULNESS OF A CEO’S INNOVATIVE ABILITY TO THE FIRM 
 Next, I examine why and how innovator CEOs spur firm innovation. Specifically, I ask 
the question: what kind of innovative ability can spur firm innovation? For example, if a firm led 
by an innovator CEO is in the retail industry and the innovator CEO has a patent in the health 
care industry, does this innovative ability spur the high-tech firm’s innovation? I expect that if 
the innovator CEO’s innovative ability is more useful for the firm, the effect of the innovator 
CEO on firm’s innovation will be greater. In other words, if the CEO’s patent technological 
classification is the same as the firm’s, the CEO’s innovative ability is useful for the firm and can 
spur more firm innovation. 
 For the firms with innovator CEOs, I split the sample into two subsamples based on CEO 
patent classification for the technologies to which the patented inventions belong and the firm 
industry classification.31 Patent technological classification is from USPTO and Hall et al. 
(2001).32 I use Fama-French 12 industry classification as the firm industry classification. I 
manually matched patent technological classification and firm industry classification. Table 7 
presents the results. I find that when a CEO’s patent technological classification is the same as 
                                                 
31 I also split the sample based on CEO patent technological classification and firm patent technological 
classification. I define firm’s patent technological classification but do not count for the CEO’s patent. The results 
remain the same and are available upon request. 
32 USPTO has developed 400 main patent technologies class and over 120,000 patent subclasses. Hall et al. (2001) 
have developed a higher-level classification and aggregated the 400 classes into 36 two-digit technological sub-
categories. And these in turn further aggregated into 6 main categories: Chemical (excluding Drugs); Computers and 
Communications; Drugs and Medical; Electrical and Electronics; Mechanical; and Others. 
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the firm industry classification, CEOs’ innovative ability has a positive effect on firm average 
citation and citation-weighted innovation. However, when CEO patent technological 
classification is not the same as the firm industry classification, the positive coefficients on 
CEOs’ innovative ability disappears after controlling for endogeneity. Surprisingly, the estimated 
coefficients on CEO’s innovative ability are negatively significant when the firm’s innovation is 
measured by citation-weighted firm innovation and patent market-value, suggesting that a CEO’s 
innovative ability hurts the firm’s innovation. Further, the equality tests of coefficients show that 
the differences of CEO cumulative average citation coefficients between the two subsamples are 
significantly different. This result is also in line with agency theory that innovator CEOs may 
have overinvestment problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) especially when CEOs’ innovative 
ability is not useful for the firm. Overall, the results suggest that innovator CEOs can spur firm 
innovation only when their patent technological classification is the same as the firm industry 
classification.33 In other words, innovator CEOs can spur firm innovation only when the CEO’s 
innovative ability is beneficial for the firm. 
 
R&D SPENDING 
I further study how innovator CEOs spur firm innovation by examining the R&D 
spending. If the innovator CEO values innovation for the firm, then they will invest more in 
innovative projects. Following Sunder et al. (2017), R&D spending is a measure of innovation 
                                                 
33 The equality of coefficients tests show that the coefficients between firms where CEO patent technological 
classification is the same as the firm industry classification and firms CEO patent technological classification is not 
the same as the firm industry classification are significantly different. The results are available upon request. 
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input. R&D spending is calculated as the ratio of R&D spending to lagged total assets. If R&D 
spending is missing, the value is set to zero.  
 Table 8 displays the results from regressing CEOs’ innovative ability on R&D spending. 
When CEOs’ innovative ability is measured by a dummy variable, the estimated coefficients on 
CEOs’ innovative ability are positively significant in both OLS and 2SLS regressions, 
suggesting that innovator CEOs invest more in firm’s innovation activities compared to non-
innovator CEOs. When CEOs’ innovative ability is measured by the cumulative average citation 
per patent up to a given year, CEOs’ innovative ability is positively significantly related to R&D 
spending in OLS and 2SLS regressions for the whole sample and the sample excluding firms led 
by non-innovator CEOs, suggesting that CEOs with higher innovative ability invest more in 
firm’s innovation activities. The results show that innovator CEOs could potentially have 
overinvestment problems. 
 
INNOVATION EFFICIENCY 
 Thus far, results indicate that innovator CEOs spur more firm innovation and they spend 
more on these innovative activities. However, it is not clear if a firm’s investments in R&D 
spending are efficient or not. Therefore, I examine the innovation efficiency for innovator CEOs. 
Specifically, I estimate the following regression: 
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𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡+1
=  𝛼1 +  𝛽1𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽2𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 ∗ 𝑅&𝐷 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅&𝐷 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽6𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽7𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛
′𝑠 𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑜𝑔 (1 + 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽10𝐿𝑜𝑔 (1 + 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐿𝑜𝑔 (1 + 𝑣𝑒𝑔𝑎)𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾𝑘 +  𝛿𝑡
+  𝜀𝑖,                                                                         (9) 
 Controlling for CEO innovative ability and R&D spending, the estimated coefficients on 
the interaction term, 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 ∗ 𝑅&𝐷 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡,  stand for the innovation 
efficiency. All other variables are as previously defined. The results are reported in Table 9. In 
Panel A, I find that innovator CEO and R&D spending are positively related to firm innovation 
consistent with previous findings. After controlling for innovator CEO and R&D spending, the 
interaction term is negatively significant associated with all the firm’s innovation measurements 
in both OLS and 2SLS regressions, suggesting that innovator CEOs do not use R&D funding 
efficiently to spur firm innovation. In Panel B, CEOs’ innovative ability is measured by 
cumulative citation per patent up to a given year. I find that after controlling for CEOs’ 
innovative ability and R&D spending, the interaction term is negatively significant in both OLS 
and 2SLS regressions, suggesting that innovator CEOs with greater innovative ability use R&D 
funding even less efficiently to spur firm innovation. The results are the same for the whole 
sample and the sample excluding firms led by non-innovator CEOs. The results in Table 9 are 
consistent with the hypothesis 3 and the agency cost theory that CEOs overinvest in the projects 
that satisfy their own interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen 1986).   
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V. INNOVATOR CEO AND FIRM CASH HOLDINGS 
In order to understand the negative relation between a CEO’s innovative ability and the 
stock abnormal return on the announcement date of hiring a new innovator CEO, I further 
investigate the effect of innovator CEOs on firm cash holdings. Following Qiu and Wan (2015), 
I estimate the regression as below: 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡+1 =  𝛼1 +  𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽4𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛
′𝑠 𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑜𝑔 (1 + 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑜𝑔 (1 + 𝑣𝑒𝑔𝑎)𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾𝑘
+  𝛿𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖,                                                                                                                  (10) 
where 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO had any patents during 
1975-2010, 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡+1 is the ratio of cash and marketable securities to total book assets, and all 
other variable definitions are provided in Appendix. Table 10 presents the results from 
estimating equation (10). In column (1), I do not control for year and industry fixed effects. In 
column (2), I control for year fixed effect, in column (3), I control for both year and industry 
fixed effects. I find the coefficients on innovator CEO are positively significant in all three 
regressions, suggesting that firms led by innovator CEOs hold more cash compared to firms led 
by non-innovator CEOs.34 Control variables are consistent with the literature. For example, small 
                                                 
34 I also find that when CEOs’ innovative ability is useful for the frim, firms with innovator CEOs hold less cash 
compared to firms with non-innovator CEOs. When CEOs’ innovative ability is not useful for the firm, firms with 
innovator CEOs hold more cash compared to firms with non-innovator CEOs, suggesting the agency problems of 
innovator CEOs. 
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firms, and firms with lower Tobin’s Q and high income volatility hold more cash (Qiu and Wan, 
2015).  
 Next, I compare the value of cash for firms with innovator CEOs and firms with non-
innovator CEOs. I follow Faulkender and Wang (2006) to measure cash value and estimate the 
following regression: 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝐵 =  𝛼1 + 𝛽1
∆𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽2
∆𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽3
∆𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1
+  𝛽4
∆𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5
∆𝐼𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽6
∆𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽7
𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9
𝑁𝐹𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑖 ,                                                 (11)   
The dependent variable, 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝐵 , is the excess stock return adjusted for size and book-
to-market, where 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is the stock return for firm i in year t and 𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝐵  is the stock i’s benchmark 
return at year t.35 The benchmark return is the 25 Fama and French (1993) portfolios returns 
formed on size and book-to-market. The independent variables, ∆𝑋𝑖,𝑡, stand for a change in 
variable X for firm i over year t-1 to year t. The independent variables include cash and 
marketable securities (𝐶𝑖,𝑡), earnings before extraordinary items (𝐸𝑖,𝑡), net assets (𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡), research 
and development expense (𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡), interest expense (𝐼𝑖,𝑡), total dividends (𝐷𝑖,𝑡), market leverage 
(𝐿𝑖,𝑡) and the firm’s net financing (𝑁𝐹𝑖,𝑡). The coefficient of cash and marketable securities (𝐶𝑖,𝑡), 
𝛽1, reflects the cash value of a firm. The dependent variable and all the independent variables 
(except leverage) are scaled by, 𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1, the market value of firm i in year t-1. Therefore, 𝛽1 
measures the dollar change in shareholder value when one dollar cash holding changes in a firm. 
                                                 
35 The yearly stock return is computed using monthly returns from CRSP.  
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Table 11 presents the results of comparing the cash value between firms with innovation 
CEOs and firms with non-innovator CEOs. In column (1) and (2), I do not control for year and 
industry fixed effects. In column (3) and (4), I control for year fixed effect. In column (5) and 
(6), I control for both year and industry fixed effects. I find that the cash value of firms with 
innovator CEOs is lower than the firms with non-innovator CEOs in all six regressions. For 
example, after controlling for year and industry fixed effects, one dollar change in cash holdings 
results 0.347 dollar change in shareholder values for firms with innovator CEOs. However, the 
cash value is 0.566 in firms with non-innovator CEOs. The results suggest that the stock market 
values the cash holdings lower in firms with innovator CEOs than firms with non-innovator 
CEOs. Although firms with innovator CEOs hold more cash, the cash value is lower, suggesting 
that firms with innovator CEOs hold excess cash and hurt shareholders’ value.   
  
34 
 
 
 
VI. LONG-RUN EFFECTS 
In this section, I examine the long-run effects of innovator CEOs on stock return and firm 
innovation. First, I estimate the following regressions to test the impact of innovator CEOs on 
firm long-run stock return up to five years after the firm hires the innovator CEO: 
𝐴𝑅0,𝑛
𝑖 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝛽4𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛
′𝑠 𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑜𝑔 (1 + 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑜𝑔 (1 + 𝑣𝑒𝑔𝑎)𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾𝑘 +  𝛿𝑡 +
 𝜀𝑖,                              (12)  
where 𝐴𝑅0,𝑛
𝑖  is the buy-and-hold benchmark-adjusted return for firm 𝑖 for months 1-n after the 
date of hiring the innovator CEO, 𝑟𝑡
𝑖 is the stock raw return for firm 𝑖 in month 𝑡 after the date of 
hiring a new innovator CEO, and 𝑟𝑡
𝑏 is the benchmark return in month 𝑡. The benchmark returns 
are CRSP value-weighted index and CRSP equal-weighted index. I calculate the buy-and-hold 
benchmark-adjusted return of months 1-12 (𝐴𝑅0,1
𝑖 ), 1-24 (𝐴𝑅0,2
𝑖 ), 1-36 (𝐴𝑅0,3
𝑖 ), 1-48 (𝐴𝑅0,4
𝑖 ), 1-
60 (𝐴𝑅0,5
𝑖 ) after firm 𝑖  hiring the innovator CEO. I also control for industry fixed effects (𝛾𝑘) 
and year fixed effects (𝛿𝑡). All the other variables are as previously defined.  
 Table 12 presents the results from estimating equation (13). I find that CEOs’ innovative 
ability has no impact on stock return for the first two years after the firm hires the innovator 
CEO. However, firms with innovator CEOs experience greater abnormal buy-and-hold stock 
return starting the third year of hiring innovator CEOs compared to firms with non-innovator 
CEOs. The results are consistent with the previous results and the expectation that since 
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innovator CEOs positively impact firm innovation but pose agency problems to the firm, 
innovator CEOs do not drive firm value in the short-run while drive firm value in the long-run. 36 
 Second, I employ 2SLS regressions to investigate the effects of innovator CEOs on firm 
innovation in the long-run. I estimate regression equation (6)-the first-stage, and equation (7)-the 
second-stage by changing the dependent variable in the second-stage to firm innovation in the 
year three (𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡+3), or firm innovation in the year ten (𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡+10). 
Table 13 reports the results. In Panel A, when firm innovation is measured in the year three, 
firms with innovator CEOs experience greater firm innovation measured in all five proxies. 
However, the effects of CEOs’ innovative ability on firm innovation measured in the year three 
are smaller compared to when firm innovation is measured in the next year in Table 4 Panel A. 
In Panel B, firm innovation is measured in the year ten. I find that the innovator CEO still has a 
positive impact on firm innovation but the effects of innovator CEO on firm innovation are 
smaller compared to when firm innovation is measured in the year three in Panel A. The results 
suggest that CEOs’ innovation ability can impact firm innovation for up to ten years but the 
effects of CEOs’ innovative ability on firm innovation decrease over time.  
                                                 
36 The results for the impact of innovator CEOs on stock return around the date of hiring a CEO is in Appendix 
Table 7A. I find that the stock cumulative abnormal return in the three days window for innovator CEOs is lower 
than for non-innovator CEOs around the date of hiring an innovator CEO, and that the CEO’s innovative ability is 
negative and statistically significant associated with the abnormal stock return around the date of hiring a new 
innovator CEO. The results suggest that the market recognizes that innovator CEOs have inefficient overinvestment 
problems. 
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VII. ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
One concern is that CEOs might use their power to force their name on the patent but not 
actually be involved in the patent development work. To deal with this concern, I reexamine the 
effects of CEOs’ innovative ability on firm innovation using alternative CEOs’ innovative ability 
measures: CEO cumulative average citations per patent before/after becoming CEO, and CEO 
cumulative average citations per patent before/after joining the firm. I also test the effects of 
alternative CEOs’ innovative ability measures on firm innovation in difference sample periods: 
the whole sample, the sample only including the years after hiring the CEO, the sample only 
inlcuing the year of hiring the CEO, the sample only including the years after the CEO joins the 
firm,  and the sample only including the year that the CEO joins the firm. Regardless of the 
different measures of CEOs’ innovative ability and sample periods used, I find that CEOs’ 
innovative ability positively impacts firm innovation.37 The results are avaiable upon request.  
 All the patents a CEO develops while working for a company belong to that company. 
Thus, there is a possible false positive relation between innovator CEOs and firm innovation. 
Therefore, I calculate alternative firm innovation measures defined as the difference between 
firm innovation and CEO innovation that belongs to the firm. Table 14 presents the results. I still 
find a positive relation between a CEO’s innovative ability and the alternative firm innovation, 
consistent with hypothesis one. 
                                                 
37 I also find that the effects of CEO cumulative average citations per patent before becoming CEO have positive 
impact on firm innovation for up to ten year after hiring the innovator CEO but the effects decrease over time. 
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Islam and Zein (2018) argue that innovator CEOs can spur firm innovator because 
innovator CEOs have the ability to execute innovative investment projects. Specifically, they 
find that firms with innovator CEOs experience higher new product announcement stock return 
relative to non-innovator CEOs in the high-tech industry.38 Since innovator CEOs can also bring 
agency problems, the overinvestment problems, to the firm, it is possible that innovator CEOs 
can impact innovative investment projects depending on the level of agency problem. I expect 
that firms led by innovator CEOs with higher agency problems chase the quantity of patents, 
while firms led by innovator CEOs with lower agency problems chase better products. 
Specifically, I expect that the effect of innovator CEOs on new product announcement date stock 
return is higher for firms with lower agency problem compared to firms with higher agency 
problem, while the effect of innovator CEOs on firm innovation measured by the quantity of 
patent is lower for firms with lower agency problem compared to firms with higher agency 
problem. 
The new product announcement stock return data is provided by Mukherjee, Singh and 
Zaldokas (2017). The new product announcement stock returns are constructed by using textual 
analysis with event studies on stock market return. They estimate the cumulative abnormal 
returns over the three-day window around a firm announcing the new product and provide two 
measurements of the new product announcement stock return: (1) all product announcement 
return is defined as the sum all positive cumulative abnormal returns over the year; and (2) the 
number of new products is defined as the count of the number of announcements with the 
cumulative abnormal returns above the 75 percentile. 
                                                 
38 I also find firms with innovator CEOs experience higher new product announcement stock return relative to non-
innovator CEOs for all the industries. 
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I split the sample into firms with higher agency problem and firms with lower agency 
problem. I define a firm with higher agency problem if the firm’s cash holding is higher than the 
median cash holding level in the industry (two-digit SIC code). I employ 2SLS regressions and 
estimate regression equation (6)-the first-stage, and equation (7)-the second-stage by changing 
the dependent variable in the second-stage to new product announcement return measures.39 The 
results are presented in Table 15. I find that the effects of innovator CEOs on all product 
announcement return and the number of new products are higher for firms with lower agency 
problem. Further, I reexamine Table 4 for firms with higher agency problem and firms with 
lower agency problem separately.40 I find that firms led by innovator CEOs with higher agency 
problem have greater number of patents and citations compared to firms with lower agency 
problem. The results are consistent with the expectation that firms with lower agency problem 
produce better products but lower patent quantities.   
 Another concern is that the CEO’s innovative ability is just an alternative measure of the 
CEO’s past industry working experience. To address this, I included past working experience 
into the regressions. If I can still find a positive relationship between a CEO’s innovative ability 
and the firm innovation, the concern is not valid. Past working experience is calculated as a 
dummy variable equal to one if the CEO’s previous company is in the same industry as his 
current company industry. Table 16 Panel A show the results, and CEO past working experience 
is calculated based on a four-digit SIC code.41 Results indicate that past working experience is 
negatively related to firm innovation and that a CEO’s innovative ability is still positively related 
                                                 
39 I also control for firm R&D spending. 
40 The results are available upon request. 
41 Results are robust to CEO past working experience calculated based on a two-digit SIC code. 
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to firm innovation. This suggests that the CEO’s innovative ability is not an alternative measure 
of the CEO’s past working experience. 
Custodio, Ferreira and Matos (2017) construct a CEO general ability index (GAI) and 
find that firms with CEOs that have a higher GAI produce more firm innovation. Therefore, it 
could be that my measure of a CEO’s innovative ability is just measuring a CEO’s general 
ability. To address this concern, I add GAI in regression equation (5). GAI is defined as42: 
𝐺𝐴𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 0.268𝑋1𝑖,𝑡 + 0.312𝑋2𝑖,𝑡 + 0.309𝑋3𝑖,𝑡 + 0.218𝑋4𝑖,𝑡 + 0.153𝑋5𝑖,𝑡,   (13)           
where X1 is the number of different positions that a CEO has had in his lifetime, X2 is the 
number of firms where a CEO worked, X3 is the number of industries where a CEO worked, X4 
is a dummy variable equal to one if a CEO was a CEO at another firm before the current 
position, X5 is a dummy variable equal to one if a CEO worked for a multidivisional firm. 
 Table 16 Panel B presents the results of regression equation (7) adding GAI. I find that 
GAI is positively related to firm average citation and citation-weighted innovation but negatively 
related to market-value innovation. After adding GAI into the regression, I still find that a CEO’s 
innovative ability is positively related to firm’s innovation, consistent with my hypothesis.               
One concern is that the innovative industry overlaps with high-tech industry. I reexamine 
Table 6 using the innovative industry that are not belong to the high-tech industry. In my sample, 
the innovative industry not including high-tech industry has 986 innovator CEOs, and non-high-
tech industry has 818 innovator CEOs. Specifically, I include 
(𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 ℎ𝑖_𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑖) defined as a dummy variable equal to one if 
the firm is in innovative industries but not in the high-tech industries and zero otherwise, and the 
                                                 
42 GAI is based on the CEO lifetime publically traded firm working experience prior to the current CEO position. 
  
40 
 
interaction of 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖 and (𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 ℎ𝑖_𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑖) as 
additional independent variables. The results present in Table 17. The interaction term of 
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖 and (𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 ℎ𝑖_𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑖) is negatively significant 
across all the model specifications, suggesting that the negative impact of innovator CEOs on 
firm innovation in the innovative industry is driven by the innovative industries that are not 
belong to the high-tech industries.43   
                                                 
43 For example, the professional and commercial equipment (SIC code 5040) industry is in the innovative industry 
but not high-tech industry and ranks the third for industry average citations per patent among all the industries. 
Electronic computers (SIC code 3571) is in the innovative industry and also the high-tech industry, and ranks the 
first for industry average citations per patent among all the industries.  
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
 In this paper, I use the CEO’s patenting activity to quantify and qualify the CEO’s 
innovative ability. I find that firms led by innovator CEOs experience more firm innovation 
compared to firms led by non-innovator CEOs. I also find that the greater the CEO’s innovative 
ability, the more innovative the firm is. CEOs’ innovative ability has a long-term effect on firm 
innovation and stock return. Innovator CEOs in the innovative industry lower firm innovation 
compared to less innovative industry, suggesting the potential overinvestment problem. I also 
find that innovator CEOs can spur firm innovation only when the CEO’s innovative ability is 
useful for the firm. The effect of CEOs’ innovative ability on firm innovation is long-run effect. 
However, CEOs’ innovative ability that benefit firm innovation may not be without a cost. 
Although firms with innovator CEOs spend more on R&D projects, the innovative efficiency is 
lower compared to firms with non-innovator CEOs. Furthermore, firms with innovator CEOs 
hold more cash than firms with non-innovator CEOs but have a lower cash value. Overall, the 
results suggest that innovator CEOs spur firm innovation but pose agency problems to the firm. 
The results are also robust to the alternative measurement of CEOs’ innovative ability and firm 
innovation, the CEO’s past working experience and the CEO’s general ability.  
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Table 1 
Year and Industry Distribution 
This table provides the breakdown of the number of non-innovator CEOs, number of innovator CEOs, and the 
percentage of innovator CEOs in the sample by year (Panel A) and by industry excluding financial firms and 
utilities (Panel B and C). The sample of CEOs is from ExecuComp for the period of 1992-2008. 
Panel A: Distribution by Year 
Year Non-Innovator CEOs (#) Innovator CEOs (#) Innovator CEOs (%) 
1992                                210  17 7.5% 
1993                                617  45 6.8% 
1994                                879  91 9.4% 
1995                                943  102 9.8% 
1996                                982  114 10.4% 
1997                              1,022  127 11.1% 
1998                              1,044  127 10.8% 
1999                              1,093  145 11.7% 
2000                              1,086  127 10.5% 
2001                              1,033  125 10.8% 
2002                              1,016  121 10.6% 
2003                              1,024  127 11.0% 
2004                              1,047  119 10.2% 
2005                              1,038  104 9.1% 
2006                              1,070  99 8.5% 
2007                              1,191  110 8.5% 
2008                              1,182  104 8.1% 
Total                            16,477                            1,804  9.9% 
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Panel B: Distribution by Fama-French 12 Industry Groups 
Industry 
Non-Innovator 
CEOs (#) 
Innovator CEOs 
(#) 
Innovator CEO 
Patent's Industry = 
Firm's Industry (#) 
Innovator CEOs 
(%) 
Consumer NonDurables 1,319 55                            21  4.0% 
Consumer Durables 193 34                              7  15.0% 
Manufacturing 2,869 341                          161  10.6% 
Enrgy 1,112 19                              6  1.7% 
Chems 796 82                            54  9.3% 
Business Equipment 3,233 662                          489  17.0% 
Shops 2,097 72 0 3.3% 
Health 1,564 262                          254  14.3% 
Other 3,294 277                            65  7.8% 
Total                      16,477                       1,804                         1,057  9.9% 
     
     
     
Panel C: Distribution by High-tech Industry Following Loughran and Ritter (2004) 
Industry 
Non-Innovator 
CEOs (#) 
Innovator CEOs 
(#) 
Innovator CEO 
Patent's Industry = 
Firm's Industry (#) 
Innovator CEOs 
(%) 
High-tech 3,264                         717                           546  18.0% 
None high-tech                      13,213                       1,087                           511  7.6% 
Total                      16,477                       1,804                         1,057  9.9% 
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Table 2 
Summary Statistics 
This table presents summary statistics of the variables used in this study. T-tests (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests) are conducted to test for differences between 
the means (medians) for firms with innovator CEOs and non-innovator CEOs. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. *, ** and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
          
  Non-Innovator CEOs   Innovator CEOs 
Variable   N  Mean Median Std. Dev.   N Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Dependent variables          
  Firm patent 16477 28.44 0.00 151.10  1804 39.91*** 4.00*** 153.87 
  Firm citation 16477 299.64 0.00 2171.25  1804 409.99** 15.50*** 1786.61 
  Firm avg. citation 16477 4.51 0.00 11.92  1804 9.97*** 2.21*** 23.81 
  Citation-weighted firm innovation 16477 57.86 0.00 321.39  1804 92.51*** 8.13*** 344.48 
  Market-value firm innovation 16477 460.47 0.00 2923.97  1804 823.62*** 9.69*** 4814.34 
  R&D spending 16477 4.38 0.75 8.84  1804 8.58*** 5.92*** 11.07 
Independent variables          
  CEO patent 16477 0 0 0  1804 0.82*** 0 4.04 
  CEO citation 16477 0 0 0  1804 12.21*** 0 67.20 
  CEO avg. citation 16477 0 0 0  1804 4.74*** 0 27.03 
  CEO cumulative patent 16477 0 0 0  1804 9.86*** 2.00*** 26.59 
  CEO cumulative citation 16477 0 0 0  1804 260.14*** 40.00*** 673.71 
  CEO cumulative avg. citation 16477 0 0 0  1804 26.20*** 15.00*** 41.44 
  CEO total cumulative avg. citation 16477 0 0 0  1804 23.75*** 14.17*** 30.27 
  Assets (millions) 16475 4862.07 1008.01 18725.46  1804 5490.38 607.74*** 45216.52 
  Capital intensity 16274 172.03 37.10 879.16  1797 60.13*** 37.97** 79.52 
  Stock return (%) 16287 0.80 0.04 21.21  1792 0.57 0.02 12.14 
  Tobin's Q 14965 2.30 1.68 2.53  1659 2.93*** 2.13*** 3.45 
  Tenure (months) 16477 78.35 48.00 85.30  1804 107.05*** 72.00*** 103.17 
  CEO age (years) 16422 55.43 56.00 7.63  1802 55.25 55.00 8.31 
  Delta  13725 1010.61 186.34 10052.47  1629 3651.61*** 226.02*** 26658.81 
  Vega 14288 105.01 37.23 235.46   1664 121.05** 33.51** 320.34 
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Table 3  
Innovator CEOs and firm's innovation--OLS results 
This table presents the effects of innovator CEOs on firm's innovation from OLS regressions. Panel A presents CEO's innovative ability measured by Innovator CEO, which is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the CEO had any patents during 1975-2010. Panel B presents CEO's innovative ability measured by CEO cumulative avg. citation, which is the ratio of CEO cumulative citation over 
CEO cumulative patent. Firm patent is the number of patent the firm applied in a given year. Firm citation is the number of citations subsequently received by the patents the firm applied in a given 
year. Firm avg. citation is the ratio of firm citations over firm patents. Citation-weighted firm innovation is the sum of the weight of citations on each patent plus one for firm i in time t divided by 
book assets of firm i in year t. Market-value firm innovation is total dollar value of innovation produced by firm i in year t divided by book assets of firm i in year t. All independent variables are 
lagged by 1 year. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *, 
respectively. 
Panel A: CEOs' innovative ability measured by innovator CEO 
  Log (1+ firm patent) Log (1+ firm citation) Firm avg. citation 
Citation-weighted firm 
innovation 
Market-value firm 
innovation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Innovator CEO 0.560*** 0.0268 0.877*** 0.0811 3.872*** 2.369*** 49.01*** 20.21** 325.2*** -112.1    
 (15.58) (0.96) (15.94) (1.41) (12.06) (4.53) (5.49) (3.21) (4.34)    (-1.18)    
Log (assets) 0.452*** 0.203*** 0.538*** 0.250*** 0.0736 -1.034*** 66.63*** 18.50*** 671.4*** 308.6*** 
 (46.89) (15.68) (36.39) (9.39) (0.85) (-4.26) (27.78) (6.34) (33.37)    (6.99)    
Log (capital intensity) -0.0329** 0.0158 -0.0555** 0.0868** -0.0866 0.0473 0.387 -6.447* 73.06**  -43.15    
 (-2.81) (1.05) (-3.09) (2.81) (-0.83) (0.17) (0.13) (-1.91) (2.99)    (-0.84)    
Stock return -0.00300** -0.000121 -0.00459** -0.000837 -0.0178* -0.0564** -0.183 0.0697 -6.873**  -20.45*** 
 (-2.87) (-0.10) (-2.87) (-0.34) (-1.91) (-2.53) (-0.71) (0.26) (-3.16)    (-5.03)    
Tobin's Q 0.104*** 0.00728** 0.167*** 0.0371*** 0.551*** 0.329*** 5.973*** -0.475 171.0*** 105.2*** 
 (19.74) (2.23) (20.56) (5.53) (11.65) (5.37) (4.54) (-0.65) (15.50)    (9.45)    
Log (1+tenure) -0.00405 -0.00399 -0.000545 -0.00544 -0.147* -0.0651 0.214 -2.588** -28.03    -49.00**  
 (-0.45) (-0.81) (-0.04) (-0.54) (-1.85) (-0.71) (0.10) (-2.35) (-1.50)    (-2.94)    
CEO age -0.0118*** 0.000813 -0.0148*** 0.00486** -0.0357** 0.0228 -2.206*** 0.272 -6.989**  5.252    
 (-7.65) (0.76) (-6.23) (2.21) (-2.58) (1.13) (-5.73) (1.13) (-2.16)    (1.44)    
Log (1+delta) -0.00819 0.00159 -0.00807 -0.00587 0.250** -0.0660 2.940 1.626 81.01*** 123.8*** 
 (-0.90) (0.25) (-0.58) (-0.45) (3.07) (-0.55) (1.30) (1.13) (4.27)    (5.70)    
Log(1+vega) 0.107*** 0.00369 0.149*** -0.0187 0.399*** -0.216* 2.083 0.569 -37.13**  -86.78*** 
 (12.77) (0.61) (11.63) (-1.52) (5.35) (-1.92) (1.00) (0.42) (-2.13)    (-4.24)    
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm fixed effects N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y 
Adjusted R-square 0.397 0.895 0.373 0.804 0.145 0.348 0.101 0.872 0.161 0.611 
Observations 13913 13913 13913 13913 13913 13913 13913 13913 13913 13913 
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Panel B: CEOs' innovative ability measured by CEO cumulative avg. citation 
  Log (1+ firm patent) Log (1+ firm citation) Firm avg. citation 
Citation-weighted firm 
innovation 
Market-value firm 
innovation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
CEO cumulative avg. citation 0.00947*** 0.00200*** 0.0194*** 0.00735*** 0.201*** 0.175*** 0.582** 0.270** 2.166 1.127 
 (12.11) (4.24) (16.25) (7.58) (29.58) (20.11) (3.00) (2.54) (1.33) (0.70) 
Log (assets) 0.447*** 0.203*** 0.535*** 0.251*** 0.183** -0.996*** 65.90*** 18.56*** 664.8*** 308.9*** 
 (46.26) (15.72) (36.23) (9.47) (2.18) (-4.17) (27.50) (6.36) (33.07) (7.00) 
Log (capital intensity) -0.0326** 0.0152 -0.0568** 0.0844** -0.137 -0.00366 0.509 -6.284* 74.53** -45.33 
 (-2.78) (1.01) (-3.16) (2.74) (-1.34) (-0.01) (0.17) (-1.86) (3.05) (-0.89) 
Stock return -0.00294** -0.000106 -0.00447** -0.000810 -0.0165* -0.0551** -0.180 0.0978 -6.862** -20.64*** 
 (-2.80) (-0.09) (-2.80) (-0.33) (-1.82) (-2.51) (-0.69) (0.36) (-3.15) (-5.08) 
Tobin's Q 0.105*** 0.00710** 0.166*** 0.0365*** 0.518*** 0.313*** 6.041*** -0.511 171.9*** 105.2*** 
 (19.69) (2.18) (20.44) (5.45) (11.23) (5.21) (4.59) (-0.69) (15.57) (9.45) 
Log (1+tenure) 0.00115 -0.00463 0.00679 -0.00789 -0.136* -0.121 0.714 -2.595** -24.41 -49.98** 
 (0.13) (-0.95) (0.50) (-0.79) (-1.74) (-1.34) (0.32) (-2.35) (-1.31) (-2.99) 
CEO age -0.0115*** 0.000944 -0.0139*** 0.00534** -0.0232* 0.0343* -2.198*** 0.295 -7.060** 5.291 
 (-7.41) (0.88) (-5.87) (2.43) (-1.72) (1.73) (-5.70) (1.22) (-2.18) (1.45) 
Log (1+delta) -0.00587 0.000779 -0.00820 -0.00901 0.154* -0.137 3.348 1.677 85.12*** 122.1*** 
 (-0.64) (0.12) (-0.59) (-0.69) (1.94) (-1.17) (1.48) (1.17) (4.48) (5.63) 
Log(1+vega) 0.108*** 0.00428 0.151*** -0.0166 0.424*** -0.165 2.140 0.652 -36.98** -86.49*** 
 (12.85) (0.71) (11.80) (-1.35) (5.83) (-1.49) (1.03) (0.48) (-2.12) (-4.22) 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm fixed effects N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y 
Adjusted R-square 0.393 0.895 0.373 0.805 0.187 0.368 0.100 0.872 0.160 0.611 
Observations 13913 13913 13913 13913 13913 13913 13913 13913 13913 13913 
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Table 4 
Innovator CEOs and firm's innovation--2SLS results 
This table presents the effects of innovator CEOs on firm's innovation from 2SLS regressions. Instrumental variable is CEO coauthors' ability calculated as CEO coauthors' average citation over 
average patent. CEO coauthors' patents do not include the patents cooperated with the CEO. The odd number columns show the results on the whole sample. The even number columns present the 
results only including innovator CEOs. All independent variables are lagged by 1 year. In Panel A, CEOs’ innovative ability is measured by a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO had any 
patents during 1975-2010. In Panel B, CEOs’ innovative ability is measured by the ratio of CEO cumulative citations over CEO cumulative patents. Variable definitions are provided in the 
Appendix. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
Panel A: CEOs' innovative ability measured by innovator CEO 
  First-stage  Log (1+ firm patent) Log (1+ firm citation) Firm avg. citation 
Citation-weighted firm 
innovation 
Market-value firm 
innovation 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Innovator CEO  0.253*** 1.578*** 0.710*** 92.55*** 337.5**  
  (4.97) (16.06) (14.84) (5.76) (2.50)    
CEO coauthors' ability 0.0203***      
 (77.24)         
Log (assets) -0.00271    0.204*** 0.541*** 0.104*** 67.56*** 673.5*** 
 (-0.82)    (15.67) (36.29) (14.30) (27.71) (32.91)    
Log (capital intensity) 0.00719*   0.00393 -0.0755*** -0.0296*** -0.885 70.36**  
 (1.88)    (0.26) (-4.17) (-3.35) (-0.30) (2.83)    
Stock return -0.000356    -0.000384 -0.00445** -0.00193** -0.182 -6.925**  
 (-1.18)    (-0.32) (-2.78) (-2.48) (-0.70) (-3.15)    
Tobin's Q 0.000213    0.00686** 0.167*** 0.0679*** 6.128*** 173.5*** 
 (0.26)    (2.10) (20.49) (17.12) (4.60) (15.52)    
Log (1+tenure) -0.00191    -0.00602 0.0120 0.00438 0.438 -27.16    
 (-1.53)    (-1.22) (0.87) (0.65) (0.19) (-1.43)    
CEO age 0.00121*** 0.00132 -0.0158*** -0.00413*** -2.268*** -7.001**  
 (4.40)    (1.21) (-6.61) (-3.55) (-5.80) (-2.13)    
Log (1+delta) 0.00501**  -0.000180 -0.0194 -0.00548 2.502 84.59*** 
 (3.09)    (-0.03) (-1.38) (-0.80) (1.08) (4.37)    
Log(1+vega) 0.00146    0.00360 0.142*** 0.0536*** 1.686 -40.09**  
 (0.95)    (0.60) (10.95) (8.49) (0.80) (-2.25)    
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted R-square 0.783    0.911 0.832 0.445 0.890 0.665 
Observations 
13671 
13,671 13,671 13,671 13,671 13,671 
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Panel B: CEOs' innovative ability measured by CEO cumulative avg. citation 
  First-stage  
Log (1+ firm 
patent) 
Log (1+ firm 
citation) 
Firm avg. 
citation 
Citation-weighted firm 
innovation 
Market-value firm 
innovation 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CEO cumulative avg. citation  0.00469*** 0.00834*** 0.0501*** 1.087*** 1.285 
  (0.000943) (0.00194) (0.0172) (0.215) (3.262) 
CEO coauthors' ability 1.099***      
 (0.0165)      
Log (assets) -0.428** 0.205*** 0.252*** -0.951*** 18.76*** 311.5*** 
 (0.206) (0.0130) (0.0267) (0.237) (2.964) (44.93) 
Log (capital intensity) -0.134 0.00638 0.0787** 0.229 -6.159* -47.37 
 (0.239) (0.0151) (0.0310) (0.275) (3.441) (52.16) 
Stock return -0.0890*** -5.65e-05 -0.000778 -0.0554** 0.0887 -20.84*** 
 (0.0189) (0.00119) (0.00244) (0.0216) (0.271) (4.108) 
Tobin's Q 0.115** 0.00637* 0.0364*** 0.342*** -0.587 106.1*** 
 (0.0519) (0.00327) (0.00673) (0.0595) (0.746) (11.31) 
Log (1+tenure) -0.00465 -0.00648 -0.00644 0.0397 -2.829** -49.43*** 
 (0.0783) (0.00493) (0.0102) (0.0898) (1.125) (17.06) 
CEO age 0.0254 0.00151 0.00520** -0.00506 0.336 5.737 
 (0.0173) (0.00109) (0.00224) (0.0198) (0.248) (3.756) 
Log (1+delta) 0.274*** -0.000197 -0.00960 0.0118 1.336 123.1*** 
 (0.101) (0.00641) (0.0132) (0.117) (1.461) (22.15) 
Log(1+vega) -0.162* 0.00474 -0.0178 -0.214* 0.702 -90.15*** 
 (0.0960) (0.00605) (0.0125) (0.110) (1.381) (20.94) 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm fixed effects Y  Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted R-square 0.682 0.382 0.363 0.314 0.097 0.160 
Observations 13,671 13671 13671 13671 13671 13671 
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Table 5 
Innovator CEOs and firm's innovation--Propensity score matching results 
This table presents the effects of innovator CEOs on firm's innovation from propensity score matching results. Firm patent is the number of patent the firm applied in a given 
year. Firm citation is the number of citations subsequently received by the patents the firm applied in a given year. Firm avg. citation is the ratio of firm citations over firm 
patents. Citation-weighted firm innovation is the sum of the weight of citations on each patent plus one for firm i in time t divided by book assets of firm i in year t. Firm avg. 
citation is the ratio of firm citations over firm patents. Market-value firm innovation is total dollar value of innovation produced by firm i in year t divided by book assets of 
firm i in year t. All independent variables are lagged by 1 year. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
  Log (1+ firm patent)   Log (1+ firm citation)   Firm avg. citation   
Citation-weighted firm 
innovation   
Market-value firm 
innovation 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10) 
Innovator CEO 0.625*** 0.646***  0.989*** 0.957***  0.470*** 0.485***  15.56** 16.43***  -1.831 1.824 
 (12.58) (14.23)  (13.79) (12.20)  (11.63) (13.23)  (3.06) (3.32)  (-0.04) (0.04) 
Nearest matching 1 2  1 2  1 2  1 2  1 2 
Other control 
variables Y Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
Industry fixed 
effects Y Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
Observations 
            
3,006  
            
4,509    
            
3,006  
            
4,509    
            
3,006  
            
4,509    
            
3,006  
            
4,509    
            
3,006  
            
4,509  
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Table 6 
Effect of industry innovativeness  
This table presents the effects of innovator CEOs on firm's innovation. An innovative industry follows 
Hirshleifer, Low and Teoh (2012) and is equal to one if the average citation per patent for the industry is greater 
than the median average citation per patent across all industries. Innovator CEO is a dummy variable equal to one 
if the CEO has any patents during 1975-2010 Firm avg. citation is the ratio of firm citations over firm patents. 
Citation-weighted firm innovation is the sum of the weight of citations on each patent plus one for firm i in time t 
divided by book assets of firm i in year t. Market-value firm innovation is total dollar value of innovation 
produced by firm i in year t divided by book assets of firm i in year t. All independent variables are lagged by 1 
year. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
  
 Firm avg. citation 
Citation-weighted firm 
innovation 
Market-value firm 
innovation 
 OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Innovator CEO 0.571 101.0*** 32.05 837.7** 236.8 -1761.5    
 (0.46) (7.78) (0.92) (2.54) (0.81) (-0.64)    
Innovator CEO * Innovative industry 3.097** -97.44*** 12.75 -781.5** 65.09 2139.8    
 (2.42) (-7.51) (0.36) (-2.37) (0.22) (0.78)    
Innovative industry 3.859*** 6.423*** 49.17*** 69.85*** 269.2*** 217.7**  
 (13.75) (14.10) (6.26) (6.03) (4.08) (2.27)    
Log (assets) 0.0907 0.177* 66.82*** 67.97*** 672.5*** 677.7*** 
 (1.06) (1.82) (27.90) (27.58) (33.44) (33.14)    
Log (capital intensity) -0.0528 -0.152 0.847 -0.207 75.59** 77.95**  
 (-0.51) (-1.29) (0.29) (-0.07) (3.10) (3.12)    
Stock return -0.0146 -0.0126 -0.142 -0.135 -6.646** -6.774**  
 (-1.58) (-1.21) (-0.55) (-0.51) (-3.05) (-3.09)    
Tobin's Q 0.511*** 0.516*** 5.477*** 5.593*** 168.3*** 169.8*** 
 (10.86) (9.72) (4.16) (4.15) (15.24) (15.18)    
Log (1+tenure) -0.111 -0.106 0.678 -0.287 -25.50 -26.54    
 (-1.40) (-1.18) (0.31) (-0.12) (-1.37) (-1.39)    
CEO age -0.0343** -0.0170 -2.189*** -1.991*** -6.896** -6.768**  
 (-2.50) (-1.08) (-5.69) (-4.95) (-2.14) (-2.03)    
Log (1+delta) 0.271*** 0.381*** 3.208 3.944* 82.48*** 82.32*** 
 (3.35) (4.12) (1.42) (1.68) (4.35) (4.22)    
Log(1+vega) 0.288*** 0.282*** 0.717 1.007 -44.60** -46.26**  
 (3.87) (3.33) (0.34) (0.47) (-2.55) (-2.59)    
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted R-square 0.158 0.167 0.104 0.081 0.162 0.161    
Observations 13913 13671 13913 13671 13913 13671    
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Table 7 
The usefulness of CEO’s innovative ability to the firm 
This table presents the usefulness of CEO’s innovative ability to the firm. CEO cumulative avg. citation is the ratio of CEO cumulative citation over CEO cumulative patent. Firm avg. citation is the 
ratio of firm citations over firm patents. Citation-weighted firm innovation is the sum of the weight of citations on each patent plus one for firm i in time t divided by book assets of firm i in year t. 
Market-value firm innovation is total dollar value of innovation produced by firm i in year t divided by book assets of firm i in year t. All independent variables are lagged by 1 year. Variable 
definitions are provided in the Appendix. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
              
  
(1) 
CEO patent technological classification = firm industry classification   
(2) 
CEO patent technological classification not equal to firm industry 
classification 
 Firm avg. citation 
Citation-weighted firm 
innovation 
Market-value firm 
innovation  Firm avg. citation 
Citation-weighted firm 
innovation 
Market-value firm 
innovation 
 OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS   OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
CEO cumulative avg. citation 0.232*** 0.281*** 0.187 3.084*** -1.922 6.363     0.156*** 0.030 -0.777* -2.307 -11.45** -45.01**  
 (13.28) (7.11) (0.90) (5.51) (-0.94) (1.27)     (6.90) (0.45) (-1.84) (-1.45) (-2.30) (-2.30)    
Log (assets) -0.450 -0.0740 73.13*** 93.92*** 622.8*** 702.6***  -0.492 0.118 121.8*** 150.4*** 1291.5*** 1552.5*** 
 (-0.72) (-0.11) (9.86) (10.29) (8.58) (8.60)     (-0.97) (0.26) (12.86) (13.89) (11.55) (11.65)    
Log (capital intensity) 0.212 0.383 -3.889 -11.92 -173.9* -185.3*    0.932 0.982 9.396 -23.52 157.6 -180.4    
 (0.24) (0.44) (-0.37) (-0.96) (-1.71) (-1.67)     (1.11) (1.18) (0.60) (-1.20) (0.86) (-0.75)    
Stock return -0.124** -0.122** -0.150 -0.101 -29.65*** -29.87***  -0.400 0.416 -15.15 -26.02 -355.8* -419.7*   
 (-2.07) (-2.11) (-0.21) (-0.12) (-4.24) (-4.08)     (-0.47) (0.52) (-0.96) (-1.40) (-1.91) (-1.83)    
Tobin's Q 0.550* 0.635** 1.758 3.138 181.6*** 182.5***  0.199 0.590 -0.263 10.22 62.96 214.2**  
 (1.83) (2.16) (0.49) (0.75) (5.16) (4.89)     (0.56) (1.63) (-0.04) (1.20) (0.81) (2.04)    
Log (1+tenure) -2.155*** -1.617** -3.167 2.385 16.91 20.27     -2.078*** -0.532 7.879 4.660 66.75 -14.01    
 (-3.76) (-2.72) (-0.46) (0.28) (0.25) (0.27)     (-4.14) (-1.15) (0.84) (0.43) (0.60) (-0.10)    
CEO age 0.0242 0.00302 -4.831*** -5.474*** -17.88* -20.98**   0.317** 0.0772 -9.360*** -7.229** -95.12*** -79.60**  
 (0.29) (0.04) (-4.76) (-4.58) (-1.80) (-1.96)     (3.12) (0.76) (-4.95) (-3.03) (-4.25) (-2.71)    
Log (1+delta) 0.735 1.017* 15.54** 13.59* 322.9*** 360.8***  0.368 0.882* 65.78*** 86.02*** 750.9*** 1000.4*** 
 (1.35) (1.88) (2.39) (1.77) (5.07) (5.24)     (0.78) (1.88) (7.50) (7.80) (7.24) (7.36)    
Log(1+vega) 0.766 0.669 2.562 -1.967 -2.081 -13.10     0.906** 0.0467 -57.27*** -75.70*** -680.9*** -990.9*** 
 (1.44) (1.26) (0.40) (-0.26) (-0.03) (-0.19)     (2.32) (0.11) (-7.87) (-7.64) (-7.92) (-8.12)    
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted R-square 0.320 0.348 0.206 0.028 0.255 0.265     0.172 0.172 0.447 0.518 0.446 0.475    
Observations 885 788 885 788 885 788      613 468 613 468 613 468    
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The equality tests of coefficients Firm avg. citation 
Citation-weighted firm 
innovation 
Market-value firm 
innovation 
 OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
        
The differences of CEO 
cumulative avg. citation 
coefficients between (1) and (2) 
0.076 0.250*** 0.964** 5.389*** 9.528* 51.373*** 
The equality tests (Wald test) 
0.63 7.73 4.76 9.00 2.80 6.65 
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Table 8 
Innovator CEOs and firm's R&D spending 
This table presents the effects of innovator CEOs on firm's R&D spending. Column (1) and (2) presents CEO's 
innovative ability measured by Innovator CEO, which is a dummy variable equal to one if the CEOs have any 
patent in their life. Column (3) to (5) presents CEO's innovative ability measured by CEO cumulative avg. 
citation, which is the ratio of CEO cumulative citation over CEO cumulative patent. All independent variables are 
lagged by 1 year. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
Dependent variable:  
R&D spending CEO innovative ability measured 
by: Innovator CEO   
CEO innovative ability measured by:  
CEO cumulative avg. citation 
OLS 2SLS  OLS 2SLS 2SLS 
(1) (2)   (3) (4) (5) 
CEO innovative ability 1.978*** 4.172***  0.035*** 0.093*** 0.065*** 
 (9.16) (10.98)  (7.47) (10.92) (2.91) 
Log (assets) -1.597*** -1.572***  -1.614*** -1.569*** -2.258*** 
 (-27.80) (-26.91)  (-28.10) (-26.72) (-9.30) 
Log (capital intensity) 0.581*** 0.568***  0.581*** 0.554*** 1.475*** 
 (8.35) (8.08)  (8.33) (7.84) (4.10) 
Stock return -0.006 -0.007  -0.006 -0.006 0.143*** 
 (-1.02) (-1.10)  (-0.98) (-1.00) (5.14) 
Tobin's Q 0.379*** 1.378***  1.379*** 1.375*** 0.901*** 
 (43.58) (43.19)  (43.54) (42.86) (7.00) 
Log (1+tenure) 0.087 0.081  0.104** 0.118** 0.708*** 
 (1.63) (1.52)  (1.96) (2.19) (3.14) 
CEO age -0.069*** -0.063***  -0.068*** -0.062*** -0.254*** 
 (-7.56) (-6.75)  (-7.40) (-6.63) (-6.85) 
Log (1+delta) -0.262*** -0.310***  -0.255*** -0.321*** -0.032 
 (-4.85) (-5.67)  (-4.72) (-5.82) (-0.15) 
Log(1+vega) 0.895*** 0.928***  0.897*** 0.932*** 0.834*** 
 (18.12) (18.51)  (18.16) (18.50) (4.35) 
Year fixed effects Y Y  Y Y Y 
Industry fixed effects Y Y  Y Y Y 
Adjusted R-square 0.2801 0.4304  0.2787 0.4245 0.5878 
Observations 14356 14114   14356 14114 1261 
 
 
  
    
69 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 9: Innovator CEOs and firm's innovation efficiency   
    
 
 
7
0
 
Table 9 
Innovator CEOs and firm's innovation efficiency 
This table presents The effects of innovator CEOs on firm's innovation efficiency. Dependent variable R&D spending is the ratio of R&D to lagged total assets, expressed as a percentage. Panel A presents CEO's innovative 
ability measured by Innovator CEO, which is a dummy variable equal to one if the CEOs have any patent in their life. Panel B presents CEO's innovative ability measured by CEO cumulative avg. citation, which is the ratio of 
CEO cumulative citation over CEO cumulative patent. Firm patent is the number of patent the firm applied in a given year. Firm citation is the number of citations subsequently received by the patents the firm applied in a 
given year. Citation-weighted firm innovation is the sum of the weight of citations on each patent plus one for firm i in time t divided by book assets of firm i in year t. Firm avg. citation is the ratio of firm citations over firm 
patents.  Market-value firm innovation is total dollar value of innovation produced by firm i in year t divided by book assets of firm i in year t. All independent variables are lagged by 1 year. Variable definitions are provided in 
the Appendix. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
Panel A: CEOs' innovative ability measured by innovator CEO 
  Log (1+ firm patent) Log (1+ firm citation) Firm avg. citation 
Citation-weighted firm 
innovation Market-value firm innovation 
 OLS 2SLS  OLS 2SLS  OLS 2SLS  OLS 2SLS  OLS 2SLS  
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   
Innovator CEO 0.698*** 1.269*** 
 
1.054*** 2.170*** 
 
4.480*** 0.951*** 
 
56.17*** 118.9*** 
 
400.8*** 336.5*    
 (16.81) (13.73)  (16.43) (15.19)  (11.61) (13.47)  (5.22) (4.96)  (4.44) (1.67)     
Innovator CEO x R&D spending -0.0282*** -0.0497*** 
 
-0.0373*** -0.0802*** 
 
-0.114*** -0.0318*** 
 
-1.813** -3.984*** 
 
-16.27** -11.55     
 (-9.79) (-11.81)  (-8.38) (-12.31)  (-4.28) (-9.88)  (-2.43) (-3.65)  (-2.60) (-1.26)     
R&D spending 0.0490*** 0.0513*** 
 
0.0682*** 0.0730*** 
 
0.177*** 0.0271*** 
 
4.015*** 4.280*** 
 
30.49*** 30.03***  
 (36.17) (36.25)  (32.54) (33.32)  (14.07) (25.06)  (11.43) (11.65)  (10.34) (9.74)     
Log (assets) 0.528*** 0.533*** 
 
0.643*** 0.654*** 
 
0.341*** 0.146*** 
 
72.94*** 74.39*** 
 
718.6*** 723.6***  
 (55.80) (55.40)  (44.02) (43.94)  (3.89) (19.86)  (29.78) (29.77)  (34.94) (34.51)     
Log (capital intensity) -0.0549*** -0.0588*** 
 
-0.0864*** -0.0900*** 
 
-0.164 -0.0337*** 
 
-1.511 -1.852 
 
59.13** 58.47**   
 (-4.90) (-5.18)  (-4.99) (-5.13)  (-1.57) (-3.88)  (-0.52) (-0.63)  (2.43) (2.37)     
Stock return -0.000938 -0.00104 
 
-0.00171 -0.00187 
 
-0.0105 -0.000998 
 
-0.0108 -0.0246 
 
-5.583** -5.643**   
 (-0.94) (-1.04)  (-1.11) (-1.20)  (-1.13) (-1.30)  (-0.04) (-0.09)  (-2.57) (-2.58)     
Tobin's Q 0.0609*** 0.0603*** 
 
0.106*** 0.104*** 
 
0.395*** 0.0445*** 
 
2.331* 2.329* 
 
143.8*** 145.3***  
 (11.72) (11.48)  (13.18) (12.77)  (8.19) (11.07)  (1.73) (1.71)  (12.72) (12.69)     
Log (1+tenure) -0.00636 -0.00763 
 
-0.00389 -0.00428 
 
-0.155* -0.00269 
 
-0.0104 -0.554 
 
-29.56 -32.15*    
 (-0.75) (-0.88)  (-0.29) (-0.32)  (-1.95) (-0.41)  (-0.00) (-0.25)  (-1.59) (-1.70)     
CEO age -0.00845*** -0.00829*** 
 
-0.00998*** -0.00954*** 
 
-0.0240* -0.00167 
 
-1.908*** -1.879*** 
 
-4.828 -4.252     
 (-5.69) (-5.51)  (-4.35) (-4.10)  (-1.74) (-1.45)  (-4.96) (-4.81)  (-1.49) (-1.30)     
Log (1+delta) -0.00905 -0.0157* 
 
-0.00934 -0.0204 
 
0.247** -0.00591 
 
2.850 2.456 
 
80.42*** 84.63***  
 (-1.04) (-1.78)  (-0.70) (-1.49)  (3.06) (-0.87)  (1.27) (1.07)  (4.25) (4.39)     
Log(1+vega) 0.0637*** 0.0640*** 
 
0.0889*** 0.0878*** 
 
0.245** 0.0342*** 
 
-1.457 -1.559 
 
-63.83*** -65.96***  
 (7.92) (7.80)  (7.15) (6.92)  (3.27) (5.45)  (-0.70) (-0.73)  (-3.65) (-3.69)     
Year fixed effects Y Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y  
Industry fixed effects Y Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y  
Adjusted R-square 0.450 0.444 
 
0.418 0.408 
 
0.157 0.333 
 
0.110 0.109 
 
0.168 0.169   
Observations 13913 13671   13913 13671   13913 13671   13913 13671   13913 13671      
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OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
CEO cumulative avg. citation 0.0104*** 0.0210*** 0.0160*** 0.0211*** 0.0362*** 0.0334*** 0.218*** 0.0164*** 0.0144*** 0.608** 2.123*** 2.209** 2.361 7.020** -6.982   
(12.93) (13.50) (4.94)   (17.08) (15.14) (6.13) (30.07) (13.92) (5.28) (2.92) (5.27) (3.02) (1.35) (2.08) (-0.89)   
CEO cumulative avg. citation x R&D spending -0.0002*** -0.0003*** -0.0002*** -0.0004*** -0.0005*** -0.0004*** -0.002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0158** -0.0318*** -0.0357*** -0.119** -0.168** -0.110   
(-10.08) (-12.78) (-5.55)   (-10.07) (-12.57) (-5.61) (-8.98) (-10.08) (-4.27) (-2.61) (-4.49) (-3.83) (-2.34) (-2.83) (-1.11)   
R&D spending 0.0471*** 0.0473*** 0.0328*** 0.0658*** 0.0659*** 0.0416*** 0.165*** 0.0243*** 0.0111** 3.937*** 4.006*** 6.589*** 29.57*** 30.24*** 42.24***
(36.76) (36.41) (7.59)   (33.36) (33.13) (5.71) (14.31) (24.88) (3.06) (11.89) (11.94) (6.74) (10.63) (10.75) (4.05)   
Log (assets) 0.527*** 0.538*** 0.656*** 0.645*** 0.661*** 0.734*** 0.454*** 0.149*** 0.0856** 72.57*** 74.83*** 133.4*** 714.9*** 726.2*** 1175.4***
(55.55) (55.38) (19.62)   (44.25) (44.37) (13.03) (5.31) (20.34) (3.04) (29.62) (29.81) (17.66) (34.76) (34.51) (14.56)   
Log (capital intensity) -0.0579*** -0.0657*** 0.0277   -0.0919*** -0.101*** 0.0700 -0.221** -0.0385*** 0.0424 -1.616 -2.477 -10.44 58.57** 56.33** -115.5   
(-5.15) (-5.76) (0.59)   (-5.31) (-5.79) (0.88) (-2.18) (-4.47) (1.07) (-0.56) (-0.84) (-0.98) (2.40) (2.28) (-1.02)   
Stock return -0.000829 -0.000825 -0.00111   -0.00154 -0.00151 -0.00880 -0.00950 -0.000843 -0.00717** -0.00238 -0.00362 1.178 -5.527** -5.562** -17.78** 
(-0.83) (-0.82) (-0.30)   (-1.00) (-0.97) (-1.43) (-1.05) (-1.11) (-2.33) (-0.01) (-0.01) (1.42) (-2.54) (-2.54) (-2.01)   
Tobin's Q 0.0603*** 0.0592*** 0.0393** 0.104*** 0.102*** 0.0827** 0.370*** 0.0437*** 0.0420** 2.319* 2.204 -4.798 144.0*** 144.4*** 116.9** 
(11.57) (11.20) (2.30)   (12.98) (12.60) (2.86) (7.86) (10.97) (2.91) (1.72) (1.61) (-1.24) (12.73) (12.60) (2.83)   
Log (1+tenure) -0.00355 -0.00296 -0.0174   0.000260 0.00438 -0.0367 -0.151* 0.00158 -0.0368 0.317 -0.0228 -5.913 -27.39 -30.69 -35.35   
(-0.42) (-0.34) (-0.60)   (0.02) (0.33) (-0.75) (-1.96) (0.24) (-1.51) (0.14) (-0.01) (-0.90) (-1.48) (-1.63) (-0.50)   
CEO age -0.00751*** -0.00741*** -0.0354*** -0.00836***-0.00813*** -0.0456*** -0.0103 -0.00110 -0.0103** -1.858*** -1.806*** -5.122*** -4.506 -4.027 -32.37** 
(-5.05) (-4.89) (-7.24)   (-3.65) (-3.50) (-5.54) (-0.76) (-0.97) (-2.51) (-4.83) (-4.62) (-4.64) (-1.40) (-1.23) (-2.75)   
Log (1+delta) -0.00893 -0.0190** 0.151*** -0.0126 -0.0259* 0.202*** 0.138* -0.00834 0.0603** 3.113 2.118 39.79*** 83.35*** 83.23*** 594.2***
(-1.02) (-2.13) (5.55)   (-0.94) (-1.89) (4.40) (1.75) (-1.24) (2.62) (1.38) (0.92) (6.45) (4.40) (4.30) (9.02)   
Log(1+vega) 0.0652*** 0.0657*** 0.0421*  0.0917*** 0.0910*** 0.114** 0.279*** 0.0357*** 0.0760*** -1.417 -1.424 -42.23*** -63.70*** -66.21*** -512.2***
(8.07) (7.96) (1.70)   (7.39) (7.19) (2.73) (3.84) (5.73) (3.64) (-0.68) (-0.67) (-7.54) (-3.64) (-3.70) (-8.56)   
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Adjusted R-square 0.447 0.437 0.420 0.420 0.411 0.310 0.201 0.344 0.324 0.109 0.106 0.329 0.167 0.167 0.396
Observations 13913 13671 1256 13913 13671 1256 13913 13671 1256 13913 13671 1256 13913 13671 1256
Panel B: CEOs' innovative ability measured by CEO cumulative avg. citation
Log (1+ firm patent) Log (1+ firm citation) Firm avg. citation Citation-weighted firm innovation Market-value firm innovation
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Table 10 
Innovator CEO and firm cash holdings 
This table presents the results from OLS regression of innovator CEO and firm cash holdings. Innovator CEO is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the CEO has any patents during 1975-2010. The dependent variable is the ratio of 
cash and marketable securities to total book assets. All other variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. T-
statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, 
and *, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Innovator CEO 0.0437*** 0.0450*** 0.0378*** 
 (10.01) (10.47) (8.82)    
    
Log(sale) -0.0513*** -0.0500*** -0.0496*** 
 (-49.32) (-48.36) (-47.80)    
    
Tobin's Q 0.0197*** 0.0209*** 0.0194*** 
 (25.34) (26.95) (25.29)    
    
Stock return -0.00134 -0.00211* -0.00190    
 (-1.07) (-1.70) (-1.56)    
    
Log(ROA) -0.0761*** -0.0673*** -0.0631*** 
 (-9.24) (-8.26) (-7.85)    
    
Sale growth -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (-0.40) (-0.46) (-0.54)    
    
Income volatility 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
 (13.20) (12.73) (12.73)    
    
Log (1+delta) 0.0118*** 0.0109*** 0.0104*** 
 (11.31) (10.61) (10.10)    
    
Log(1+vega) 0.0134*** 0.00839*** 0.00840*** 
 (14.11) (8.57) (8.68)    
Year fixed effects N Y Y 
Industry fixed effects N Y Y 
Adjusted R-square 0.308 0.328 0.350    
Observations 12003 12003 12003    
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Table 11 
Innovator CEO and cash value 
This table presents the results from OLS regression of innovator CEO and cash value. The dependent variable is 
the excess stock return adjusted for size and book-to-market calculated as the stock return for firm i in year t 
subtracts the stock i’s benchmark return at year t. The benchmark return is the 25 Fama and French (1993) 
portfolios returns formed on size and book-to-market. The independent variables include cash and marketable 
securities, earnings before extraordinary items, net assets, research and development expense, interest expense, 
total dividends, market leverage  and the firm’s net financing. All the independent variables (except leverage) are 
scaled by the market value of firm i in year t-1. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
  
Firms with 
innovator 
CEOs 
Firms with 
non-
innovator 
CEOs   
Firms with 
innovator 
CEOs 
Firms with 
non-
innovator 
CEOs   
Firms with 
innovator 
CEOs 
Firms with 
non-
innovator 
CEOs 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
 
 
 
0.319*** 0.560***  0.332*** 0.559***  0.347*** 0.566*** 
 (3.87) (17.29)  (3.87) (17.03)  (4.04) (17.16) 
 
 
 
-0.00864 0.0179***  -0.0108 0.0179***  -0.0176 0.0183*** 
 (-0.08) (3.68)  (-0.10) (3.67)  (-0.16) (3.74) 
 
 
 
0.239*** 0.0132**  0.244*** 0.0128**  0.247*** 0.0118** 
 (5.90) (2.28)  (5.92) (2.19)  (5.97) (2.01) 
 
 
 
-0.220 0.968***  -0.220 0.962***  -0.306 0.991*** 
 (-1.14) (11.50)  (-1.12) (11.35)  (-1.54) (11.42) 
 
 
 
-4.282*** -0.0781**  -4.427*** -0.0760**  -4.328*** -0.0728** 
 (-5.96) (-2.63)  (-6.00) (-2.55)  (-5.87) (-2.43) 
 
 
 
-0.901 0.0239  -1.122 0.0458  -1.175 0.0578 
 (-0.87) (0.09)  (-1.05) (0.17)  (-1.10) (0.22) 
 
 
 
0.225*** 0.579***  0.245*** 0.578***  0.255*** 0.584*** 
 (3.99) (18.50)  (4.22) (18.24)  (4.39) (18.34) 
 
 
 
-0.180** -0.251***  -0.193** -0.261***  -0.212** -0.263*** 
 (-2.46) (-7.73)  (-2.61) (-7.94)  (-2.81) (-7.92) 
 
 
 
0.0166 -0.0220  -0.00234 -0.0171  0.0137 -0.0122 
 (0.14) (-0.70)  (-0.02) (-0.54)  (0.11) (-0.38) 
         
Year fixed effects N N  Y Y  Y Y 
Industry fixed effects N N  N N  Y Y 
Adjusted R-square 692 6524  692 6524  692 6524 
Observations 0.089 0.080   0.095 0.081   0.099 0.082 
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Table 12 
Innovator CEO and Long-run Stock Performance  
This table presents the results from OLS regression of the effects of innovator CEOs on stock long-run performance. The dependent variables are buy-and-
hold benchmark-adjusted return of months 1-12 (AR0,1), 1-24 (AR0,2), 1-36 (AR0,3), 1-48 (AR0,4), and 1-60 (AR0,5) after the announcement date of hiring 
a new innovator CEO. The benchmark returns are CRSP value-weighted index (marke_vw adj.) and CRSP equal-weighted index (market-ew adj.). Variable 
definitions are provided in the Appendix. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, 
and *, respectively.  
  
  
AR0,1 
(market-
vw adj.)  
AR0,1  
(market-
ew adj.)  
AR0,2 
(market-
vw adj.)  
AR0,2 
(market-
ew adj.)  
AR0,3 
(market-
vw adj.)  
AR0,3 
(market-
ew adj.)  
AR0,4 
(market-
vw adj.)  
AR0,4 
(market-
ew adj.)  
AR0,5 
(market-
vw adj.)  
AR0,5 
(market-
ew adj.)  
Innovator CEO 4.451 2.887 16.25 12.58 38.60* 29.18 79.02** 59.81* 101.7** 72.12**  
 (0.70) (0.46) (1.38) (1.06) (1.88) (1.40) (2.51) (1.88) (2.92) (2.02)    
           
Log (assets) -8.753*** -8.986*** -15.33*** -15.29*** -22.94*** -22.18*** -28.85*** -26.37*** -35.38*** -30.45*** 
 (-5.61) (-5.79) (-5.31) (-5.28) (-4.55) (-4.34) (-3.75) (-3.38) (-4.15) (-3.48)    
           
Log (capital intensity) 0.00208 0.0000320 0.00504 -0.00184 0.0154 0.00202 0.0199 0.00837 0.0330 0.0136    
 (0.22) (0.00) (0.29) (-0.11) (0.51) (0.07) (0.43) (0.18) (0.65) (0.26)    
           
Tobin's Q 1.012 0.984 3.438** 3.470** 8.594*** 8.478*** 20.14*** 20.28*** 12.94*** 13.27*** 
 (1.41) (1.38) (2.60) (2.61) (3.72) (3.62) (5.70) (5.67) (3.31) (3.30)    
           
Log (1+delta) 7.306*** 7.335*** 14.45*** 14.37*** 26.02*** 25.78*** 50.05*** 47.78*** 61.72*** 56.01*** 
 (4.11) (4.14) (4.39) (4.35) (4.53) (4.42) (5.70) (5.38) (6.35) (5.61)    
           
Log(1+vega) -0.336 -0.0150 -2.435 -1.202 -1.878 -0.410 -16.40* -14.03 -24.78** -22.23**  
 (-0.18) (-0.01) (-0.70) (-0.34) (-0.31) (-0.07) (-1.77) (-1.50) (-2.42) (-2.11)    
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted R-square 0.037 0.044 0.051 0.055 0.062 0.061 0.083 0.077 0.068 0.056 
Observations 1376 1376 1376 1376 1376 1376 1376 1376 1376 1376 
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Table 13 
Innovator CEOs and long-run firm's innovation 
This table presents the effects of CEOs' innovative ability on firm's long-run innovation from 2SLS regressions. 
Panel A presents the results when firm innovation is measured in three years. Panel A presents the results when 
firm innovation is measured in ten years. Instrumental variable is CEO coauthors' ability calculated as CEO 
coauthors' average citation over average patent. CEO coauthors' patents do not include the patents cooperated 
with the CEO. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
Panel A: Firm innovation in year three 
  
Log (1+ firm 
patent) (t+3) 
Log (1+ firm 
citation) (t+3) 
Firm avg. 
citation (t+3) 
Citation-
weighted firm 
innovation 
(t+3) 
Market-value 
firm 
innovation 
(t+3) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Innovator CEO 0.658*** 0.979*** 0.425*** 67.44*** 248.3*   
 (10.40) (10.75) (10.93) (4.07) (1.84)    
      
Log (assets) 0.419*** 0.488*** 0.111*** 67.31*** 648.5*** 
 (42.73) (34.58) (18.43) (26.21) (30.93)    
      
Log (capital intensity) -0.0381** -0.0629*** -0.0225** 0.532 95.60*** 
 (-3.22) (-3.69) (-3.10) (0.17) (3.78)    
      
Stock return -0.00232** -0.00445** -0.00162** -0.201 -5.214**  
 (-2.22) (-2.95) (-2.52) (-0.73) (-2.33)    
      
Tobin's Q 0.107*** 0.143*** 0.0485*** 6.723*** 145.0*** 
 (20.08) (18.62) (14.81) (4.81) (12.71)    
      
Log (1+tenure) 0.00834 0.0201 0.00922* 1.164 -25.86    
 (0.92) (1.55) (1.66) (0.49) (-1.34)    
      
CEO age -0.00916*** -0.00957*** -0.00182* -2.405*** -6.254*   
 (-5.84) (-4.24) (-1.89) (-5.86) (-1.87)    
      
Log (1+delta) 0.000752 -0.000328 0.000967 5.896** 83.53*** 
 (0.08) (-0.02) (0.17) (2.44) (4.23)    
      
Log(1+vega) 0.0730*** 0.0850*** 0.0279*** -2.164 -36.97**  
 (8.61) (6.97) (5.36) (-0.98) (-2.04)    
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted R-square 13671 13671 13671 13671 13671    
Observations 0.359 0.322 0.275 0.091 0.147  
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Panel B: Firm innovation in year ten 
  
Log (1+ firm 
patent) (t+10) 
Log (1+ firm 
citation) 
(t+10) 
Firm avg. 
citation (t+10) 
Citation-
weighted firm 
innovation 
(t+10) 
Market-value 
firm 
innovation 
(t+10) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Innovator CEO 0.136** 0.161** 0.0427*** 10.34 -34.82    
 (3.00) (3.26) (3.30) (0.85) (-0.45)    
      
Log (assets) 0.183*** 0.177*** 0.0308*** 30.11*** 241.5*** 
 (26.06) (23.12) (15.39) (15.91) (20.20)    
      
Log (capital intensity) -0.0416*** -0.0507*** -0.0140*** 0.151 21.79    
 (-4.93) (-5.50) (-5.78) (0.07) (1.51)    
      
Stock return -0.000996 -0.000803 -0.000149 -0.151 -2.014    
 (-1.33) (-0.98) (-0.70) (-0.75) (-1.58)    
      
Tobin's Q 0.0348*** 0.0319*** 0.00642*** 4.634*** 56.70*** 
 (9.12) (7.67) (5.89) (4.50) (8.72)    
      
Log (1+tenure) 0.0261*** 0.0287*** 0.00689*** 3.385* 15.79    
 (4.03) (4.07) (3.73) (1.94) (1.43)    
      
CEO age -0.00333** -0.00360** -0.000928** -0.983** -2.768    
 (-2.97) (-2.94) (-2.90) (-3.25) (-1.45)    
      
Log (1+delta) -0.00205 -0.00964 -0.000378 -0.881 2.470    
 (-0.31) (-1.34) (-0.20) (-0.49) (0.22)    
      
Log(1+vega) 0.00402 0.00573 0.000103 -0.363 -7.489    
 (0.66) (0.87) (0.06) (-0.22) (-0.73)    
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted R-square 13671 13671 13671 13671 13671    
Observations 0.212 0.195 0.186 0.044 0.077    
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Table 14 
Alternative firm innovation measure 
This table presents the effects of innovator CEOs on alternative firm innovation measure. Column (1) and (2) 
present dependent variable measured as firm patent subtract CEO patent. Column (3) and (4) present dependent 
variable measured as firm citation subtract CEO citation. Column (5) and (6) present dependent variable 
measured as firm average citation subtract CEO average citation. All independent variables are lagged by 1 year. 
Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
(Frim patent - CEO 
patent) 
(Firm citation - CEO 
citation) 
(Firm avg. citation - CEO 
avg. citation) 
 OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Innovator CEO 17.38*** 24.77*** 108.0* 349.0*** 3.241*** 7.061*** 
 (4.22) (3.40) (1.87) (3.42) (10.45) (13.37)    
       
Log (assets) 32.23*** 32.70*** 299.3*** 309.2*** 0.150* 0.285*** 
 (29.15) (28.98) (19.29) (19.53) (1.80) (3.48)    
       
Log (capital intensity) 0.532 0.315 6.691 2.202 -0.187* -0.228**  
 (0.40) (0.23) (0.36) (0.12) (-1.85) (-2.31)    
       
Stock return -0.0990 -0.103 -0.833 -0.892 -0.0172* -0.0172**  
 (-0.83) (-0.86) (-0.50) (-0.53) (-1.90) (-1.97)    
       
Tobin's Q 3.447*** 3.497*** 34.21*** 34.20*** 0.542*** 0.529*** 
 (5.69) (5.70) (4.02) (3.97) (11.86) (11.87)    
       
Log (1+tenure) 0.571 0.372 20.32 16.78 -0.0719 -0.0223    
 (0.56) (0.36) (1.41) (1.15) (-0.93) (-0.29)    
       
CEO age -0.998*** -0.981*** -10.47*** -10.17*** -0.0365** -0.0340**  
 (-5.63) (-5.44) (-4.21) (-4.02) (-2.73) (-2.59)    
       
Log (1+delta) 1.696 1.618 5.930 1.344 0.230** 0.184**  
 (1.63) (1.52) (0.41) (0.09) (2.92) (2.38)    
       
Log(1+vega) -0.221 -0.272 12.77 12.38 0.351*** 0.318*** 
 (-0.23) (-0.28) (0.95) (0.90) (4.87) (4.49)    
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted R-square 0.111 0.112 0.059 0.058 0.145 0.141 
Observations 13913 13671 13913 13671 13913 13671 
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Table 15 
Innovator CEOs and New Product Announcement 
This table presents the effects of innovator CEOs on new product announcement stock return from 2SLS 
regressions. All product announcement return is defined as the sum all positive cumulative abnormal returns over 
the year. The number of new products is defined as the count of the number of announcements with the 
cumulative abnormal returns above the 75 percentile. A firm is defined as a firm with higher agency problem if 
the firm’s cash holding is higher than the median cash holding level in the industry (two-digit SIC code). 
Instrumental variable is CEO coauthors' ability calculated as CEO coauthors' average citation over average patent. 
Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable: 
All product announcement return 
Dependent variable: 
The number of new products  
 
More cash 
holding Less cash holding 
More cash 
holding Less cash holding 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Innovator CEO 0.0580** 0.186*** 0.892** 2.508*** 
 (1.97) (5.84) (2.17) (5.81) 
R&D spending 0.00458*** 0.00489*** 0.0611*** 0.0650*** 
 (6.17) (6.56) (5.92) (6.41) 
Log (assets) 0.0599*** 0.0310*** 0.841*** 0.412*** 
 (10.31) (7.19) (10.41) (7.02) 
Log (capital intensity) -0.0239** -0.00373 -0.273** -0.0453 
 (-2.80) (-0.61) (-2.30) (-0.55) 
Stock return -0.0140*** 0.00110 -0.163** 0.0333 
 (-3.50) (0.68) (-2.94) (1.51) 
Tobin's Q 0.0118*** -0.00518* 0.119*** -0.104** 
 (4.68) (-1.74) (3.39) (-2.56) 
Log (1+tenure) -0.00528 -0.00959** -0.0912 -0.136** 
 (-0.98) (-2.29) (-1.22) (-2.39) 
CEO age -0.00125 -0.00236** -0.0158 -0.0307** 
 (-1.31) (-3.18) (-1.19) (-3.05) 
Log (1+delta) 0.0373*** 0.0246*** 0.546*** 0.334*** 
 (6.70) (5.49) (7.07) (5.48) 
Log(1+vega) -0.0230*** 0.000382 -0.296*** 0.0184 
 (-4.63) (0.09) (-4.29) (0.31) 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Industry fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted R-square 1521 1355 1521 1355 
Observations 0.247 0.173 0.241 0.164 
 
  
     
85 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 16: Innovator CEO, CEO past working experience and general ability index 
 
  
     
86 
 
Table 16 
Innovator CEO, CEO past working experience and general ability index 
This table presents the effects of innovator CEOs, CEO past working experience and general ability index on 
firm's innovation. Past working experience is equal to one if the CEO worked in the same industry in the past. 
Panel A presents the results that CEO past working experience based on four-digit SIC code. Panel B presents the 
effects of innovator CEOs and general ability index on firm's innovation. General ability index is from Custodio, 
Ferreira and Matos (2017). Firm avg. citation is the ratio of firm citations over firm patents. Citation-weighted 
firm innovation is the sum of the weight of citations on each patent plus one for firm i in time t divided by book 
assets of firm i in year t. Market-value firm innovation is total dollar value of innovation produced by firm i in 
year t divided by book assets of firm i in year t. All other independent variables are lagged by 1 year. Variable 
definitions are provided in the Appendix. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
Panel A: CEO past working experience based on four-digit SIC code. 
 Firm avg. citation 
Citation-weighted firm 
innovation 
Market-value firm 
innovation 
 OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Innovator CEO 3.879*** 7.691*** 49.64*** 92.60*** 332.8*** 349.2**  
 (12.08) (13.99) (5.56) (5.85) (4.44) (2.63)    
Past working experience  -0.487 -0.747 -40.23** -44.69** -477.3** -488.3**  
 (-0.75) (-1.17) (-2.22) (-2.44) (-3.14) (-3.18)    
Log (assets) 0.0741 0.208** 66.66*** 68.21*** 671.9*** 676.3*** 
 (0.86) (2.45) (27.80) (27.85) (33.40) (32.93)    
Log (capital intensity) -0.0807 -0.110 0.871 0.389 78.81** 78.95**  
 (-0.77) (-1.07) (0.30) (0.13) (3.22) (3.18)    
Stock return -0.0178* -0.0179** -0.184 -0.193 -6.877** -6.967**  
 (-1.91) (-1.97) (-0.71) (-0.74) (-3.16) (-3.18)    
Tobin's Q 0.551*** 0.537*** 5.969*** 5.941*** 171.0*** 172.8*** 
 (11.65) (11.61) (4.54) (4.46) (15.50) (15.47)    
Log (1+tenure) -0.151* -0.104 -0.0508 -0.715 -31.17* -33.59*   
 (-1.88) (-1.33) (-0.02) (-0.32) (-1.67) (-1.77)    
CEO age -0.0357** -0.0333** -2.208*** -2.124*** -7.006** -6.471**  
 (-2.58) (-2.45) (-5.74) (-5.43) (-2.17) (-1.97)    
Log (1+delta) 0.249** 0.209** 2.866 2.401 80.13*** 83.56*** 
 (3.06) (2.60) (1.27) (1.04) (4.22) (4.32)    
Log(1+vega) 0.400*** 0.363*** 2.201 2.258 -35.74** -36.99**  
 (5.37) (4.94) (1.06) (1.07) (-2.05) (-2.08)    
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted R-square 45 0.140 0.101 0.102 0.162 0.163 
Observations 13913 13671 13913 13671 13913 13671 
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Panel B: CEO general ability index. 
 Firm avg. citation 
Citation-weighted firm 
innovation 
Market-value firm 
innovation 
 OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
  (1) (2) (4) (5) (7) (8) 
Innovator CEO 4.128*** 8.102*** 52.27*** 95.79*** 341.9*** 400.8**  
 (11.57) (13.34) (5.04) (5.21) (3.97) (2.62)    
       
General ability index 0.165 0.207* 2.827 3.237 -56.13* -61.38**  
 (1.35) (1.72) (0.80) (0.89) (-1.91) (-2.03)    
       
Log (assets) -0.0734 0.0571 72.75*** 74.29*** 725.8*** 733.3*** 
 (-0.75) (0.60) (25.63) (25.64) (30.79) (30.48)    
       
Log (capital intensity) -0.0704 -0.106 0.241 -0.295 69.97** 69.83**  
 (-0.60) (-0.93) (0.07) (-0.09) (2.47) (2.43)    
       
Stock return -0.0642 -0.0571 -1.637 -1.639 -58.64*** -59.58*** 
 (-1.56) (-1.43) (-1.37) (-1.36) (-5.90) (-5.94)    
       
Tobin's Q 0.611*** 0.600*** 6.828*** 6.868*** 213.0*** 216.0*** 
 (11.13) (11.22) (4.28) (4.24) (16.09) (16.07)    
       
Log (1+tenure) -0.228** -0.161* -0.713 -1.397 -43.28** -46.82**  
 (-2.56) (-1.86) (-0.28) (-0.53) (-2.01) (-2.14)    
       
CEO age -0.0315** -0.0295* -2.695*** -2.593*** -5.190 -4.264    
 (-1.98) (-1.90) (-5.85) (-5.52) (-1.36) (-1.09)    
       
Log (1+delta) 0.268** 0.247** 4.319 4.169 96.54*** 101.1*** 
 (2.91) (2.73) (1.61) (1.53) (4.34) (4.46)    
       
Log(1+vega) 0.385*** 0.331*** -0.623 -0.735 -46.53** -48.36**  
 (4.53) (3.95) (-0.25) (-0.29) (-2.27) (-2.30)    
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted R-square 0.149 0.145 0.107 0.108 0.173 0.174  
Observations 11489 11262 11489 11262 11489 11262 
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Table 17 
Effect of industry innovativeness not including high-tech industry 
This table presents the effects of innovator CEOs on firm's innovation. The definition of high-tech industry follows Loughran 
and Ritter (2004). An innovative industry is equal to one if the average citation per patent for the industry is greater than the 
median average citation per patent across all industries. Innovator CEO is a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO has any 
patents during 1975-2010 Firm avg. citation is the ratio of firm citations over firm patents. Citation-weighted firm innovation 
is the sum of the weight of citations on each patent plus one for firm i in time t divided by book assets of firm i in year t. 
Market-value firm innovation is total dollar value of innovation produced by firm i in year t divided by book assets of firm i in 
year t. All independent variables are lagged by 1 year. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. T-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 Firm avg. citation 
Citation-weighted firm 
innovation 
Market-value firm 
innovation 
 OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Innovator CEO 4.705*** 11.06*** 89.17*** 145.0*** 666.7*** 552.9**  
 (10.27) (12.17) (6.96) (5.52) (6.19) (2.51)    
Innovator CEO * Innovative 
industry (not including hi-tech) 
-2.239*** -8.156*** -81.85*** -126.8*** -668.3*** -540.4**  
(-3.76) (-8.51) (-4.92) (-4.58) (-4.78) (-2.32)    
Innovative industry (not including 
hi-tech) 
4.042*** 3.885*** 51.89*** 51.12*** 289.8*** 292.6*** 
(14.63) (14.35) (6.71) (6.54) (4.46) (4.46)    
Log (assets) 0.107 0.261** 67.47*** 68.95*** 677.8*** 679.4*** 
 (1.25) (3.07) (28.15) (28.03) (33.68) (32.89)    
Log (capital intensity) -0.0493 -0.0843 0.824 0.273 75.34** 75.72**  
 (-0.47) (-0.83) (0.28) (0.09) (3.09) (3.06)    
Stock return -0.0149 -0.0162* -0.156 -0.174 -6.764** -6.821**  
 (-1.61) (-1.79) (-0.60) (-0.67) (-3.11) (-3.11)    
Tobin's Q 0.511*** 0.504*** 5.480*** 5.515*** 168.3*** 170.3*** 
 (10.88) (10.93) (4.17) (4.14) (15.25) (15.24)    
Log (1+tenure) -0.111 -0.0676 0.627 -0.0116 -25.92 -27.81    
 (-1.41) (-0.86) (0.28) (-0.01) (-1.39) (-1.47)    
CEO age -0.0317** -0.0256* -2.092*** -2.006*** -6.103* -5.960*   
 (-2.30) (-1.88) (-5.44) (-5.11) (-1.89) (-1.81)    
Log (1+delta) 0.249** 0.176** 2.369 1.923 75.61*** 82.45*** 
 (3.07) (2.19) (1.05) (0.83) (3.98) (4.24)    
Log(1+vega) 0.292*** 0.259*** 0.798 0.777 -43.97** -46.20**  
 (3.93) (3.52) (0.38) (0.37) (-2.52) (-2.59)    
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted R-square 0.158 0.150 0.105 0.105 0.164 0.164    
Observations 13913 13671 13913 13671 13913 13671    
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Talent cycling in IPOs refers to the job seeking behavior in high-tech firms where 
talented patent inventors leave once an IPO is successful and then pursue another job at a private 
firm.44 This phenomenon is common in Silicon Valley and a headache for many companies that 
go public.45 For example, Google expressed this concern at the time of their IPO in 2004. One of 
the risk factors in their prospectus said that “The initial option grants to many of our senior 
management and key employees are fully vested. Therefore, these employees may not have 
sufficient financial incentives to stay with us.” Bernstein (2015) finds that the patent inventors in 
IPO firms are 18% more likely to leave and 14% more likely to generate new start-ups after the 
firm completes an IPO compared to firms that withdraw their IPO filing and stay private. 
Campbell, Ganco, Franco and Agarwal (2012) also find that employees with greater pay 
(presumably the more talented employees) are more likely to leave and create a new venture 
within the same industry than join another established firm. Previous literature finds that the 
outflow of talent is associated with lower revenue growth (Batt, 2002), reduced operating 
performance (Ton and Huckman, 2008; and Hancock, Allen, Bosco, McDaniel and Pierce, 
2013), and decreased firm innovation after an IPO (Bernstein, 2015). This paper examines the 
                                                 
44 Talent cycling is a subset of inventor mobility. Inventor Mobility, as defined in the previous literature (Marx, 
Strumsky, and Fleming, 2009; and Chemmanur, Kong, Krishnan and Yu, 2015), refers to patent inventors who 
move to another firm which can be public or private.  
45 This article addresses talent cycling is a headache for many companies. https://www.paysa.com/blog/twilio-tech-
talent-evolution-from-pre-ipo-to-post-ipo/  
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outflow of talented tech workers after IPOs to explain the underperformance of post-IPOs, which 
has puzzled academics for the last twenty years. 
Ritter (1991) finds that IPO firms underperform compared to a sample of size- and 
industry-matched seasoned firms for up to three years post IPO. Researchers have proposed 
many explanations for this puzzle. It has been proposed that non-venture-backed IPOs (Brav and 
Gompers, 1997) and IPO firms without prestigious underwriters (Carter, Dark and Singh, 1998), 
poorer quality underwriters (Dong, Michel and Pandes, 2011) or less prestigious venture capital 
providers (Krishnan, Ivanov, Masulis and Singh, 2011) experience lower post-IPO long-run 
performance. Researchers also find that IPO firms with unusually high accruals in the IPO year 
(Teoh, Welch and Wong, 1998) and acquired within a year of going public (Brau, Couch and 
Sutton, 2012) experience poor stock return performance. Another string of literature explains 
IPO underperformance from the control of management perspective. For example, Jain and Kini 
(1994) find that firms with management that retains a larger portion ownership experience better 
post-IPO performance. Kroll, Walters and Le (2007) find that firms with original top 
management team members controlling a firm’s board have a better post-IPO performance.  
Human capital is also a non-negligible factor for IPO performance. Lippman and Rumelt 
(1982) and Coff (1997) propose that human capital is the source of a firm’s competitive 
advantage. Barney (1991) indicates that a firm’s competitive advantage is banked on the talent 
and expertise of employees. Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) study the relations between the 
quality of a firm’s management and IPO long-run performance and measure management quality 
from three dimensions including management team resources, team structure and management 
reputation outside of the business community. They find that firms with better managers have 
greater long-term stock returns. Chemmanur, Kong, Krishnan and Yu (2015) study the effects of 
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management quality and inventor mobility on firm innovation. They find that firms with higher 
management quality are associated with greater firm innovation by hiring more and higher 
quality inventors. Kaiser, Kongsted and Ronde (2015) also find that inventor mobility increases 
firm innovation. Bernstein (2015) examines inventor mobility and firm innovation by comparing 
firms that go public versus firms that withdraw their IPO filing. He finds that after an IPO, a 
firm’s innovation decreases, in part because more inventors leave the firm. However, none of 
these studies examine the impact of the outflow of talent on IPO long-run performance. 
The sample includes 884 IPO firms that had patents one year before the IPO date from 
1985 to 2007.46 In my sample, I find that 11% of patent inventors have the talent cycling 
behavior. 47 Specifically, 15.3% of patent inventors left their IPO firms within one year after an 
IPO (leavers). Among the 15.3% of leavers, 72% of patent inventors joined non-public 
companies (cyclers) and 28% of patent inventors joined public companies (non-cyclers). 
Comparing cyclers and non-cyclers, I find that on average, cyclers’ patents and citations are 
significantly greater than those of non-cycler, and that within a firm, cyclers also have more 
patents and citations than non-cyclers. Furthermore, cyclers are even better than the newly hired 
inventors (newcomers). Within one year after an IPO, the number of newcomers is greater than 
the number of cyclers, but the quality of newcomers is lower than that of the cyclers. Therefore, 
cyclers tend to be the most talented employees in the firm. 48 
To examine the phenomenon of talent cycling, a patent inventor is defined as a cycler if 
the inventor has at least one patent at a non-public firm within one year after an IPO. If an IPO 
                                                 
46 The 884 firms filed patent applications one year before IPO, and those patents were granted eventually. 
47 In my sample, totally there are 7,060 patent inventors and 779 patent inventors left the IPO firm within one year 
after an IPO and joined non-public firms. 
48 Cyclers also have more patents and citations than stayers. Stayers are defined as the inventors that were in the IPO 
firm one year before an IPO and still in the firm one year after an IPO. 
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firm has at least one cycler, the firm is treated as a firm with cyclers. Among the 884 IPOs, 318 
firms have cyclers and 566 firms have no cyclers. Investigating the effects of talent cycling on a 
firm’s long-run performance, I first use buy-and-hold benchmark-adjusted returns. The 
benchmarks are CRSP value-weighted index, CRSP equal-weighted index and a portfolio of 
non-IPO firms matched to IPO firms on size and market-to-book (style-matched firms). Results 
indicate that firms with cyclers have poor long-run performance compared to firms with no 
cyclers. The differences in the market-adjusted returns and style-adjusted returns are about 35% 
and 50%, respectively, for three years post IPO. After controlling for other factors that may 
impact IPO long-run performance, I still find that firms with cyclers underperform firms with no 
cyclers by about 33% for three years post IPO based on the market-adjusted returns and 62% 
based on the style-adjusted returns. Firms with higher talented cyclers perform even worse. 
Further, firms with cyclers have worse accounting performance and are more likely to be merged 
compared to firms with no cyclers.49  
Though talent cycling is associated with IPO long-run underperformance, there is a 
positive side of talent cycling. Talent cycling increases the probability of an IPO in the economy. 
Specifically, I find that among the 318 firms with cyclers, 28 firms went public with the help of 
those cyclers, so the probability of an IPO with the help of cyclers is 8.81% compared to the 
overall probability of an IPO in the U.S., which is only 0.09%.50 In the matched sample analysis, 
I match the 318 firms with cyclers with another 318 firms that have patents including public and 
non-public firms based on the patents’ technological classification, the number of patents in the 
                                                 
49 I also use an alternative statistical approach—the calendar-time factor model—that avoids the overlap problem 
with buy-and-hold returns (Brav, 2000) to examine the long-run returns. Using the Fama-French (1993) 3-factor 
model and the 3-factor model purged IPO and SEO firms (Loughran and Ritter, 2000), I still find that firms with 
cyclers perform worse than firms with no cyclers. 
50 The probability of an IPO in the U.S. is based on the statistics from to the Statistics of U.S. Business data on 2015. 
There are a total of 5,900,731 firms in the U.S. and only 5,288 public firms 
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firm, the number of citations received by the patents in the firm, and the number of inventors in 
the firm. The probability of an IPO in the matched sample is only 0.31%.51 
If cyclers left the IPO firm because they have the expectation that the firm’s future 
performance will be poor, then there is an endogeneity issue. To deal with the endogeneity 
problem, I use the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (IDD), a legal doctrine that significantly 
prevents inventor mobility, as the instrument variable defined as a dummy variable equal to one 
if the state adopts the IDD by the state court. After controlling for the endogeneity issue, I find 
that firms with cyclers underperform firms with no cyclers by about 17% for three years post 
IPO based on the market-adjusted returns and 40% for four years post IPO based on the style-
adjusted returns.52  
Though talent cycling is different from human capital loss as defined in Eiling (2013), I 
also show that after controlling for the changes in human capital measured by salary expenses or 
the changes in the number of employees, the results remain the same and human capital has no 
impact on IPO long-run performance.53 I also show that the results are robust to different time 
periods, such as the bubble period and the hot market period. 
My paper is closely related to Campbell, et al. (2012). They study the firm performance 
consequences of losing talent and find that firms with employees that move to a new start-up 
perform worse than firms with employees that move to an established firm. We both study the 
inventors that left the firm and categorize them based on which of two types of firms they go to 
and the effects on firm performance. However, we differ in two ways. Campbell, et al. use 
                                                 
51 In the matched sample, only one firm is public firm. 
52 The other method of dealing with endogeneity issue is to employ the propensity score matching procedure. The 
results are quantitatively similar as the results using the IV. 
53 Talent cycling indicates the outflow of the best talent in the firm, while human capital refers to all the employees, 
not just the best talent. 
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revenues per employee to measure firm performance, while I study the stock long-run 
performance, accounting performance and also the survival probability. Second, I focus on 
explaining the effect of outflow of talent on IPO long-run underperformance, which they did not 
study. 
 This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, this paper is complementary 
to a growing body of literature that explores the explanations of IPO long-run underperformance, 
such as underwriter and venture capital reputation (Carter, el at., 1998; Krishnan, et al., 2011), 
earnings management (Teoh, at el., 1998), the quality of top management (Chemmanur and 
Paeglis, 2005) and acquisition activity ((Brau, et al., 2012). Second, this paper also adds to the 
inventor mobility literature that investigates the reasons (Marx, Strumsky, and Fleming, 2009; 
Palomeras and Melero, 2010) and consequences (Topel and Ward, 1992; Almeida and Kogut, 
1999; Campbell, et al., 2012) of inventor mobility.  
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II. SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION AND VARIABLE MEASUREMENTS 
The data is collected from several different databases. I identify IPO firms and their 
characteristics from Securities Data Company (SDC) database. Firm financial information is 
obtained from Compustat. Stock returns are obtained from the daily returns file of Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Patent inventor information for identifying talent cycling 
comes from the Harvard Business School (HBS) patenting database constructed by Li, Lai, 
D’Amour, Doolin, Sun, Torvik, Amy and Fleming (2014).  
I follow Brau, Couch and Sutton (2012) to exclude firms in the financial industry 
(Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes between 6000 and 6999), firms with offer price 
under $5 per share, foreign issuers, real estate investment trusts (REITs), unit offers, closed-end 
funds, and limited partnerships. I also restrict the IPO firms in my sample to those that have 
innovation, which means that the IPO firms have at least one patent application one year before 
an IPO.54 Since the HBS patenting database ends in 2010, and there were only 21 and 41 IPOs in 
the financial crisis years of 2008 and 2009, respectively, and most importantly, those IPOs did 
not have any patent application one year before an IPO, my sample includes U.S. IPOs 
completed between 1985 and 2007.55 In total, there are 3,833 IPO firms in the 1985-2007 period, 
                                                 
54 My results remain the same if I restrict the IPO firms in my sample to have at least one patent application two 
years before an IPO. And if I restrict the IPO firms in my sample to have at least one patent application three years 
before an IPO, our main results remain the same but the significance is decreased. The results are available upon 
request. 
55 The sample starts from 1985 due to the limited coverage in the SDC for the variable, the first and second day 
trading price, which I used to compute for initial return, the control variable used in the regression analysis. 
     
98 
 
including 884 firms with innovation. My results are based on the 884 innovative firms from 1985 
to 2007. 
VARIABLE MEASUREMENTS 
The HBS patenting database provides unique identifiers (variable: Invnum_N) for each 
patent’s inventors. I follow Bernstein (2015) to define an inventor as a leaver if the inventor has 
at least one patent at an IPO firm one year before an IPO and at least one patent in a different 
firm one year after an IPO.56 I choose a one year period because the average (median) period 
between two patents applied by inventors in my sample is 11.42 (5.00) months.57 Further, I 
distinguish leavers into cyclers and non-cyclers based on the firm type that they go to one year 
after an IPO. A cycler is defined as an inventor with at least one patent at an IPO firm and at 
least one patent at a non-public firm one year after an IPO. A non-cycler is defined as an 
inventor with at least one patent at an IPO firm and at least one patent at a public firm one year 
after the IPO. The inventors that were in the IPO firm one year before the IPO and still in the 
IPO firm one year after the IPO are defined as stayers. Therefore, the inventors that the IPO firm 
has one year before an IPO are divided into three categories: cyclers, non-cyclers and stayers.  
I define a firm with leavers as a firm that has at least one cycler or non-cycler, and a firm 
with cyclers as a firm that has one or more than one cycler.58 I also use two continuous variables 
to measure the cyclers in the IPO firm: the number of cyclers defined as the simple count of 
                                                 
56 The time frame that Bernstein uses is three years before and five years after the IPO filing. In Bernstein (2015) 
footnote 20, he verifies that “all inventor relocations are not mistakenly associated with acquisitions and name 
changes.” Hoisl (2007) also uses the similar way to define an inventor as a leaver. 
57 The average (median) period between two patents invented by leavers in my sample is 9.09 (4.00) months. The 
average (median) period between two patents invented by non-leavers in my sample is 11.85 (6.00) months. Using 
difference time periods, the results either remain the same or the significance level declined a little. The results are 
available upon request. 
58 Only 27 firms have inventors that are all cyclers, and 48 firms have more than 50% of cyclers over all the 
inventors. 
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number of cyclers in the firm, and the percentage of cyclers defined as the number of cyclers to 
the total number of inventors in the firm. Further, I measure the quality of cyclers using patents 
and citations. Cyclers’ patents are defined as the total number of patents made by cyclers in an 
IPO firm, and cycler’s citations are defined as the total citations received by a cycler’s patents in 
an IPO firm. 
Table 1 provides the frequency distribution by IPO year and industry in firm level. In 
Panel A, the sample includes a total of 3,833 IPO firms. Only 884 (23.1%) IPO firms have 
innovation one year before the IPO year.59 Among the 884 firms with innovation one year before 
IPO year, 383 (43.3%) IPO firms have leavers, suggesting that in almost half of firms that have 
talent, the talent left one year after an IPO. Of the 383 firms with leavers, 318 firms (83%) have 
cyclers, suggesting that in most firms that have leavers, the leavers left their original IPO firms 
and went to non-public firms.  
The results are consistent with the phenomenon of talent cycling. Panel B shows the 
frequency distribution by the Fama and French 12 industries at the firm level.60 Except for the 
low innovative industries including energy, utilities and financial industries, all the other 
industries have firms with cyclers. Table 2 presents the frequency distribution by year in inventor 
level. The 884 firms with innovation one year before the IPO have a total of 7,060 inventors. 
Among the 7,060 inventors, 1,082 (15.3%) inventors left the IPO firms within one year after an 
IPO, and 779 out of 1,082 (72.0%) leavers are cyclers. The results suggest that IPO firms lose 
more than 10% of their talent within one year after an IPO.  
                                                 
59 I define a firm with innovation if the firm has at least one patent application in the IPO year. According to Hall, 
Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001), the relevant time placer for patents should be the application date, and on average, 
there is a 2-year lag between patent’s application date and grant date. 
60 The Fama and French indsutries are defined in Fama’s website. 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html#Research 
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Next, I examine whether the talent that left their IPO firms within one year after an IPO 
are the best talent. Table 3 presents the results. Panel A shows cyclers’ statistics at the firm level. 
I find that 36% of firms have cyclers and on average, a firm has 0.88 cycler and the percentage 
of cyclers calculated as the number of cyclers over the total number of inventors in a firm is 
11%. The average number of patents (citations) the cyclers have in the IPO firms one year before 
an IPO is 1.22 (47.36), and the number of patents (citations) per cycler is 0.53 (19.66). In Panel 
B, I compare a firm’s cyclers and newcomers defined as the number of new inventors who join 
the firm one year after an IPO. I find that on average, firms have more inventors joining the firm 
than leaving the firm one year after an IPO. The number of cyclers is significantly less than the 
number of newcomers, and the percentage of cyclers is 13% less than the percentage of 
newcomers. However, the quality of newcomers measured by patents and citations is 
significantly lower than that of the cyclers. On average, a firm’s cyclers have more patents and 
citations than newcomers, and the number of patents (citations) per cycler is 1.24 (50.82) more 
than the number of patents (citations) per newcomer.61 The results indicate that IPO firms’ newly 
hired inventors are less talented than their cyclers. 
In Panel C, I compare the difference between cyclers and stayers in the same IPO firm. I 
find that although cyclers have fewer patents than stayers, they have more citations. When I 
calculate the number of patents or citations per inventor, I find that in the same IPO firm, on 
average, cyclers have more patents and citations than stayers, suggesting that inventors that 
chose to leave the IPO firm within one year after an IPO are better inventors. Further, I compare 
cyclers with non-cyclers in inventor level. In Panel D, I compare cyclers and non-cyclers in the 
same IPO firm. In other words, the sample only restricts to firms that have both cyclers and non-
                                                 
61 Newcomer’s patents are calculated as the number of patents the newcomer has in the firm one year after an IPO. 
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cyclers. If a patent is made by at least one cycler (non-cycler), I count this patent as a cycler’s 
(non-cycler’s) patent.62 I find that in the same firm, cyclers’ patents and citations are 
significantly more than non-cyclers’, suggesting that cyclers are better than non-cyclers in the 
same firm. In Panel E, I find that on average, cyclers have significantly more patents and 
citations than non-cyclers, suggesting that cyclers are better inventors. Overall, the results show 
that more than one third of firms have cyclers and those cyclers are the best talent in the firm, 
consistent with the phenomenon of talent cycling.  
 Four performance measurements are constructed to measure IPO long-run performance: 
buy-and-hold abnormal return, match-adjusted return on assets (ROA), market-to-book ratio and 
the listing survival.  
 Following Ritter and Welch (2002) and Brau, Couch and Sutton (2012), I construct the 
buy-and-hold abnormal return for IPO firms from the IPO date to up to four years after an IPO as 
the monthly stock raw return subtracting the monthly benchmark return for the corresponding 
month. A successive 21-trading-day period is considered to be one month, and the first day 
return of an IPO firm is not used to calculate the first month return. The buy-and-hold abnormal 
stock return is calculated in equation (1). 
𝐴𝑅0,3
𝑖 = ∏(1 + 𝑟𝑡
𝑖)
36
𝑡=1
− ∏(1 + 𝑟𝑡
𝑏)
36
𝑡=1
,                                                                                                (1) 
where 𝐴𝑅0,3
𝑖  is the buy-and-hold benchmark-adjusted return for firm 𝑖 for months 1-36 after 
going public, 𝑟𝑡
𝑖 is the stock raw return for IPO firm 𝑖 in month 𝑡 after going public, and 𝑟𝑡
𝑏 is the 
benchmark return in month 𝑡. I also calculate the buy-and-hold benchmark-adjusted return of 
                                                 
62 I also define cycler’s and non-cycler’s patent in another way. If a patent made only by cycler (non-cycler), I count 
this patent as cycler’s (non-cycler’s) patent. The results remain the same and are available upon request.  
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months 1-12 (𝐴𝑅0,1
𝑖 ), 1-24 (𝐴𝑅0,2
𝑖 ), 1-48 (𝐴𝑅0,4
𝑖 ), 12-24 (𝐴𝑅1,2
𝑖 ), 12-36 (𝐴𝑅1,3
𝑖 ), and 12-48 (𝐴𝑅1,4
𝑖 ) 
after firm 𝑖  IPO. If IPOs are delisted before their 3-year anniversary, I follow Ritter (1991) and 
Loughran and Ritter (1995) to truncate their abnormal return at the delisting date and use the 
truncated abnormal return for all longer horizon returns for those IPOs. I also calculate the 
cumulative abnormal returns in equation (2). 
𝐶𝐴𝑅0,𝑛
𝑖 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑡
𝑖
𝑛
𝑡=0
,                                                                                                                                (2) 
where 𝐶𝐴𝑅0,𝑛
𝑖  is the cumulative benchmark-adjusted return from IPO year to month n, and 𝐴𝑅𝑡
𝑖  
is the benchmark-adjusted return for firm 𝑖 in month 𝑡. 
 The buy-and-hold stock abnormal return is calculated using three benchmarks: CRSP 
value-weighted index, CRSP equal-weighted index and a portfolio of non-IPO firms matched to 
IPO firms on size and market-to-book (style-matched firms). I follow Lyon, Barber and Tsai 
(1999) and Ritter and Welch (2002) to do the style-matching procedure. First, I require the 
matching non-IPO firms to be listed in CRSP for at least five years and not to have issued equity 
within 5 years. Second, I identify a set of non-IPO firms with market capitalization ±30% of the 
IPO firms. Third, from the set of non-IPO firms I choose the firm that has the closest market-to-
book ratio as the matching firm of the IPO firm. If the matching firm is delisted prior to the 
return estimation ending period, I splice in the next closest market-to-book matching firm at that 
firm’s delisted date.  
The second IPO long-run performance measure is the match-adjusted ROA defined as net 
income divided by total assets, reflecting the firm accounting performance. I follow Krishnan, 
Ivanov, Masulis and Singh (2011) to do the industry match-adjustment process, and this method 
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is also supported by Barber and Lyon (1996). Each IPO firm is matched to a sample of non-IPO 
firms in three years before and after the IPO date based on the IPO firm’s 4-digit Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) code. If the matched sample has fewer than five firms, the IPO 
firm is matched to a sample of non-IPO firms based on the IPO firm’s 3-digit (or 2-digit) SIC 
code. Then, I calculate the sample of matched firms’ median ROA. The match-adjusted ROA for 
the IPO firm is calculated as its ROA minus the matched firms’ median ROA.  
 The third IPO long-run performance measure is the market-to-book (M/B) ratio measured 
at the end of the 12th quarter after the IPO. If an IPO firm is delisted before the 12th quarter, 
ROA and M/B are measured at the end of the maximum quarter for which data are available in 
Compustat after the IPO. I also follow Krishnan, et al (2011) to winsorize the ROA and M/B at 
1% and 99% levels.63 
 The fourth IPO long-run performance measure is listing survival defined as a dummy 
variable equal to one if the firm remains in the CRSP database for three years after IPO, and zero 
otherwise. The delisting reasons include financial distress, such as bankruptcy, liquidation, and 
going private, and exclude mergers. I investigate whether firms whose talent has left are more 
likely to have financial distress problems. The listing survival captures an IPO firm’s financial 
strength. In my sample, there are a total of 988 firms delisted three years after the IPO including 
365 firms delisted due to financial distress and 623 firms delisted due to mergers.64 Since about 
two thirds of firms are delisted due to mergers, I further examine the effect of talent cycling on a 
firm’s merger activities by creating a variable, merger, defined as a dummy variable equal to one 
                                                 
63 The results remain the same as the results without winsorize.  
64 Among the 623 firms delisted due to mergers, only 41 firms have cyclers. Among 885 IPO firms that have 
innovation one year before an IPO, there are a total of 115 firms delisted three years after IPO including 20 firms 
delisted due to financial distress and 95 firms delisted due to mergers 
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if the firm is delisted due to merges, and zero otherwise. I investigate whether innovative firms 
whose talent has left within one year after an IPO are more likely to be acquired by other firms.  
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III. IPO Underperformance 
 Table 4 presents the buy-and-hold abnormal return for up to 3 years. Panel A shows the 
abnormal returns for the full sample including 3,833 IPOs from 1985 to 2007. The average 
market-adjusted returns are significantly negative for the holding periods for up to three years 
post IPO. Specifically, the mean market-value-weighted-adjusted return for three years after an 
IPO is -16.20%, which is comparable to the market-adjusted return in prior literature, such as 
Loughran and Ritter (1995), Ritter and Welch (2002) and Brau, Couch and Sutton (2012). The 
average style-adjusted return is only -2.51% consistent with Brav and Gompers (1997) that IPO 
long-run performance is sensitive to the benchmarks choice and smaller if using size and market-
to-book matched sample. In Panel B, I compare the buy-and-hold abnormal returns between 
firms with innovation and firms with no innovation. I find that firms with innovation perform 
better than firms with no innovation for up to three years after an IPO. For example, the mean 
market-value-weighted-adjusted return for three years post IPO is -5.64% for firms with 
innovation and -19.37% for firms with no innovation and the difference test is significant at 5% 
level.  
Panel C presents the results of abnormal returns for firms with no leavers in column (1), 
firms with cyclers in column (2) and firms with non-cyclers in column (3). Comparing the 
abnormal returns between firms with no leavers and firms with cyclers, I find that firms with 
cyclers significantly underperform firms with no leavers for three years post IPO, and the 
difference in the style-adjusted return is -46.69% with 5% level significance. The results suggest 
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that firms’ loss of their best talent after an IPO is a reason for IPO long-run underperformance. 
Next, I compare the abnormal returns between firms with cyclers and firms with non-cyclers and 
find that firms with non-cyclers perform better than firms with cyclers two and three years after 
an IPO, suggesting that inventors that went to non-public firms are better talent than inventors 
that went to public firms within one year after an IPO and a reason for underperformance is 
firm’s loss of their best talent. Further, I compare firms with stayers with firms with non-cyclers. 
I find that there is no difference in the buy-and-hold abnormal returns for up to three years. The 
results are consistent with my argument that non-cyclers that left IPO firms and went to public 
firms within one year after an IPO are not the best talent in the IPO firms. Therefore, IPO firms 
with non-cyclers do not have poor long-run performance. In the following analysis, I combine 
firms with stayers with firms with non-cyclers into a category of firms with no cyclers. Panel D 
presents the results of comparing firms with cyclers and firms with no cyclers. Again, I find that 
firms with cyclers have poor long-run performance compared to firms with no cyclers, and the 
differences in abnormal returns are larger and more significant. The differences between firms 
with cyclers and firms with no cyclers in market-adjusted return and the style-adjusted return are 
around 35% and 50%, respectively, for three years post IPO. 
Next, I examine the cumulative buy-and-hold benchmark-adjusted returns for IPO firms from 
1985 to 2007 with monthly rebalancing for up to 36 months after an IPO. Figure 1 plots the 
results for the full sample, 3,833 IPO firms. I find that IPO firms underperform the CRSP value-
weighted index by 17.09%, the CRSP equal-weighted index by 45.05%, and the style-matched 
firms by 13.53% over three years. The results are comparable to Ritter (1991) and Teoh, Welch 
and Wong (1998) and consistent with Ritter that the CARs are sensitive to the choice of 
benchmarks. In Figures 2 to 4, I compare firms with innovation and firms with no innovation for 
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benchmark-adjusted returns and find that firms with innovation perform better than firms with no 
innovation. The results are consistent with prior literature that innovation has positive impact on 
stock return (Patel and Ward, 2011; Hirshleifer, Hsu and Li, 2013). In Figures 5 to 7, I compare 
firms with cyclers and firms with no cyclers (plus the overall average—firms with innovation) 
for value-weighted-adjusted returns, equal-weighted-adjusted returns and style-adjusted returns, 
respectively. I find that firms with cyclers outperform firms with no cyclers and the differences 
become greater over time, suggesting that losing cyclers, the best talent in the firms, the IPO 
firms perform worse and worse over time.  
In this section, I employ a multivariate regression analysis controlling for other factors 
that may affect IPO long-run performance. I also use calendar-time factor model regressions to 
test IPO long-run performance of firms with cyclers and firms with no cyclers. 
3.2.a Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis 
 I control for other factors that may affect IPO long-run performance. Prior studies 
document that lead underwriter reputation and venture capital (VC) backing significantly affect 
IPO firms’ long-run performance (Brav and Gompers, 1997; Carter, et al. 1998). I measure VC 
backing (variable: VC)) as a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is VC-backed, and zero 
otherwise. I obtain the rankings of lead underwriter (variable: UW rank) from Loughran and 
Ritter (2004).65 Following Krishnan, et al. (2011), I also control for IPO firm quality by 
including the IPO first day return (variable: Initial return) defined as the closing price one day 
after the offering date divided by offering price minus one66, Tobin’s Q (variable: Ln (Tobin’s 
Q)) defined as the natural logarithm of market value of assets over the book value of assets, and 
                                                 
65 The data is from Ritter’s website. https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipo-data/  
66 If closing price one day after the offering date is missing, I use closing price two days after the offering date. 
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market capitalization (variable: Ln(Market cap)) defined as the natural logarithm of offer price 
multiplied by the total number of post-IPO shares. IPO literature (Krishnan et al., 2011; Brau, et 
al., 2012) controls for firm age when studying IPO long-run performance. Firm age at the IPO 
(variable: Ln(1+age)) is from Loughran and Ritter (2004) measured as the natural logarithm of 
one plus the number of years from founding year to IPO year. Since I study the effect of outflow 
of talent after IPO year on firms’ long-run performance, the newly joined inventors after the IPO 
might confound the results. Therefore, I also control for the ratio of the number of newcomers to 
the total number of inventors in the firm one year (variable: Newcomer01_perc), two years 
(variable: Newcomer02_perc), three years (variable: Newcomer03_perc) and four years 
(variable: Newcomer04_perc) after an IPO year depending on the use of stock return periods. 
Table 5 presents the summary statistics for the control variables. I find that in my sample, 
66% of firms are backed by VC and on average, firm’s lead underwriter has a 7.56 ranking score 
on a 1-9 scale. Since my sample only includes firms with innovation, those firms are very young 
with an average age of 2.17 years and have a large initial day return of 31.41%. I also find that 
on average, 42% of inventors are newcomers one year after an IPO. Comparing firms with 
cyclers and firms with no cyclers, I find that firms with cyclers are younger and bigger in size 
(measured by market capitalization), and have higher initial return, greater growth opportunity 
(measured by Tobin’s Q), better underwriter reputation and more firms backed by VC.  
Next, I apply the following multivariate cross-sectional regression to investigate the 
effect of talent cycling on buy-and-hold benchmark-adjusted returns. 
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𝐴𝑅0,𝑛
𝑖 = 𝛼1 +  𝛽1𝑇𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 +  𝛽2𝑉𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽3Ln(1 + age)𝑖 + 𝛽4Initial return𝑖
+  𝛽5Ln(Market cap)𝑖 +  𝛽6Ln (Tobin’s Q)𝑖 +  𝛽7UW rank𝑖 + 𝛽8Newcomers𝑖
+  𝛾𝑘 +  𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀1𝑖,                                          (3) 
where 𝐴𝑅0,𝑛
𝑖  is the buy-and-hold benchmark-adjusted return for firm 𝑖 from IPO year to 𝑛th 
years after an IPO, and 𝑇𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 is measured in five ways, (1) cyclers defined as a 
dummy variable equal to one if the firm has at least one cycler and zero otherwise, (2) number of 
cyclers defined as the quartile rank of the number of cyclers in a firm, (3) percentage of cyclers 
defined as the quartile rank of the ratio of the number of cyclers to the total number of inventors 
in a firm, (4) cyclers' patent defined as the number of patents made by cyclers, and (5) cyclers' 
citation defined as the number of citations received by cyclers’ patents. I also control for industry 
fixed effects (𝛾𝑘) and year fixed effects (𝛿𝑡). I expect 𝛽1 to be negatively significant, suggesting 
that talent cycling negatively impacts an IPO firm’s long-run performance. 
 Table 6 presents the results of the effects of talent cycling on IPO long-run performance. 
In Panel A, I find that after controlling for other factors that might affect IPO long-run 
performance, firms with cyclers underperform firms with no cyclers. Specifically, firms with 
cyclers lower the abnormal return by about 30% for three years post IPO based on the market-
adjusted return and 55.4% for four years post IPO based on the style-adjusted return. In Panels B 
and C, I use continuous variables, number of cyclers and percentage of cyclers ranked by 
quartile, to measure talent cycling and find that firms with more cyclers have worse IPO long-run 
performance up to four years after an IPO. In Panels D and E, I use cyclers’ patents and cycler’s 
citations to measure cyclers’ quality and find that firms that have higher quality cyclers who left 
within one year after an IPO perform even worse. Next, I examine the buy-and-hold benchmark-
adjusted return excluding the first year and calculate the buy-and-hold benchmark-adjusted 
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return of months 12-24 (𝐴𝑅1,2), 12-36 (𝐴𝑅1,3) and 12-48 (𝐴𝑅1,4) after an IPO. Panel F presents 
the results. I find that firms with cyclers underperform firms with no cyclers for the period of 12-
36 months after an IPO when the return’s benchmark is a portfolio of firms matched by size and 
book-to-market. However, firms with cyclers do not underperform firms with no cyclers for the 
period of 12-24 and 12-48 months after an IPO, suggesting that most of the underperformance 
comes from the first year after an IPO. The results are consistent with talent cycling since I 
measure an inventor as a cycler if the inventor has at least one patent at a non-public firm within 
one year after an IPO. Therefore, firms that lose their best talent within one year after an IPO 
perform worse than the firms that do not suffer talent outflow one year after an IPO. Further, in 
Panel G, I examine the effect of talent cycling on firm’s accounting performance, survival and 
whether they are more likely to be merged. I find that firms with more cyclers have worse 
accounting performance measured by ROA and are more likely to be merged. 
Examining the control variables, I find that the percentage of newcomers is positively 
related to the buy-and-hold benchmark-adjusted returns, suggesting that the talent is important to 
the innovative firms. In the style-adjusted model, VC backing is positively and significantly 
related to the buy-and-hold benchmark-adjusted returns one year after an IPO, consistent with 
Brav and Gompers (1997). I also find that firms with lower initial returns, bigger size and greater 
growth opportunities are associated with better long-run performance. 
 
CALENDAR-TIME FACTOR MODEL REGRESSION 
Since Brav (2000) points out the overlap problem with buy-and-hold returns, I use an 
alternative statistical approach that avoids this problem to examine the long-run returns, the 
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calendar-time factor model regressions. First, I use the Fama-French (1993) 3-factor model and 
estimate the model as follows. 
𝑅𝑝𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝑏(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) + 𝑠𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡,                                    (4) 
where 𝑅𝑝𝑡 is the return for an equal-weighted calendar-time portfolio of IPOs in month 𝑡, 𝑟𝑓𝑡 is 
the return on the three-month T-bill in month 𝑡, 𝑅𝑚𝑡is the return on the value-weighted market 
index in month 𝑡, (𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) is the market risk premium 𝑀𝑅𝑃, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 is the return on a value-
weighted portfolio of small firms minus the return on a value-weighted portfolio of large firms in 
month 𝑡, and 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 is the return on a value-weighted portfolio of high book-to-market stocks 
minus the return on a value-weighted portfolio of high book-to-market stocks in month 𝑡. The 
intercept (𝑎) measures the abnormal performance. 
 In Table 7, I report the results for the full sample in column (1), firms with no innovation 
in column (2), firms with innovation in column (3), firms with no cyclers in column (4) and 
firms with cyclers in column (5). I also calculate the returns for the portfolio of IPO firms for the 
period of 0-6 months after an IPO in Panel A, 0-12 months after an IPO in Panel B, 0-24 months 
after an IPO in Panel C, 0-36 months after an IPO in Panel D and 0-48 months after an IPO in 
Panel E. Comparing firms with innovation and firms with no innovation, I find that IPO firms 
with innovation have significantly positive abnormal returns for the period of 0-6 months, 0-36 
months and 0-48 months after an IPO, while IPO firms with no innovation have no abnormal 
returns. For example, the intercept term for firms with innovation during the prior 36 (48) 
months is 0.593% (0.536%) with a t-statistic of 2.10 (2.14). The results suggest that firms with 
innovation have a positive abnormal return, consistent with Patel and Ward (2011) and 
Hirshleifer, et al. (2013). Comparing firms with cyclers and firms with no cyclers, I find that IPO 
firms with cyclers underperform IPO firms with no cyclers. Specifically, I find that firms with 
     
112 
 
cyclers have no abnormal returns, while firms with no cyclers have significant positive abnormal 
returns for the period of 0-6 months (1.228%), 0-36 months (0.693%) and 0-48 months (0.575%) 
after an IPO. The results indicate that firms with cyclers have worse long-run performance 
compared to firms with no cyclers, suggesting that talent cycling explains IPO long-run 
underperformance.  
 Brav, Geczy and Gompers (2000) argue that the findings of the underperformance of IPO 
firms is the result of the misspecification of the three-factor model for predicting returns on small 
growth firms. Loughran and Ritter (2000) address this concern by using the Fama-French three-
factor regression after purging the factors of new issues and find a greater underperformance. 
Next, I reexamine the equation (4) by using the Fama-French three-factor regression after 
purging the factors of new issues where 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 is the return on a value-weighted portfolio of 
small firms minus the return on a value-weighted portfolio of large firms in month 𝑡 purged of 
IPO and SEO firms, and 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 is the return on a value-weighted portfolio of high book-to-
market stocks minus the return on a value-weighted portfolio of high book-to-market stocks in 
month 𝑡 purged of IPO and SEO firms. The data for the three-factor model purged of IPO and 
SEO firms is from Ritter’s website for the period of 1973 to 2003.67  
Table 8 presents the results for the calendar-time factor model regressions using the 
Fama-French 3-factor model purged of IPO and SEO firms from 1985 to 2003. The results in 
Table 8 are basically the same as the results in Table 7. I also find that in the full sample, IPO 
firms have a significant average monthly abnormal return of -0472% in Panel B, which is 
                                                 
67 https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipo-data/  
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consistent with Loughran and Ritter (2002) that IPO firm underperform using the Fama-French 
3-factor model purged of IPO and SEO firms.   
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IV. THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF TALENT CYCLING IN IPO 
 Although talent cycling is one of the reasons of IPO long-run underperformance, there 
are some economic benefits of talent cycling in IPO. In my sample, there are 318 firms with 
cyclers and a total of 779 cyclers. Those cyclers left their original IPO firms and went to non-
public firms. And then, there are 28 firms that went public with the help of those cyclers, so the 
probability of an IPO with the help of cyclers is 8.81%.68 However, according to the Statistics of 
U.S. Business data on 2015 for U.S., there are a total of 5,900,731 firms in the U.S. and only 
5,288 public firms, so the probability of an IPO in the U.S. is only 0.09%.69  
 In order to further examine the economic benefits of talent cycling, I conduct a match 
sample procedure. The sample is from the HBS patenting database including all the public firms 
and non-public firms with patents. I first delete the 318 firms with cyclers in the sample. Then, I 
match the 318 firms with cyclers with another 318 firms in that sample based on the patents’ 
technological classification, the number of patents in the firm, the number of citations received 
by the patents in the firm, and the number of inventors in the firm. Among the matched 318 
firms, only one firm is a public firm, so the probability of an IPO without the help of cyclers is 
only 0.31%.70 Therefore, talent cycling in IPO helps more firms to go public and increases the 
probability of an IPO in the U.S.  
                                                 
68 28/318=8.81% 
69 5,288/5,900,731=0.09%. The Statistics of U.S. Business data is obtained from 
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2015/econ/susb/2015-susb-annual.html  
70 1/318=0.31% 
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V. ENDOGENEITY ISSUE 
If the cyclers choosing to leave after an IPO is because they have information about the 
future performance of the IPO firm and an expectation that the firm’s performance is decreasing, 
there is a concern that the underperformance of firms with cyclers could not be due to the leave 
of cyclers, and 𝛽1 in equation (3) is biased due to endogeneity. I control for the endogeneity issue 
in two ways: (1) find an instrument variable and use two-stage least square (2SLS) model, and 
(2) use propensity score matching method.  
 
2SLS RESULTS 
The 2SLS model requires a selection of instrument variables (IV). Successful IV 
candidates must satisfy two criteria. The first criterion is that the instrument does not correlate 
with the error term in equation (3). The second is that the instrument affects firm long-run 
performance only through talent cycling. Therefore, I use the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine 
(IDD) as the instrument variable defined as a dummy variable equal to one if the state adopts the 
IDD by the state court.71 The IDD is a legal doctrine in trade secret law that prevents a firm’s 
current or former employee from working for a rival firm if the firm demonstrates that the 
employee would “inevitably” disclose the firm’s trade secrets to the rival firm. Since Klasa, 
Ortiz-Molina, Serfling and Srinivasan (2017) find that the adoption of IDD in states significantly 
                                                 
71 Klasa, et al. (2017) Table 1 shows the 21 precedent-setting cases in which state courts adopt the IDD. 
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reduces the mobility of talent to rival firms, and Hansen’s J-test of overidentifying restrictions is 
not significant, the IDD is a valid instrument variable. 
I estimate the following first-stage regression: 
𝑇𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖
= 𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝑉𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽2Ln(1 + age)𝑖 + 𝛽3Initial return𝑖 + 𝛽4Ln(Market cap)𝑖
+  𝛽5Ln (Tobin’s Q)𝑖 +  𝛽6UW rank𝑖 + 𝛽7Newcomers𝑖 + 𝛽8IDD𝑖 +  𝛾𝑘 +  𝛿𝑡
+  𝜃𝑡 +  𝜀1𝑖,                (5) 
where IDD𝑖 is the instrument variable for 𝑇𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖. I also control for industry fixed 
effects (𝛾𝑘), year fixed effects (𝛿𝑡) and state fixed effects (𝜃𝑡). The second-stage equation 
estimates the impact of talent cycling on firm long-run stock performance: 
𝐴𝑅0,𝑛
𝑖 = 𝛼1 +  𝛽1𝑇𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖̂ +  𝛽2𝑉𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽3Ln(1 + age)𝑖 + 𝛽4Initial return𝑖
+  𝛽5Ln(Market cap)𝑖 + 𝛽6Ln (Tobin’s Q)𝑖 +  𝛽7UW rank𝑖 +  𝛾𝑘 +  𝛿𝑡 +  𝜃𝑡
+  𝜀1𝑖,   (6) 
where 𝑇𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖̂  is the predicted value from the regression in equation (5). 
 Table 9 presents the results of the effect of talent cycling on IPO long-run performance 
using 2SLS model. In Panel A, I calculate the buy-and-hold benchmark-adjusted returns 
including the first year after an IPO up to the fourth year after an IPO and find that firms with 
cyclers underperform firms with no cyclers. Specifically, firms with cyclers have lower abnormal 
returns by about 16% over years 1-3 after going public based on the market-adjusted return and 
about 40% over years 1-4 after going public based on the style-adjusted return. In Panel B, I 
calculate the buy-and-hold benchmark-adjusted returns excluding the first year after an IPO and 
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find that firms with cyclers underperform firms with no cyclers by about 12% over years 2-3 
after going public based on market-adjusted return and about 30% over years 2-4 after going 
public based on style-adjusted return. Controlling the endogeneity issue, I find that the results are 
consistent with the results of using OLS regressions in general, suggesting that the outflow of the 
best talent is the reason for IPO long-run underperformance. 
Examining the control variables, I find that IPO firms with lower initial returns, high 
potential of growth and large size are associated with greater long-run stock returns after an IPO. 
I also find that IPO firms backed by VC tend to have better long-run performance after an IPO, 
consistent with Brav and Gompers (1997). The percentage of newcomers after an IPO is 
positively related to the buy-and-hold benchmark-adjusted returns, suggesting that the talent is 
very important to the innovative firms. 
 
PROPENSITY SCORE MATCHED SAMPLES 
 The second way that I deal with the endogeneity problem is to employ a propensity score 
matching procedure (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). Using this methodology, I can construct a 
control sample of firms with no cyclers that exhibit no observable differences in firm and 
inventor characteristics compared to firms with cyclers. Therefore, if the two samples’ long-run 
performance is different, the only reason can be due to the fact that cyclers left the firm. 
 The first step of implementing this methodology is to calculate the probability 
(propensity score) from the logit regression for all the firms in the sample using all the control 
variables in equation (3). Then, I construct the matched sample by choosing the firms that have 
no cyclers with propensity scores closest to each firm that has cyclers. Next, I run OLS 
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regressions including firms with no cyclers (the matched sample) and firms with cyclers 
controlling for firm characteristics, year fixed effects and firm fixed effects. The results are 
presented in Table 10. I find that firms with cyclers perform worse than firms with no cyclers by 
about 35% over years1-3 after going public based on market-adjusted return and about 60% over 
years 1-4 after going public based on style-adjusted return. The results are consistent with the 
results in the previous OLS regressions, suggesting that IPO long-run underperformance can be 
explained by talent cycling in IPO.  
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VI. ROBUSTNESS 
Since I use the number of inventors who left the firm within one year after an IPO to 
measure the number of cyclers in a firm, I may just capture the number of employees who left 
the firm within one year after an IPO. Further, since cyclers are the best talent in the firm, the 
outflow of cyclers has a negative impact on IPO long-run performance. However, the outflow of 
normal employees should not have a negative impact on IPO long-run performance. Therefore, I 
add one variable, the number of employees, into equation (3). The number of employees is 
defined as the difference between the number of employees one year after an IPO and one year 
before an IPO over total assets. Table 11 Panel A presents the results. I find that the number of 
employees is positively related with IPO long-run performance only for the first year after an 
IPO, and cyclers is still negatively related to IPO long-run performance up to three years after an 
IPO. The results suggest that increasing the number of employees will not affect firm long-run 
performance since increasing the number of employees could be due to the expansion of 
operations or the decrease in productivity. However, the outflow of cyclers has a negative impact 
on IPO long-run performance since cyclers are the best talent in the company.  
 Eiling (2013) studies human capital and cross-section of expected stock returns and finds 
that human capital measured by salary expenses affects the cross-sectional of expected stock 
returns. In order to show that cyclers is a better proxy to capture the best talent than human 
capital measured by salary expenses, I add one variable, salary expenses, into equation (3). The 
salary expense is defined as the quartile rank of the differences between the salary expenses one 
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year after an IPO and one year before an IPO.72 Panel B in Table 11 presents the results. I find 
that adding salary expenses into equation (3) does not change the results. Firms with cyclers have 
worse long-run performance than firms with no cyclers, but salary expense has no relation with 
long-run performance.  
One concern of examining IPO long-run performance is the effect of the stock market 
internet bubble in 1999 and 2000 (Brau, Couch and Sutton, 2012). Therefore, I reexamine 
equation (3) by excluding firms that went public during the bubble years, 1999 and 2000. Table 
11 Panel C presents the results. I find that the results generally remain the same as the previous 
findings for the full sample. Without the bubble years, firms with cyclers perform even worse 
than firms with no cyclers by about 42% over years1-3 after going public based on market-
adjusted return and about 77% over years 1-4 after going public based on style-adjusted return. 
 Another concern of this paper is that there might be more inventors who left the firm 
within one year after an IPO during hot IPO market because of more IPOs during hot market. 
Therefore, I reexamine equation (3) by adding one variable, hot market, defined as a dummy 
variable equal to one if the number of IPOs in a year is greater than the median number of IPOs 
in the sample by year. Table 11 Panel D presents the results. I find that the results are the same as 
the previous results and hot market is not significant.  
                                                 
72 The missing value of salary expenses is set to zero. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
 In this paper, I study talent cycling in IPOs and examine the effect of talent cycling on 
IPO long-run performance and economic benefits of talent cycling. Talent cycling in IPOs refers 
to the job seeking behavior in high-tech firms where talented patent inventors leave once an IPO 
is successful and then pursue another job at a private firm. I define an inventor as a cycler if the 
inventor left the firm within one year of IPO and then went to a non-public firm. If a firm has at 
least one cycler, I define the firm as a firm with cyclers. In my sample, 36% of firms have 
cyclers. Comparing cyclers, non-cyclers and newcomers in the IPO firms, I find that cyclers are 
the best talent. Therefore, the outflow of the best talent in the IPO firms would negatively impact 
their long-run performance. Specifically, I find that firms with cyclers underperform firms with 
no cyclers in the univariate tests and the multivariate tests after controlling for other factors that 
may impact IPO long-run performance. I also find that firms with more cyclers perform even 
worse. One concern of this paper is that inventors who left the firm within one year after an IPO 
due to the fact that they had information and expectations about the firm’s poor future 
performance. To deal with the endogeneity issue, I employ 2SLS regressions and the propensity 
score matching method and find the results remain the same. Talent cycling also brings 
economic benefits to the IPO market. I find that talent cycling increases the probability of an 
IPO. Further, I show that talent cycling is different from human capital loss since the results are 
robust to the changes in the number of employees who left and the changes in human capital. 
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The results are also robust to the different time periods, such as the bubble periods and the hot 
market periods.  
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 APPENDIX 1: Frequency Distribution by IPO Year and Industry in Firm Level 
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Table 1 
 Frequency Distribution by IPO Year and Industry in Firm Level 
This table provides the frequency distribution of IPO firms by year and by industry from 1985 to 2007. The full sample includes 3,833 IPO firms, 884 firms 
that have innovation one year before IPO, 383 firms with leavers and 318 firms with cyclers. Leavers are defined as the inventors with at least one patent at an 
IPO firm one year before IPO and at least one patent in a different firm one year after IPO. Cyclers are defined as the inventors with at least one patent at an 
IPO firm one year before IPO and at least one patent in a non-public firm one year after IPO. The sample includes domestic IPO firms and excludes penny 
stock, financial firms, real estate investment trusts (REITs), unit offers, closed-end funds, and limited partnerships. 
Panel A. Frequency Distribution by IPO Year in Firm Level 
IPO Year Frequency 
% of Total 
sample  
No. of 
firms with 
innovation 
one year 
before 
IPO 
% of firms 
with 
innovation one 
year before 
IPO 
No. of  firms 
with leavers 
% of  firms 
with leavers 
No. of  firms 
with cyclers 
% of  firms with 
cyclers 
1985 5 0.1% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
1986 157 4.1% 18 11.5% 5 27.8% 5 100.0% 
1987 143 3.7% 19 13.3% 8 42.1% 6 75.0% 
1988 54 1.4% 9 16.7% 3 33.3% 2 66.7% 
1989 62 1.6% 13 21.0% 1 7.7% 1 100.0% 
1990 62 1.6% 10 16.1% 3 30.0% 2 66.7% 
1991 142 3.7% 41 28.9% 19 46.3% 16 84.2% 
1992 218 5.7% 58 26.6% 19 32.8% 16 84.2% 
1993 306 8.0% 68 22.2% 29 42.6% 23 79.3% 
1994 250 6.5% 41 16.4% 15 36.6% 12 80.0% 
1995 314 8.2% 70 22.3% 36 51.4% 30 83.3% 
1996 445 11.6% 103 23.1% 48 46.6% 40 83.3% 
1997 305 8.0% 51 16.7% 20 39.2% 17 85.0% 
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1998 180 4.7% 30 16.7% 11 36.7% 7 63.6% 
1999 300 7.8% 78 26.0% 36 46.2% 33 91.7% 
2000 252 6.6% 106 42.1% 66 62.3% 57 86.4% 
2001 48 1.3% 18 37.5% 7 38.9% 6 85.7% 
2002 50 1.3% 12 24.0% 8 66.7% 7 87.5% 
2003 41 1.1% 10 24.4% 3 30.0% 3 100.0% 
2004 125 3.3% 46 36.8% 27 58.7% 22 81.5% 
2005 112 2.9% 26 23.2% 10 38.5% 5 50.0% 
2006 127 3.3% 30 23.6% 4 13.3% 3 75.0% 
2007 135 3.5% 27 20.0% 5 18.5% 5 100.0% 
Total  3833 100.0% 884 23.1% 383 43.3% 318 83.0% 
 
Panel B. Frequency Distribution by Fama and French 12 Industry Groups in Firm Level 
Industry Frequency 
% of Total 
sample  
No. of 
firms with 
innovation 
one year 
before 
IPO 
% of firms 
with 
innovation one 
year before 
IPO 
No. of  firms 
with leavers 
% of  firms 
with leavers 
No. of  firms 
with cyclers 
% of  firms with 
cyclers 
Consumer NonDurables 176 4.6% 23 13.1% 5 21.7% 4 80.0% 
Consumer Durables 48 1.3% 13 27.1% 6 46.2% 6 100.0% 
Manufacturing 282 7.4% 99 35.1% 30 30.3% 21 70.0% 
Energy 117 3.1% 3 2.6% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Chems 52 1.4% 20 38.5% 8 40.0% 8 100.0% 
Business Equipment 1,003 26.2% 332 33.1% 133 40.1% 107 80.5% 
Telecom 139 3.6% 9 6.5% 5 55.6% 5 100.0% 
Utilities 20 0.5% 1 5.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Shops 423 11.0% 9 2.1% 2 22.2% 2 100.0% 
Health 576 15.0% 277 48.1% 165 59.6% 140 84.8% 
Financial  0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Other 997 26.0% 98 9.8% 29 29.6% 25 86.2% 
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Table 2 
Frequency Distribution by Year in Inventor Level 
This table provides the frequency distribution for inventors that the IPO firms have one year before IPO from 1985 to 2007. The full sample includes 7,060 
inventors, 1,082 inventors that left the IPO firm one year after IPO, 779 inventors that left the IPO firms one year after IPO and went to non-public firms. 
Leavers are defined as the inventors with at least one patent at an IPO firm one year before IPO and at least one patent in a different firm one year after IPO. 
Cyclers are defined as the inventors with at least one patent at an IPO firm one year before IPO and at least one patent in a non-public firm one year after IPO. 
The sample includes domestic IPO firms and excludes penny stock, financial firms, real estate investment trusts (REITs), unit offers, closed-end funds, and 
limited partnerships. 
IPO Year No. of inventors 
% of Total 
sample    No. of leavers % of leavers   No. of  cyclers % of  cyclers 
1985 0 0.0%  0 0.0%  0 0.0% 
1986 175 2.5%  15 8.6%  10 66.7% 
1987 97 1.4%  20 20.6%  6 30.0% 
1988 49 0.7%  3 6.1%  2 66.7% 
1989 50 0.7%  2 4.0%  2 100.0% 
1990 37 0.5%  3 8.1%  2 66.7% 
1991 211 3.0%  25 11.8%  21 84.0% 
1992 277 3.9%  35 12.6%  30 85.7% 
1993 445 6.3%  66 14.8%  46 69.7% 
1994 228 3.2%  50 21.9%  42 84.0% 
1995 617 8.7%  82 13.3%  63 76.8% 
1996 674 9.5%  118 17.5%  91 77.1% 
1997 330 4.7%  67 20.3%  55 82.1% 
1998 358 5.1%  47 13.1%  33 70.2% 
1999 718 10.2%  139 19.4%  97 69.8% 
2000 1,076 15.2%  232 21.6%  150 64.7% 
2001 273 3.9%  19 7.0%  14 73.7% 
2002 123 1.7%  20 16.3%  17 85.0% 
2003 91 1.3%  9 9.9%  5 55.6% 
2004 553 7.8%  77 13.9%  58 75.3% 
2005 345 4.9%  38 11.0%  21 55.3% 
2006 148 2.1%  7 4.7%  6 85.7% 
2007 185 2.6%  8 4.3%  8 100.0% 
Total  7060 100.0%   1082 15.3%   779 72.0% 
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Table 3 
Cycler Characteristics 
This table provides cyclers' characteristics. Panel A shows the statistics for cyclers. Panel B compares cyclers with newcomers in the firm level. Panel C 
compares cyclers with stayers in the firm level. Panel D compares cyclers with non-cyclers in then inventor level. Panel E compares cyclers with non-
cyclers in the firm level. Cyclers are defined as the inventors with at least one patent at an IPO firm one year before IPO and at least one patent in a non-
public firm one year after IPO. Non-cyclers are defined as the inventors with at least one patent at an IPO firm one year before IPO and at least one patent 
in a public firm one year after IPO. Stayers are defined as the inventors in the IPO firm one year before IPO and still in the firm one year after IPO. 
Newcomers are defined as the new inventors join the firm one year after IPO. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
Panel A. Cycler statistics (firm level)  
    
Variable N Mean Median Std. Dev. P25 P75 
Cycler (dummy) 884 0.36 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Number of cyclers 884 0.88 0.00 1.90 0.00 1.00 
Percentage of cyclers 884 0.11 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.13 
Cycler's patent 884 1.22 0.00 3.07 0.00 1.00 
Cycler's citation 884 47.36 0.00 207.59 0.00 14.00 
Number of patents per cycler 884 0.53 0.00 1.05 0.00 1.00 
Number of citations per cycler 884 19.66 0.00 73.84 0.00 8.05 
Panel B. Comparing cyclers with newcomers (firm level)   
  N Mean 
Difference 
Paired t-test 
Number of cyclers 318 2.45 -4.72*** 
Number of newcomers 318 7.17 (-6.89) 
Percentage of cyclers 318 0.32 -0.13*** 
Percentage of newcomers 318 0.45 (-5.48) 
Cycler total patents 318 3.38 1.15*** 
Newcomer total patents 318 2.23 (3.83) 
Cycler total citations 318 131.66 102.77*** 
Newcomer total citations 318 28.89 (5.60) 
Number of patents per cycler 318 1.49 1.24*** 
Number of patents per newcomer 318 0.24 (16.79) 
Number of citations per cycler 318 54.65 50.82*** 
Number of citations per newcomer 318 3.83 (7.95) 
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Panel C. Comparing cyclers with stayers (firm level) 
  N Mean 
Difference 
Paired t-test 
Cycler's patent 221 3.99 -1.82*** 
Stayer's patent 221 5.81 (-2.67) 
    
Cycler's citation 221 156.16 47.16* 
Stayer's citation 221 109.00 (1.86) 
    
Number of patents per cycler 221 1.60 0.83*** 
Number of patent per stayer 221 0.74 (6.75) 
    
Number of citations per cycler 221 57.63 40.57*** 
Number of citations per stayer 221 17.05 (5.10) 
Panel D. Comparing cyclers with non-cyclers (firm level) 
  N Mean 
Difference 
Paired t-test 
Cycler's patent 138 4.71 2.28*** 
Non-cycler's patent 138 2.43 (5.22) 
    
Cycler's citation 138 213.27 128.52*** 
Non-cycler's citation 138 84.75 (4.13) 
    
Number of patents per cycler 138 1.57 0.53*** 
Number of patent per non-cycler 138 1.04 (4.69) 
    
Number of citations per cycler 138 66.30 26.49*** 
Number of citations per non-cycler 138 39.81 (2.99) 
 
    
Panel E. Comparing cyclers with non-cyclers (inventor level)  
  N Mean 
Difference 
Paired t-test 
Cycler's patent 779 5.76 2.58*** 
Non-cycler's patent 303 3.18 (2.924) 
    
Cycler's citation 779 305.57 207.54** 
Non-cycler's citation 303 98.04 (2.260) 
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Table 4 
Abnormal Returns  
Table 4 presents the buy-and-hold abnormal returns for the full sample (Panel A), firms with innovation and firms 
with no innovation (Panel B), frims with stayers, firms with cyclers and firms with non-cyclers (Panel C), and 
firms with cyclers and firms with no cyclers (Panel D). The benchmark returns are CRSP value-weighted index 
(marke_vw adj.), CRSP equal-weighted index (market-ew adj.) and a portfolio of non-IPO firms matched to IPO 
firms on size and market-to-book (size-MB adj.). A firm with innovation is defined as the firm has at least one 
patent application in the IPO year. A firm with leavers are defined as the firm has at least one inventor with at 
least one patent at the firm one year before IPO and at least one patent in a different firm one year after IPO. A 
firm with cyclers are defined as the firm has at least one inventors with at least one patent at the firm one year 
before IPO and at least one patent in a non-public firm one year after IPO. A firm with non-cyclers are defined as 
the firm's all the leavers are non-cyclers. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
Panel A. Abnormal returns for the full sample (n=3833)    
Variable Mean 
p-
Value    
AR0,1 (market-vw adj.)  -4.38% 0.0013    
AR0,1 (market-ew adj.)  -18.41% <.0001    
AR0,1 (size-MB adj.)  -3.99% 0.0374    
AR0,2 (market-vw adj.)  -9.43% 0.0007    
AR0,2 (market-ew adj.)  -43.27% <.0001    
AR0,2 (size-MB adj.)  -2.07% 0.5483    
AR0,3 (market-vw adj.)  -16.20% <.0001    
AR0,3 (market-ew adj.)  -72.59% <.0001    
AR0,3 (size-MB adj.)  -2.51% 0.5511    
      
Panel B. Abnormal returns for firms with innovation and firms with no innovation. 
  
Firms with 
innovation  
(n=884) 
Firms with no 
innovation 
(n=2949) Difference test 
Variable Mean 
p-
Value Mean 
p-
Value p-Value 
AR0,1 (market-vw adj.)  -0.46% 0.8901 -5.55% 0.0001 0.0571 
AR0,1 (market-ew adj.)  -16.47% <.0001 -18.99% <.0001  0.4359 
AR0,1 (size-MB adj.)  0.39% 0.927 -5.30% 0.013 0.1052  
AR0,2 (market-vw adj.)  -6.33% 0.2563 -10.36% 0.0011 0.5385  
AR0,2 (market-ew adj.)  -44.86% <.0001 -42.79% <.0001 0.7552 
AR0,2 (size-MB adj.)  3.59% 0.571 -3.77% 0.3536 0.1845 
AR0,3 (market-vw adj.)  -5.64% 0.4798 -19.37% <.0001 0.0372  
AR0,3 (market-ew adj.)  -70.39% <.0001 -73.25% <.0001 0.7173 
AR0,3 (size-MB adj.)  6.46% 0.5129 -5.20% 0.258 0.1214 
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Panel C. Abnormal returns for firms with stayers, firms with cyclers and firms with non-cyclers 
  (1) (2) (3)       
  
Firms with 
stayers 
(n=501) 
Firms with 
cyclers 
(n=318) 
Firms with non-
cyclers 
(n=65) 
(1) - (2)  
Difference 
test 
(1) - (3)  
Difference 
test 
(2) - (3)  
Difference 
test 
Variable Mean 
p-
Value Mean 
p-
Value Mean 
p-
Value p-Value p-Value p-Value 
AR0,1 (market-vw adj.)  5.87% 0.2482 -8.16% 0.0655 -11.67% 0.2175 0.0543 0.2269 0.7412 
AR0,1 (market-ew adj.)  -9.00% 0.0754 -26.08% <.0001 -27.02% 0.0053 0.0187 0.2124 0.9292 
AR0,1 (size-MB adj.)  7.34% 0.2078 -10.51% 0.1445 0.02% 0.9988 0.0548 0.6611 0.5294 
AR0,2 (market-vw adj.)  2.25% 0.7975 -22.05% <.0001 4.49% 0.8213 0.0412 0.9300 0.0818 
AR0,2 (market-ew adj.)  -34.52% 0.0001 -63.46% <.0001 -33.68% 0.1064 0.0164 0.9742 0.0580 
AR0,2 (size-MB adj.)  11.52% 0.222 -13.96% 0.1045 28.13% 0.1528 0.0626 0.5397 0.0445 
AR0,3 (market-vw adj.)  6.50% 0.6103 -27.29% 0.0003 6.76% 0.8077 0.0479 0.9944 0.0995 
AR0,3 (market-ew adj.)  -57.51% <.0001 -93.88% <.0001 -54.77% 0.0629 0.0363 0.9415 0.0730 
AR0,3 (size-MB adj.)  21.24% 0.1355 -25.45% 0.0802 48.74% 0.1129 0.0283 0.5020 0.0341 
          
Panel D. Abnormal returns for firms with cyclers and firms with no cyclers     
  (1) (2)       
  
Firms with no 
cyclers 
(n=566) 
Firms with 
cyclers 
(n=318) 
(1) - (2)  
Difference 
test     
Variable Mean 
p-
Value Mean 
p-
Value p-Value     
AR0,1 (market-vw adj.)  3.86% 0.4048 -8.16% 0.0655 0.0866     
AR0,1 (market-ew adj.)  -11.07% 0.0165 -26.08% <.0001 0.0316     
AR0,1 (size-MB adj.)  6.50% 0.2222 -10.51% 0.1445 0.0566     
AR0,2 (market-vw adj.)  2.51% 0.7565 -22.05% <.0001 0.0342     
AR0,2 (market-ew adj.)  -34.42% <.0001 -63.46% <.0001 0.0137     
AR0,2 (size-MB adj.)  13.43% 0.1203 -13.96% 0.1045 0.0383     
AR0,3 (market-vw adj.)  6.53% 0.5774 -27.29% 0.0003 0.0418     
AR0,3 (market-ew adj.)  -57.20% <.0001 -93.88% <.0001 0.0302     
AR0,3 (size-MB adj.)  24.40% 0.062 -25.45% 0.0802 0.0153     
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Table 5 
Summary Statistics for Control Variables 
Table 5 presents the summary statistics for the control variables. Difference tests are calculated using a t-test for the difference in means. VC is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the firm is VC-backed and zero otherwise. Ln(1+age) is from Loughran and Ritter (2004) measured as the natural logarithm of one 
plus the number of years from founding year to IPO year. Initial return is defined as the closing price one day after the offering date divided by offering price 
minus one. Ln(Market cap) is defined as the natural logarithm of offer price multiplying the total number of post-IPO shares. Ln (Tobin’s Q) is defined as the 
natural logarithm of market value of assets over the book value of assets. UW rank is the underwritter ranking from Loughran and Ritter (2004) on a 1-9 scale. 
Newcomer01_perc is the ratio of the number of newcomers to the total number of inventors in the firm one year after IPO. 
  
Full Sample  
(n=884) 
Firms with cyclers  
(n=318) 
Firms with no cyclers  
(n=566) 
Difference 
Tests 
Variable Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. p-Value 
VC 0.66 1.00 0.47 0.78 1.00 0.42 0.60 1.00 0.49 <.0001 
Ln(1+age) 2.17 2.08 0.89 2.05 1.95 0.82 2.24 2.08 0.92 0.0019 
Initial return 31.41 11.28 63.98 37.94 15.07 69.57 27.75 9.27 60.36 0.023 
Ln(market cap) 5.40 5.25 1.35 5.59 5.39 1.35 5.29 5.20 1.34 0.0019 
Ln(Tobin's Q) 1.29 1.17 0.73 1.38 1.25 0.75 1.23 1.14 0.72 0.0034 
UW rank 7.51 8.00 2.25 7.90 8.00 1.85 7.29 8.00 2.42 <.0001 
Newcomer01_perc 0.42 0.44 0.37 0.45 0.48 0.32 0.41 0.40 0.39 0.1419 
Newcomer02_perc 0.54 0.62 0.34 0.55 0.61 0.29 0.53 0.63 0.37 0.3802 
Newcomer03_perc 0.60 0.68 0.33 0.61 0.67 0.28 0.59 0.69 0.36 0.4117 
Newcomer04_perc 0.63 0.73 0.33 0.65 0.71 0.28 0.62 0.75 0.35 0.2691 
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Table 6 
Multivariate Regression Explaining IPO Long-Run Performance 
Table 6 presets the results of the effect of talent cycling on IPO long-run performance for 884 IPOs from 1985 to 2007. Cyclers is defined as a dummy variable equal to one if 
the firm has at least one cycler and zero otherwise,. Number of cyclers is defined as the quartile rank of the number of cyclers in a firm. Percentage of cyclers is defined as the 
quartile rank of the ratio of the number of cyclers to the total number of inventors in a firm. Cyclers' patent is defined aa the number of patents made by cyclers. Cyclers' 
citation is defined as the number of citations received by cyclers’ patents. ROA is the match-adjusted ROA defined as net income divided by total assets. M/B is market-to-book 
ratio measured at the end of the 12th quarter after the IPO. Survival is defined as a dummy variable equal to one if the firm remains in the CRSP database for three years after 
IPO, and zero otherwise. Merger is defined as a dummy variable equal to one if the firm listed is due to merges, and zero otherwise. 
Panel A. Cycler (dummy) 
  AR0,1 AR0,2 AR0,3 AR0,4  
 
Market-vw 
adj. 
Market-
ew adj. 
 
Size-BM 
adj. 
Market-
vw adj. 
Market-
ew adj. 
 
Size-
BM adj. 
Market-
vw adj. 
Market-
ew adj. 
 
Size-
BM adj. 
Market-
vw adj. 
Market-
ew adj. 
 
Size-BM 
adj. 
Cyclers -12.40* -13.09* -17.17* -22.98* -24.51** -32.25** -31.65* -33.13* -61.98** -21.85 -24.07 -55.40*   
 (-1.69) (-1.80) (-1.75) (-1.88) (-2.01) (-2.25) (-1.75) (-1.84) (-2.72) (-0.77) (-0.85) (-1.68)    
VC 9.139 8.651 20.70* 18.41 17.45 26.30 23.53 21.82 22.77 22.70 17.76 11.60    
 (1.09) (1.04) (1.85) (1.31) (1.25) (1.60) (1.14) (1.05) (0.87) (0.70) (0.54) (0.31)    
Ln(1+age) 2.766 2.596 2.846 8.749 7.866 6.688 11.04 10.19 1.264 6.651 5.198 -3.110    
 (0.64) (0.60) (0.49) (1.20) (1.08) (0.78) (1.03) (0.95) (0.09) (0.39) (0.31) (-0.16)    
Initial return -0.456*** -0.447*** -0.417*** -0.208* -0.207* -0.162 -0.319* -0.305* -0.385* -0.556** -0.563** -0.626**  
 (-6.48) (-6.40) (-4.44) (-1.77) (-1.77) (-1.18) (-1.84) (-1.75) (-1.75) (-2.03) (-2.06) (-1.97)    
Ln(market cap) 13.99*** 14.10*** 9.421* 5.771 5.286 2.084 14.08 15.12 8.588 12.94 13.68 6.226    
 (3.40) (3.46) (1.71) (0.84) (0.77) (0.26) (1.39) (1.49) (0.67) (0.81) (0.86) (0.34)    
Ln(Tobin's Q) 32.39*** 32.40*** 32.36*** 13.44 13.22 30.05** 9.125 9.390 41.96* 43.42 41.63 90.40**  
 (4.55) (4.59) (3.40) (1.13) (1.12) (2.16) (0.52) (0.54) (1.89) (1.57) (1.51) (2.81)    
UW rank -2.040 -2.119 -3.342 0.694 0.858 -1.545 1.723 1.648 1.404 1.502 2.145 -1.562    
 (-1.19) (-1.24) (-1.46) (0.24) (0.30) (-0.46) (0.41) (0.39) (0.26) (0.23) (0.32) (-0.20)    
Newcomer01_perc 17.59* 17.76* 32.12**                          
 (1.92) (1.95) (2.62)                          
Newcomer02_perc    41.06** 41.25** 52.69**                       
    (2.50) (2.52) (2.73)                       
Newcomer03_perc       54.92** 50.59** 36.58                    
       (2.17) (2.00) (1.14)                    
Newcomer04_perc          139.3*** 124.8** 122.4**  
          (3.45) (3.09) (2.61)    
             
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 884 884 883 884 884 883 884 884 884 884 884 884 
R-square 0.174 0.182 0.089 0.158 0.188 0.107 0.106 0.140 0.070 0.075 0.120 0.112 
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Panel B. Number of cyclers (ranked by quartile) 
  AR0,1 AR0,2 AR0,3 AR0,4 
 
Market-
vw adj. 
Market-
ew adj. 
 
Size-BM 
adj. 
Market-
vw adj. 
Market-
ew adj. 
 
Size-BM 
adj. 
Market-
vw adj. 
Market-
ew adj. 
 
Size-
BM adj. Market-vw adj. 
Market-
ew adj. 
 
Size-
BM 
adj. 
Number of cyclers -3.552* -3.716* -4.607* -6.244* -6.682* -8.442** -8.480* -8.760* -16.13** -5.928 -6.468 -15.94*   
 (-1.73) (-1.82) (-1.68) (-1.82) (-1.95) (-2.10) (-1.67) (-1.73) (-2.52) (-0.74) (-0.81) (-1.72)    
VC 9.054 8.546 20.46* 18.12 17.15 25.75 23.08 21.30 21.68 22.42 17.43 11.29    
 (1.08) (1.03) (1.83) (1.29) (1.23) (1.57) (1.12) (1.03) (0.83) (0.69) (0.53) (0.30)    
Ln(1+age) 2.813 2.648 2.931 8.859 7.982 6.862 11.20 10.38 1.618 6.761 5.324 -2.885    
 (0.65) (0.61) (0.50) (1.22) (1.10) (0.80) (1.04) (0.97) (0.12) (0.40) (0.31) (-0.15)    
Initial return -0.455*** -0.446*** -0.417*** -0.206* -0.206* -0.161 -0.318* -0.303* -0.382* -0.555** -0.562** -0.623*   
 (-6.47) (-6.39) (-4.43) (-1.76) (-1.76) (-1.17) (-1.83) (-1.75) (-1.74) (-2.03) (-2.05) (-1.96)    
Ln(market cap) 14.00*** 14.11*** 9.362* 5.718 5.234 1.923 13.98 14.99 8.270 12.89 13.61 6.314    
 (3.41) (3.46) (1.70) (0.83) (0.76) (0.24) (1.38) (1.48) (0.64) (0.81) (0.85) (0.34)    
Ln(Tobin's Q) 32.43*** 32.45*** 32.45*** 13.55 13.34 30.24** 9.289 9.573 42.33* 43.53 41.75 90.59**  
 (4.56) (4.60) (3.41) (1.14) (1.13) (2.17) (0.53) (0.55) (1.91) (1.58) (1.51) (2.82)    
UW rank -2.036 -2.114 -3.339 0.698 0.862 -1.543 1.726 1.649 1.402 1.506 2.148 -1.540    
 (-1.19) (-1.24) (-1.46) (0.24) (0.30) (-0.46) (0.41) (0.39) (0.26) (0.23) (0.32) (-0.20)    
Newcomer01_perc 17.49* 17.66* 31.99**                          
 (1.91) (1.94) (2.61)                          
Newcomer02_perc    40.84** 41.02** 52.44**                       
    (2.49) (2.50) (2.72)                       
Newcomer03_perc       54.62** 50.29** 36.05                    
       (2.16) (1.99) (1.13)                    
Newcomer04_perc          139.0*** 124.5** 121.7**  
          (3.44) (3.08) (2.59)    
             
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 884 884 883 884 884 883 884 884 884 884 884 884    
R-square 0.174 0.182 0.089 0.158 0.188 0.106 0.106 0.140 0.069 0.075 0.120 0.112    
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Panel C. Percentage of cyclers (ranked by quartile) 
  AR0,1 AR0,2 AR0,3 AR0,4 
 
Market-
vw adj. 
Market-
ew adj. 
 
Size-BM 
adj. 
Market-
vw adj. 
Market-
ew adj. 
 
Size-
BM adj. 
Market-
vw adj. 
Market-
ew adj. 
 
Size-
BM adj. Market-vw adj. 
Market-
ew adj. 
 
Size-
BM adj. 
Percentage of cyclers -3.758* -3.941* -5.733** -5.566 -5.954* -8.424** -7.989 -8.155 -16.53** -5.810 -5.905 -15.46*   
 (-1.81) (-1.92) (-2.07) (-1.61) (-1.72) (-2.07) (-1.56) (-1.59) (-2.56) (-0.72) (-0.73) (-1.65)    
VC 8.943 8.433 20.62* 17.53 16.51 25.28 22.42 20.58 20.93 22.05 16.87 10.23    
 (1.07) (1.02) (1.85) (1.25) (1.18) (1.54) (1.09) (1.00) (0.80) (0.68) (0.52) (0.27)    
Ln(1+age) 2.639 2.466 2.617 8.660 7.769 6.499 10.87 10.05 0.852 6.510 5.095 -3.543    
 (0.61) (0.57) (0.45) (1.19) (1.07) (0.76) (1.01) (0.93) (0.06) (0.38) (0.30) (-0.18)    
Initial return -0.455*** -0.446*** -0.416*** -0.208* -0.208* -0.162 -0.320* -0.305* -0.384* -0.556** -0.563** -0.625**  
 (-6.47) (-6.40) (-4.43) (-1.77) (-1.77) (-1.18) (-1.84) (-1.76) (-1.75) (-2.03) (-2.06) (-1.97)    
Ln(market cap) 13.75*** 13.85*** 9.182* 5.109 4.582 1.257 13.23 14.19 7.058 12.40 13.01 4.989    
 (3.36) (3.41) (1.68) (0.75) (0.67) (0.16) (1.31) (1.40) (0.55) (0.78) (0.82) (0.27)    
Ln(Tobin's Q) 32.66*** 32.68*** 32.72*** 13.97 13.78 30.78** 9.843 10.15 43.35* 43.90 42.17 91.60**  
 (4.59) (4.63) (3.45) (1.18) (1.16) (2.21) (0.56) (0.58) (1.96) (1.59) (1.53) (2.85)    
UW rank -2.030 -2.108 -3.321 0.692 0.856 -1.538 1.726 1.648 1.426 1.511 2.146 -1.529    
 (-1.18) (-1.24) (-1.45) (0.24) (0.30) (-0.46) (0.41) (0.39) (0.27) (0.23) (0.32) (-0.20)    
Newcomer01_perc 17.75* 17.93** 32.37**                          
 (1.94) (1.97) (2.64)                          
Newcomer02_perc    41.33** 41.54** 53.05**                       
    (2.51) (2.53) (2.75)                       
Newcomer03_perc       55.27** 50.98** 37.17                    
       (2.18) (2.01) (1.16)                    
Newcomer04_perc          139.4*** 124.9** 122.6**  
          (3.45) (3.09) (2.61)    
             
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 884 884 883 884 884 883 884 884 884 884 884 884    
R-square 0.174 0.182 0.090 0.157 0.187 0.106 0.105 0.139 0.069 0.074 0.120 0.112    
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Panel D. Cyclers' patent 
  AR0,1 AR0,2 AR0,3 AR0,4 
 
Market-
vw adj. 
Market-
ew adj. 
 
Size-BM 
adj. 
Market-
vw adj. 
Market-
ew adj. 
 
Size-
BM 
adj. 
Market-
vw adj. 
Market-
ew adj. 
 
Size-
BM 
adj. Market-vw adj. 
Market-
ew adj. 
 
Size-
BM adj. 
Cyclers' patent -9.353* -9.139* -6.827 -15.47* -16.77* -14.93 -21.73* -22.20* -31.17* -14.27 -15.84 -35.21    
 (-1.80) (-1.77) (-0.98) (-1.78) (-1.94) (-1.46) (-1.70) (-1.73) (-1.92) (-0.71) (-0.79) (-1.50)    
VC 8.860 8.253 19.47* 17.64 16.67 24.27 22.51 20.67 19.15 23.17 18.09 10.24    
 (1.06) (1.00) (1.74) (1.26) (1.20) (1.48) (1.09) (1.00) (0.73) (0.71) (0.56) (0.27)    
Ln(1+age) 2.730 2.582 2.995 8.746 7.853 6.902 11.01 10.19 1.581 7.124 5.641 -2.755    
 (0.63) (0.60) (0.51) (1.20) (1.08) (0.81) (1.02) (0.95) (0.12) (0.42) (0.33) (-0.14)    
Initial return -0.455*** -0.446*** -0.418*** -0.206* -0.206* -0.163 -0.318* -0.303* -0.386* -0.556** -0.562** -0.628**  
 (-6.46) (-6.39) (-4.44) (-1.76) (-1.76) (-1.18) (-1.83) (-1.74) (-1.75) (-2.04) (-2.05) (-1.98)    
Ln(market cap) 13.97*** 14.02*** 8.855 5.568 5.094 1.179 13.82 14.80 7.056 12.43 13.27 4.870    
 (3.40) (3.44) (1.61) (0.81) (0.74) (0.15) (1.36) (1.46) (0.55) (0.78) (0.83) (0.26)    
Ln(Tobin's Q) 31.95*** 32.00*** 32.27*** 12.80 12.51 29.73** 8.221 8.490 41.16* 41.48 39.72 88.07**  
 (4.49) (4.53) (3.38) (1.08) (1.05) (2.13) (0.47) (0.48) (1.85) (1.50) (1.44) (2.74)    
             
UW rank -2.047 -2.129 -3.376 0.671 0.835 -1.604 1.690 1.611 1.289 1.278 1.953 -1.876    
 (-1.19) (-1.25) (-1.47) (0.23) (0.29) (-0.48) (0.40) (0.38) (0.24) (0.19) (0.29) (-0.24)    
Newcomer01_perc 17.43* 17.60* 31.98**                         
 (1.90) (1.94) (2.60)                         
Newcomer02_perc    40.92** 41.09** 52.83**                      
    (2.49) (2.51) (2.73)                      
Newcomer03_perc       55.12** 50.82** 37.45                   
       (2.18) (2.01) (1.17)                   
Newcomer04_perc          157.6*** 139.6*** 147.3**  
          (3.77) (3.33) (3.03)    
             
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 884 884 883 884 884 883 884 884 884 884 884 884    
R-square 0.108 0.116 0.014 0.091 0.123 0.032 0.035 0.072 -0.008 0.004 0.052 0.043    
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Panel E. Cyclers' citation 
  AR0,1 AR0,2 AR0,3 AR0,4 
 
Market-
vw adj. 
Market-
ew adj. 
 
Size-BM 
adj. 
Market-
vw adj. 
Market-
ew adj. 
 
Size-
BM 
adj. 
Market-
vw adj. 
Market-
ew adj. 
 
Size-
BM adj. Market-vw adj. 
Market-
ew adj. 
 
Size-
BM adj. 
Cyclers' citation -2.910 -2.881 -4.083* -4.910 -5.376* -6.375* -5.747 -5.916 -11.96** -3.303 -3.672 -12.54    
 (-1.60) (-1.59) (-1.68) (-1.61) (-1.77) (-1.78) (-1.28) (-1.31) (-2.10) (-0.47) (-0.52) (-1.52)    
VC 9.395 8.800 21.10* 18.60 17.73 26.23 23.12 21.32 22.41 23.26 18.20 13.27    
 (1.12) (1.05) (1.88) (1.32) (1.26) (1.59) (1.11) (1.03) (0.85) (0.71) (0.56) (0.35)    
Ln(1+age) 2.733 2.581 2.794 8.737 7.839 6.723 11.12 10.30 1.365 7.243 5.773 -2.913    
 (0.63) (0.60) (0.48) (1.20) (1.08) (0.79) (1.03) (0.96) (0.10) (0.43) (0.34) (-0.15)    
Initial return -0.455*** -0.447*** -0.417*** -0.208* -0.207* -0.163 -0.321* -0.306* -0.386* -0.559** -0.564** -0.630**  
 (-6.47) (-6.40) (-4.44) (-1.77) (-1.77) (-1.18) (-1.84) (-1.76) (-1.76) (-2.04) (-2.06) (-1.98)    
Ln(market cap) 13.96*** 14.02*** 9.387* 5.610 5.153 1.692 13.54 14.53 7.729 12.11 12.92 5.327    
 (3.40) (3.44) (1.71) (0.82) (0.75) (0.21) (1.33) (1.43) (0.60) (0.76) (0.81) (0.29)    
Ln(Tobin's Q) 32.22*** 32.25*** 32.12*** 13.19 12.93 29.81** 8.993 9.270 41.57* 42.08 40.38 88.75**  
 (4.52) (4.56) (3.38) (1.11) (1.09) (2.14) (0.51) (0.53) (1.87) (1.52) (1.46) (2.77)    
UW rank -2.130 -2.211 -3.466 0.539 0.691 -1.753 1.518 1.435 0.994 1.172 1.835 -2.200    
 (-1.24) (-1.30) (-1.51) (0.19) (0.24) (-0.52) (0.36) (0.34) (0.19) (0.18) (0.28) (-0.28)    
Newcomer01_perc 17.62* 17.79* 32.21**                         
 (1.92) (1.96) (2.63)                         
Newcomer02_perc    40.69** 40.84** 52.33**                      
    (2.47) (2.49) (2.71)                      
Newcomer03_perc       55.04** 50.73** 36.69                   
       (2.17) (2.00) (1.15)                   
Newcomer04_perc          157.7*** 139.6*** 147.0**  
          (3.77) (3.33) (3.02)    
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 884 884 883 884 884 883 884 884 884 884 884 884    
R-square 0.108 0.116 0.016 0.090 0.123 0.033 0.033 0.070 -0.008 0.003 0.052 0.044    
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Panel F. Excluding the first year 
  AR1,2 AR1,3 AR1,4 
 
Market-vw 
adj. 
Market-ew 
adj. 
 
Size-BM 
adj. 
Market-vw 
adj. 
Market-ew 
adj. 
 
Size-BM 
adj. 
Market-vw 
adj. 
Market-ew 
adj. 
 
Size-BM 
adj. 
Cyclers -7.233 -7.806 -6.647 -20.62 -20.87 -50.83** -5.403 -6.441 -34.88    
 (-0.90) (-0.98) (-0.71) (-1.60) (-1.63) (-2.56) (-0.23) (-0.28) (-1.18)    
VC 10.43 9.658 11.84 21.92 20.77 23.51 15.92 12.71 4.378    
 (1.13) (1.06) (1.11) (1.49) (1.42) (1.03) (0.60) (0.48) (0.13)    
Ln(1+age) 5.852 5.239 2.792 0.599 0.180 -4.012 -5.709 -6.648 -9.498    
 (1.22) (1.11) (0.50) (0.08) (0.02) (-0.34) (-0.41) (-0.48) (-0.54)    
Initial return 0.0263 0.0169 0.0364 -0.0574 -0.0573 -0.119 -0.217 -0.238 -0.253    
 (0.34) (0.22) (0.41) (-0.46) (-0.47) (-0.62) (-0.97) (-1.06) (-0.89)    
Ln(market cap) -0.572 -1.062 -0.264 14.92** 15.31** 11.68 7.585 7.743 7.174    
 (-0.13) (-0.24) (-0.05) (2.07) (2.14) (1.05) (0.58) (0.59) (0.43)    
Ln(Tobin's Q) -10.50 -10.36 2.654 -21.88* -21.25* 10.71 6.581 5.429 61.05**  
 (-1.35) (-1.34) (0.29) (-1.76) (-1.71) (0.56) (0.29) (0.24) (2.12)    
UW rank 0.173 0.437 -1.396 -1.315 -1.199 0.167 -0.291 0.348 -1.094    
 (0.09) (0.24) (-0.64) (-0.44) (-0.40) (0.04) (-0.05) (0.06) (-0.16)    
Newcomer12_perc 25.03** 24.46** 29.39**                       
 (2.42) (2.40) (2.46)                       
Newcomer13_perc    6.895 3.227 -9.370                    
    (0.41) (0.19) (-0.36)                    
Newcomer14_perc       116.8*** 102.6** 104.2**  
       (3.75) (3.29) (2.63)    
          
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 882 882 880 883 883 882 883 883 882    
R-square 0.174 0.180 0.070 0.127 0.132 0.089 0.083 0.108 0.097    
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Panel G. Survival, M/B and ROA three years after IPO 
 ROA M/B Survival Merger 
Cyclers -0.0170*   0.104   0.0176   0.000488   
 (-1.90)   (0.69)   (1.19)   (0.02)   
The number of cyclers  -0.00216                  0.0152   0.00321                   0.00164                  
  (-0.95)                  (0.41)   (0.88)                   (0.31)                  
The percentage of 
cyclers   -0.0434**    0.143   -0.00360      0.134**  
   (-2.31)      (0.45)   (-0.12)      (3.02)    
VC -0.0172* -0.0189* -0.0189*   0.0469 0.0554 0.0587 0.0379** 0.0393** 0.0402**  -0.0125 -0.0129 -0.0134    
 (-1.66) (-1.82) (-1.83)    (0.27) (0.32) (0.34) (2.23) (2.32) (2.38)    (-0.50) (-0.52) (-0.55)    
Ln(1+age) 0.00909* 0.00941* 0.00868    -0.0681 -0.0699 -0.0677 0.0146* 0.0143 0.0142    0.0110 0.0111 0.0136    
 (1.71) (1.77) (1.63)    (-0.76) (-0.78) (-0.76) (1.66) (1.62) (1.60)    (0.85) (0.86) (1.05)    
Initial return 
-
0.0000252 
-
0.0000271 
-
0.0000288    
-
0.00516*** 
-
0.00514*** 
-
0.00512*** 
0.000073
6 
0.000074
3 
0.000077
1    0.000102 0.000101 0.000107    
 (-0.29) (-0.32) (-0.34)    (-3.56) (-3.55) (-3.54) (0.52) (0.52) (0.54)    (0.49) (0.48) (0.52)    
Ln(market cap) 0.0283*** 0.0279*** 0.0270*** -0.0742 -0.0728 -0.0669 0.0260** 0.0261** 0.0271**  0.0141 0.0136 0.0146    
 (5.60) (5.49) (5.37)    (-0.88) (-0.86) (-0.79) (3.12) (3.11) (3.28)    (1.16) (1.11) (1.21)    
Ln(Tobin's Q) -0.0179** -0.0179** -0.0162*   0.979*** 0.980*** 0.971*** -0.0163 -0.0159 -0.0167    -0.0198 -0.0194 -0.0244    
 (-2.04) (-2.03) (-1.84)    (6.65) (6.64) (6.57) (-1.13) (-1.10) (-1.15)    (-0.94) (-0.92) (-1.16)    
UW rank 0.00213 0.00212 0.00224    -0.0579* -0.0580* -0.0580* 0.00117 0.00114 0.00125    0.00478 0.00474 0.00435    
 (1.01) (1.01) (1.06)    (-1.65) (-1.65) (-1.65) (0.34) (0.33) (0.36)    (0.94) (0.93) (0.86)    
             
Newcomer03_perc 0.0224** 0.0221* 0.0224**  -0.0863 -0.0840 -0.0863 0.00871 0.00933 0.00886    
-
0.0582** 
-
0.0580** 
-
0.0585**  
 (2.00) (1.96) (2.00)    (-0.46) (-0.44) (-0.46) (0.47) (0.50) (0.48)    (-2.14) (-2.13) (-2.16)    
             
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 861 861 861 856 856 856 884 884 884    884 884 884 
R-square 0.228 0.225 0.230 0.221 0.221 0.221 0.108 0.107 0.107    0.072 0.072 0.083 
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Table 7 
Calendar-Time Factor Model Regressions Using Fama-French 3-Factor Model (Jan. 1985-Dec. 2007) 
Table 7 presents the calendar-time factor model regressions suing Fama-French (1993) 3-factor model for IPO firms 
in the period of 1985-2007. The model is 𝑅𝑝𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝑏(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) + 𝑠𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡, where 𝑅𝑝𝑡 is the 
return for an equal-weighted calendar-time portfolio of IPOs in month 𝑡, 𝑟𝑓𝑡 is the return on the three-month T-bill in 
month 𝑡, 𝑅𝑚𝑡is the return on the value-weighted market index in month 𝑡, (𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) is the market risk premium 
𝑀𝑅𝑃, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡  is the return on a value-weighted portfolio of small firms minus the return on a value-weighted 
portfolio of large firms in month 𝑡, and 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  is the return on a value-weighted portfolio of high book-to-market 
stocks minus the return on a value-weighted portfolio of high book-to-market stocks in month 𝑡. I calculate the 
returns for the portfolio of IPO firms for the period of 0-6 months after IPO in Panel A, 0-12 months after IPO in 
Panel B, 0-24 months after IPO in Panel C, 0-36 months after IPO in Panel D and 0-48 months after IPO in Panel E. 
Each regression uses 276 monthly observations. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.  
Panel A. 0-6 months after IPO 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Full sample 
Firms with no 
innovation 
Firms with  
innovation 
Firms with no 
cyclers Firms with cycler 
MRP 1.328*** 1.293*** 1.355*** 1.402*** 1.354*** 
 (17.04) (144.28) (50.79) (9.99) (8.78) 
      
SMB 1.002*** 1.004*** 1.322*** 1.176*** 1.060*** 
 (10.18) (93.90) (45.97) (6.63) (5.49) 
      
HML -0.619*** -0.584*** -1.002*** -1.184*** -0.847*** 
 (-4.94) (-39.95) (-27.24) (-5.31) (-3.46) 
      
Intercept 0.198 -0.0160 1.513*** 1.228** 0.718 
  (0.63) (-0.45) (14.80) (2.18) (1.14) 
      
Panel B. 0-12 months after IPO 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Full sample 
Firms with no 
innovation 
Firms with  
innovation 
Firms with no 
cyclers Firms with cycler 
MRP 1.254*** 1.349*** 1.214*** 1.231*** 1.252*** 
 (26.64) (16.01) (5.71) (12.02) (10.58) 
      
SMB 1.012*** 0.964*** 1.056*** 1.082*** 1.034*** 
 (15.40) (8.20) (4.77) (8.02) (6.62) 
      
HML -0.546*** -0.547*** -0.762** -1.127*** -0.857*** 
 (-7.47) (-3.82) (-2.52) (-6.84) (-4.50) 
      
Intercept -0.152 0.263 -0.351 0.441 0.206 
  (-0.72) (0.78) (-0.38) (1.02) (0.41) 
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Panel C. 0-24 months after IPO 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Full sample 
Firms with no 
innovation 
Firms with  
innovation 
Firms with no 
cyclers Firms with cycler 
MRP 1.254*** 1.207*** 1.365*** 1.403*** 1.250*** 
 (26.64) (23.57) (22.96) (20.94) (14.73) 
SMB 1.012*** 0.928*** 1.242*** 1.241*** 1.195*** 
 (15.40) (12.99) (15.03) (13.33) (10.13) 
HML -0.546*** -0.460*** -0.834*** -0.849*** -0.880*** 
 (-7.47) (-5.79) (-9.09) (-8.20) (-6.71) 
Intercept -0.152 -0.247 0.329 0.342 0.320 
  (-0.72) (-1.08) (1.24) (1.14) (0.84) 
      
Panel D. 0-36 months after IPO 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Full sample 
Firms with no 
innovation 
Firms with  
innovation 
Firms with no 
cyclers Firms with cycler 
MRP 1.357*** 1.204*** 1.400*** 1.427*** 1.309*** 
 (19.66)    (25.09) (22.51) (20.65) (17.31) 
      
SMB 1.138*** 0.945*** 1.218*** 1.193*** 1.245*** 
 (12.30)    (13.81) (13.79) (12.16) (11.59) 
      
HML -0.541*** -0.331*** -0.730*** -0.723*** -0.792*** 
 (-4.69)    (-4.42) (-7.55) (-6.73) (-6.73) 
      
Intercept -0.261    -0.122 0.593** 0.693** 0.168 
  (-0.92)    (-0.56) (2.10) (2.21) (0.49) 
      
Panel E. 0-48 months after IPO 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Full sample 
Firms with no 
innovation 
Firms with  
innovation 
Firms with no 
cyclers Firms with cycler 
MRP 1.259*** 1.203*** 1.408*** 1.416*** 1.390*** 
 (29.01) (26.64) (25.45) (24.37) (19.95) 
      
SMB 1.046*** 0.951*** 1.327*** 1.293*** 1.383*** 
 (16.71) (14.59) (16.68) (15.47) (13.80) 
      
HML -0.305*** -0.221** -0.570*** -0.570*** -0.533*** 
 (-4.47) (-3.11) (-6.57) (-6.25) (-4.88) 
      
Intercept 0.0435 -0.0818 0.536** 0.575** 0.304 
  (0.22) (-0.40) (2.14) (2.19) (0.96) 
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Table 8 
Calendar-Time Factor Model Regressions Using Fama-French 3-Factor Model Purged IPO and SEO 
Firms (Jan. 1985-Dec. 2003) 
Table 8 presents the calendar-time factor model regressions using Fama-French (1993) 3-factor model purged IPO 
and SEO firms for IPO firms in the period of 1985-2007. The model is 𝑅𝑝𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝑏(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) + 𝑠𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 +
ℎ𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡, where 𝑅𝑝𝑡 is the return for an equal-weighted calendar-time portfolio of IPOs in month 𝑡, 𝑟𝑓𝑡 is the 
return on the three-month T-bill in month 𝑡, 𝑅𝑚𝑡is the return on the value-weighted market index in month 𝑡, 
(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) is the market risk premium 𝑀𝑅𝑃, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 is the return on a value-weighted portfolio of small firms minus 
the return on a value-weighted portfolio of large firms in month 𝑡 purged IPO and SEO firms, and 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  is the 
return on a value-weighted portfolio of high book-to-market stocks minus the return on a value-weighted portfolio 
of high book-to-market stocks in month 𝑡 purged IPO and SEO firms. I calculate the returns for the portfolio of IPO 
firms for the period of 0-6 months after IPO in Panel A, 0-12 months after IPO in Panel B, 0-24 months after IPO in 
Panel C, 0-36 months after IPO in Panel D and 0-48 months after IPO in Panel E. Each regression uses 228 monthly 
observations. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is 
denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.  
Panel A. 0-6 month after IPO 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Full sample 
Firms with no 
innovation 
Firms with  
innovation 
Firms with no 
cyclers Firms with cycler 
MRP 1.374*** 1.366*** 1.503*** 1.422*** 1.510*** 
 (14.54)    (132.62) (46.04)    (8.40) (9.08)    
SMB 1.106*** 1.231*** 1.577*** 1.219*** 1.244*** 
 (8.74)    (96.27) (41.92)    (5.38) (5.61)    
HML -0.760*** -0.656*** -0.975*** -1.398*** -0.785**  
 (-4.82)    (-39.35) (-21.88)    (-5.01) (-2.87)    
Intercept 0.149    -0.167*** 1.481*** 1.547** 0.899    
  (0.38)    (-4.16) (11.93)    (2.23) (1.29)    
      
Panel B. 0-12 month after IPO 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Full sample 
Firms with no 
innovation 
Firms with  
innovation 
Firms with no 
cyclers Firms with cycler 
MRP 1.351*** 1.384*** 1.249*** 1.349*** 1.380*** 
 (20.42)    (13.33) (5.46)    (10.55) (9.97)    
      
SMB 1.150*** 0.941*** 1.512*** 1.295*** 1.050*** 
 (12.98)    (6.31) (5.78)    (7.60) (5.67)    
      
HML -0.641*** -0.635*** -0.881**  -1.167*** -0.971*** 
 (-5.81)    (-3.41) (-2.81)    (-5.50) (-4.24)    
      
Intercept -0.472*   0.263 -1.089    0.539 -0.0616    
  (-1.74)    (0.62) (-1.07)    (1.03) (-0.11)    
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Panel C. 0-24 month after IPO 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Full sample 
Firms with no 
innovation 
Firms with  
innovation 
Firms with no 
cyclers Firms with cycler 
MRP 1.459*** 1.290*** 1.459*** 1.484*** 1.429*** 
 (16.08)    (18.76) (16.08)    (14.93) (13.10)    
SMB 1.315*** 1.084*** 1.315*** 1.316*** 1.314*** 
 (10.87)    (11.77) (10.87)    (9.94) (9.05)    
HML -0.978*** -0.569*** -0.978*** -1.004*** -0.907*** 
 (-6.49)    (-4.96) (-6.49)    (-6.09) (-5.01)    
Intercept 0.300 -0.610** 0.300    0.401 0.0716    
  (0.81)    (-2.16) (0.81)    (0.98) (0.16)    
      
Panel D. 0-36 month after IPO 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Full sample 
Firms with no 
innovation 
Firms with  
innovation 
Firms with no 
cyclers Firms with cycler 
MRP 1.263*** 1.295*** 1.461*** 1.485*** 1.430*** 
 (27.43) (18.54) (16.27)    (15.77) (13.57)    
      
SMB 1.020*** 1.068*** 1.321*** 1.319*** 1.279*** 
 (15.53) (11.41) (11.04)    (10.51) (9.11)    
      
HML -0.415*** -0.458*** -0.925*** -0.901*** -0.941*** 
 (-5.77) (-3.93) (-6.20)    (-5.76) (-5.37)    
      
Intercept 0.0181 -0.412 0.447    0.500 0.371    
  (0.09) (-1.43) (1.21)    (1.29) (0.86)    
      
Panel E. 0-48 month after IPO 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Full sample 
Firms with no 
innovation 
Firms with  
innovation 
Firms with no 
cyclers Firms with cycler 
MRP 1.338*** 1.288*** 1.433*** 1.437*** 1.448*** 
 (20.14)    (19.55) (16.31)    (15.98) (14.21)    
      
SMB 1.149*** 1.071*** 1.372*** 1.344*** 1.394*** 
 (12.91)    (12.14) (11.72)    (11.22) (10.28)    
      
HML -0.465*** -0.348** -0.890*** -0.876*** -0.884*** 
 (-4.20)    (-3.17) (-6.10)    (-5.87) (-5.23)    
      
Intercept -0.138    -0.321 0.621*   0.643* 0.628    
  (-0.51)    (-1.18) (1.72)    (1.74) (1.50)    
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Table 9 
Talent Cycling and IPO Long-Run Performance--2SLS Results 
Table 9 presents the results of the effect of talent cycling on IPO long-run performance for 884 IPOs from 1985 to 2007 from 2SLS results. Cyclers is defined as a dummy variable equal to one if the 
firm has at least one cycler and zero otherwise. The instrument variable is IDD defined as a dummy variable equal to one if the state adopts the IDD by the state court. VC is a dummy variable equal 
to one if the firm is VC-backed and zero otherwise. Ln(1+age) is from Loughran and Ritter (2004) measured as the natural logarithm of one plus the number of years from founding year to IPO year. 
Initial return is defined as the closing price one day after the offering date divided by offering price minus one. Ln(Market cap) is defined as the natural logarithm of offer price multiplying the total 
number of post-IPO shares. Ln (Tobin’s Q) is defined as the natural logarithm of market value of assets over the book value of assets. UW rank is the underwritter ranking from Loughran and Ritter 
(2004) on a 1-9 scale. Newcomer01_perc is the ratio of the number of newcomers to the total number of inventors in the firm one year after IPO. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. T-
statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
Panel A. Including the first year                       
 
AR0,1 
(market-vw 
adj.)  
AR0,1  
(market-
ew adj.)  
AR0,1  
(size-BM 
adj.)  
AR0,2 
(market-
vw adj.)  
AR0,2 
(market-
ew adj.)  
AR0,2  
(size-BM 
adj.)  
AR0,3 
(market-
vw adj.)  
AR0,3 
(market-
ew adj.)  
AR0,3  
(size-BM 
adj.)  
AR0,4 
(market-
vw adj.)  
AR0,4 
(market-
ew adj.)  
AR0,4  
(size-BM 
adj.)  
Cycler -3.645 -3.462 5.789 -5.521 -5.473 -5.837 -19.39** -18.95** -18.74 -42.78*** -43.76*** -43.20**  
 (-1.26) (-1.20) (1.47) (-1.14) (-1.13) (-1.02) (-2.09) (-2.04) (-1.58) (-3.71) (-3.80) (-3.17)    
VC 11.09 10.30 9.919 16.41 15.95 23.18 35.18 33.23 31.33 71.71** 65.43* 53.28    
 (1.23) (1.15) (0.81) (1.07) (1.05) (1.29) (1.52) (1.43) (1.06) (2.02) (1.85) (1.27)    
Ln(1+age) 2.117 2.153 3.018 9.985 9.132 9.175 8.832 8.161 0.620 6.447 5.256 -3.840    
 (0.48) (0.49) (0.50) (1.33) (1.22) (1.04) (0.80) (0.74) (0.04) (0.37) (0.30) (-0.19)    
Initial retrun -0.441*** -0.432*** -0.444*** -0.209* -0.211* -0.191 -0.337* -0.323* -0.452** -0.537* -0.544* -0.700**  
 (-6.20) (-6.12) (-4.60) (-1.74) (-1.76) (-1.35) (-1.89) (-1.81) (-1.99) (-1.93) (-1.95) (-2.12)    
Ln(market cap) 14.10** 14.15*** 5.546 7.390 6.870 3.246 20.48* 21.29* 12.90 32.67* 34.30** 25.26    
 (3.27) (3.31) (0.95) (1.01) (0.94) (0.38) (1.88) (1.96) (0.93) (1.93) (2.03) (1.26)    
Ln(Tobin's Q) 32.21*** 32.30*** 35.49*** 9.114 9.030 24.11* 5.038 5.564 35.77 38.65 36.31 79.98**  
 (4.46) (4.50) (3.62) (0.75) (0.74) (1.67) (0.28) (0.31) (1.55) (1.37) (1.28) (2.39)    
UW rank -1.934 -2.030 -3.881 0.239 0.433 -1.228 1.351 1.193 1.967 1.879 2.670 0.127    
 (-1.11) (-1.17) (-1.64) (0.08) (0.15) (-0.35) (0.31) (0.27) (0.35) (0.27) (0.39) (0.02)    
Newcomer01_perc 15.64* 15.41* 30.01**          
 (1.68) (1.67) (2.38)          
Newcomer02_perc    41.45** 41.50** 56.72**       
    (2.47) (2.48) (2.87)       
Newcomer03_perc       58.90** 54.74** 47.22    
       (2.27) (2.11) (1.43)    
Newcomer04_perc          145.1*** 131.8** 139.7**  
          (3.54) (3.22) (2.88)    
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 876 876 875 876 876 875 876 876 876 876 876 876    
R-square 0.204 0.212 0.097 0.171 0.200 0.110 0.119 0.151 0.066 0.098 0.144 0.104    
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Panel B.  Excluding the first year 
 
AR1,2 
(market-vw 
adj.)  
AR1,2 
(market-ew 
adj.)  
AR1,2  
(size-BM adj.)  
AR1,3 
(market-vw 
adj.)  
AR1,3 
(market-ew 
adj.)  
AR1,3  
(size-BM adj.)  
AR1,4 
(market-vw 
adj.)  
AR1,4 
(market-ew 
adj.)  
AR1,4  
(size-BM adj.)  
Cycler -1.751 -1.827 -2.995 -14.41** -14.46** -23.34** -37.41*** -38.62*** -42.14**  
 (-0.51) (-0.54) (-0.75) (-2.61) (-2.63) (-2.69) (-3.73) (-3.85) (-3.29)    
VC 6.104 5.544 14.21 26.63 25.66 36.96 48.77* 45.07 36.90 
 (0.61) (0.56) (1.21) (1.65) (1.59) (1.45) (1.67) (1.54) (0.99) 
Ln(1+age) 7.438 6.574 5.168 -0.529 -1.144 -4.427 -4.075 -5.140 -5.468 
 (1.52) (1.36) (0.90) (-0.07) (-0.15) (-0.36) (-0.29) (-0.36) (-0.30) 
Initial retrun 0.00289 -0.00770 0.0226 -0.0508 -0.0505 -0.124 -0.168 -0.186 -0.261 
 (0.04) (-0.10) (0.25) (-0.40) (-0.40) (-0.63) (-0.74) (-0.82) (-0.90) 
Ln(market cap) 0.659 0.176 2.176 20.07** 20.47** 20.40* 23.50* 24.56* 25.43 
 (0.14) (0.04) (0.39) (2.63) (2.70) (1.70) (1.71) (1.79) (1.45) 
Ln(Tobin's Q) -11.07 -10.97 0.617 -27.04** -26.40** 0.148 -1.698 -3.635 47.17 
 (-1.39) (-1.40) (0.07) (-2.11) (-2.07) (0.01) (-0.07) (-0.16) (1.60) 
UW rank -0.395 -0.100 -0.786 -2.273 -2.168 1.512 -0.625 0.168 1.326 
 (-0.21) (-0.05) (-0.35) (-0.73) (-0.70) (0.31) (-0.11) (0.03) (0.19) 
Newcomer11_perc 24.89** 24.30** 28.00**       
 (2.28) (2.26) (2.20)       
Newcomer12_perc    15.14 11.76 -0.344    
    (0.86) (0.67) (-0.01)    
Newcomer13_perc       141.5*** 126.9*** 126.5**  
       (4.40) (3.95) (3.08)    
          
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 874 874 872 875 875 874 875 875 874    
R-square 0.202 0.209 0.086 0.148 0.151 0.082 0.113 0.138 0.118    
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Table 10 
Talent Cycling and IPO Long-Run Performance--Propensity Score Matching Results 
Table 10 presents the results of the effect of talent cycling on IPO long-run performance from 1985 to 2007 from propensity score matching results. Cyclers is defined as a 
dummy variable equal to one if the firm has at least one cycler and zero otherwise. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
  
AR0,1 
(market-
vw adj.)  
AR0,1  
(market-
ew adj.)  
AR0,1  
(size-BM 
adj.)  
AR0,2 
(market-
vw adj.)  
AR0,2 
(market-
ew adj.)  
AR0,2  
(size-BM 
adj.)  
AR0,3 
(market-
vw adj.)  
AR0,3 
(market-
ew adj.)  
AR0,3  
(size-BM 
adj.)  
AR0,4 
(market-
vw adj.)  
AR0,4 
(market-
ew adj.)  
AR0,4  
(size-BM 
adj.)  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Cycler -11.23* -12.41** -15.13* -20.95** -22.10** -28.77** -35.16** -34.83** -67.02** -26.95 -25.68 -61.17**  
 (-1.78) (-1.97) (-1.65) (-2.11) (-2.25) (-2.22) (-2.27) (-2.23) (-2.61) (-1.40) (-1.30) (-2.06)    
Nearest matching 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Other control variables Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 636 636 636 636 636 636 636 636 636 636 636 636 
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Table 11 
Talent Cycling and IPO Long-Run Performance--Robustness Tests 
This table presents the robustness tests of the effect of talent cycling on IPO long-run performance. In panel A, Number of employees is defined as the differences between the 
number of employees one year after IPO and one year before IPO over total assets. In Panel B, Salary expense is defined as the quartile rank of the differences between the 
salary expenses one year after IPO and one year before IPO. The missing value of salary expenses is set to zero. In Panel C, bubble years (1999 and 2000) are excluded. In 
Panel D, Hot market is defined as a dummy variable equal to one if the number of IPOs in a year is greater than the median number of IPO in the sample by year. Variable 
definitions are provided in the Appendix. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *, 
respectively. 
Panel A. Number of employees  
 
AR0,1 
(market-
vw adj.)  
AR0,1  
(market-
ew adj.)  
AR0,1  
(size-BM 
adj.)  
AR0,2 
(market-
vw adj.)  
AR0,2 
(market-
ew adj.)  
AR0,2  
(size-BM 
adj.)  
AR0,3 
(market-
vw adj.)  
AR0,3 
(market-
ew adj.)  
AR0,3  
(size-BM 
adj.)  
AR0,4 
(market-
vw adj.)  
AR0,4 
(market-
ew adj.)  
AR0,4  
(size-BM 
adj.)  
Cycler -11.34 -12.14 -12.16 -21.45 -22.87* -28.16* -23.28 -24.83* -46.75** -26.33 -29.54 -54.25    
 (-1.42) (-1.53) (-1.12) (-1.65) (-1.76) (-1.83) (-1.58) (-1.69) (-2.23) (-0.82) (-0.92) (-1.46)    
Number of employees  3854.0** 3719.0** 515.5 2682.0 2461.8 2252.7 1868.9 1620.5 1561.4 -25.15 -333.2 3263.0    
 (2.76) (2.69) (0.27) (1.18) (1.09) (0.84) (0.73) (0.63) (0.43) (-0.00) (-0.06) (0.50)    
VC 7.207 6.889 17.64 15.20 14.47 17.85 9.358 8.464 3.542 27.66 23.81 10.35    
 (0.78) (0.75) (1.41) (1.01) (0.96) (1.00) (0.55) (0.50) (0.15) (0.74) (0.64) (0.24)    
Ln(1+age) 1.615 1.663 3.792 4.383 3.459 5.591 2.974 2.894 -1.755 0.685 -1.583 -4.433    
 (0.32) (0.33) (0.56) (0.53) (0.42) (0.58) (0.32) (0.31) (-0.13) (0.03) (-0.08) (-0.19)    
Initial return -0.466*** -0.456*** -0.444*** -0.235* -0.230* -0.186 -0.280* -0.255* -0.331 -0.653** -0.638** -0.685*   
 (-5.93) (-5.83) (-4.18) (-1.84) (-1.80) (-1.24) (-1.93) (-1.76) (-1.60) (-2.07) (-2.02) (-1.87)    
Ln(market cap) 15.89*** 15.91*** 9.560 8.172 7.117 0.170 12.49 12.63 4.241 15.67 14.95 3.570    
 (3.49) (3.52) (1.55) (1.10) (0.96) (0.02) (1.49) (1.51) (0.36) (0.86) (0.82) (0.17)    
Ln(Tobin's Q) 31.72*** 31.82*** 36.55*** 11.87 11.72 33.82** 1.983 2.206 37.96* 44.72 42.10 93.03**  
 (4.05) (4.09) (3.45) (0.93) (0.92) (2.25) (0.14) (0.15) (1.85) (1.42) (1.34) (2.56)    
UW rank -2.787 -2.846 -4.281* -0.451 0.00269 -2.921 0.606 0.704 -0.633 -0.278 0.704 -4.825    
 (-1.48) (-1.53) (-1.69) (-0.15) (0.00) (-0.81) (0.18) (0.20) (-0.13) (-0.04) (0.09) (-0.55)    
Newcomer01_perc 15.86 16.19 35.60**          
 (1.56) (1.61) (2.59)          
Newcomer02_perc    34.85** 35.33** 55.37**                       
    (1.98) (2.01) (2.67)                       
Newcomer03_perc       32.46 27.72 19.17                    
       (1.56) (1.33) (0.65)                    
Newcomer04_perc          146.0** 128.6** 132.8**  
          (3.19) (2.81) (2.51)    
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 770 770 769 770 770 769 770 770 770 770 770 770    
R-square 0.185 0.191 0.089 0.162 0.188 0.104 0.102 0.150 0.078 0.072 0.114 0.112    
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Panel B. Salary expense (ranked by quartile) 
 
AR0,1 
(market-
vw adj.)  
AR0,1  
(market-
ew adj.)  
AR0,1  
(size-BM 
adj.)  
AR0,2 
(market-
vw adj.)  
AR0,2 
(market-
ew adj.)  
AR0,2  
(size-BM 
adj.)  
AR0,3 
(market-
vw adj.)  
AR0,3 
(market-
ew adj.)  
AR0,3  
(size-BM 
adj.)  
AR0,4 
(market-
vw adj.)  
AR0,4 
(market-
ew adj.)  
AR0,4  
(size-BM 
adj.)  
Cycler -12.24* -12.97* -17.35* -22.35* -23.91* -31.86** -30.35* -31.91* -58.55** -21.41 -23.66 -55.51*   
 (-1.67) (-1.78) (-1.77) (-1.82) (-1.96) (-2.21) (-1.68) (-1.76) (-2.57) (-0.75) (-0.83) (-1.67)    
Salary expense -15.70 -11.74 17.05 -58.36 -55.64 -36.12 -120.1 -113.2 -318.0** -42.11 -38.60 9.680    
 (-0.35) (-0.26) (0.28) (-0.77) (-0.74) (-0.41) (-1.08) (-1.01) (-2.26) (-0.24) (-0.22) (0.05)    
VC 9.160 8.667 20.68* 18.47 17.51 26.33 23.61 21.89 22.98 22.73 17.79 11.60    
 (1.09) (1.04) (1.85) (1.32) (1.25) (1.60) (1.14) (1.06) (0.88) (0.70) (0.54) (0.31)    
Ln(1+age) 2.801 2.622 2.808 8.880 7.991 6.770 11.27 10.42 1.884 6.735 5.275 -3.129    
 (0.64) (0.61) (0.48) (1.22) (1.10) (0.79) (1.05) (0.97) (0.14) (0.40) (0.31) (-0.16)    
Initial return -0.455*** -0.446*** -0.418*** -0.205* -0.205* -0.161 -0.315* -0.300* -0.372* -0.555** -0.561** -0.627**  
 (-6.46) (-6.39) (-4.45) (-1.74) (-1.75) (-1.17) (-1.81) (-1.73) (-1.70) (-2.02) (-2.05) (-1.97)    
Ln(market cap) 13.95*** 14.07*** 9.468* 5.558 5.083 1.951 13.65 14.71 7.432 12.79 13.54 6.260    
 (3.39) (3.45) (1.72) (0.81) (0.74) (0.24) (1.34) (1.45) (0.58) (0.80) (0.85) (0.34)    
Ln(Tobin's Q) 32.29*** 32.33*** 32.46*** 13.12 12.92 29.86** 8.474 8.776 40.24* 43.19 41.41 90.45**  
 (4.53) (4.57) (3.41) (1.10) (1.09) (2.14) (0.48) (0.50) (1.82) (1.56) (1.50) (2.81)    
UW rank -2.041 -2.119 -3.342 0.683 0.848 -1.551 1.705 1.631 1.357 1.496 2.139 -1.561    
 (-1.19) (-1.24) (-1.46) (0.24) (0.30) (-0.46) (0.40) (0.39) (0.25) (0.22) (0.32) (-0.20)    
Newcomer01_perc 17.58* 17.75* 32.13**          
 (1.92) (1.95) (2.62)          
Newcomer02_perc    41.90** 42.05** 53.21**                       
    (2.54) (2.56) (2.75)                       
Newcomer03_perc       56.68** 52.24** 41.21                    
       (2.24) (2.06) (1.29)                    
             
Newcomer04_perc          139.9*** 125.3** 122.3**  
          (3.46) (3.10) (2.60)    
             
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 884 884 883 884 884 883 884 884 884 884 884 884    
R-square 0.174 0.182 0.089 0.159 0.189 0.107 0.107 0.141 0.076 0.075 0.120 0.112    
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Panel C. Excluding bubble period 
 
AR0,1 
(market-
vw adj.)  
AR0,1  
(market-
ew adj.)  
AR0,1  
(size-BM 
adj.)  
AR0,2 
(market-
vw adj.)  
AR0,2 
(market-
ew adj.)  
AR0,2  
(size-BM 
adj.)  
AR0,3 
(market-
vw adj.)  
AR0,3 
(market-
ew adj.)  
AR0,3  
(size-BM 
adj.)  
AR0,4 
(market-
vw adj.)  
AR0,4 
(market-
ew adj.)  
AR0,4  
(size-BM 
adj.)  
Cycler -3.085 -4.173 -11.83 -26.76* -28.51* -36.66** -42.08* -42.80* -77.09** -28.94 -29.62 -77.24*   
 (-0.46) (-0.62) (-1.30) (-1.74) (-1.86) (-2.08) (-1.83) (-1.87) (-2.70) (-0.79) (-0.80) (-1.82)    
VC 6.832 6.352 19.53* 23.30 22.31 31.85 31.28 29.20 30.90 30.93 25.69 17.91    
 (0.92) (0.86) (1.96) (1.37) (1.32) (1.64) (1.23) (1.15) (0.98) (0.76) (0.63) (0.38)    
Ln(1+age) 0.0402 -0.116 -5.003 7.039 6.124 1.866 9.988 9.063 -3.179 5.263 4.159 -9.621    
 (0.01) (-0.03) (-1.00) (0.83) (0.72) (0.19) (0.79) (0.72) (-0.20) (0.26) (0.21) (-0.41)    
Initial return -0.566*** -0.542*** -0.352** -0.164 -0.178 0.123 -0.565 -0.549 -0.528 -0.987 -0.958 -0.936    
 (-4.35) (-4.21) (-2.02) (-0.55) (-0.60) (0.36) (-1.28) (-1.25) (-0.96) (-1.40) (-1.36) (-1.15)    
Ln(market cap) 12.27*** 12.34*** 6.866 7.022 6.643 -1.602 19.14 19.82 9.032 17.87 17.99 6.231    
 (3.40) (3.46) (1.42) (0.85) (0.81) (-0.17) (1.56) (1.62) (0.59) (0.91) (0.92) (0.28)    
Ln(Tobin's Q) 22.41** 22.50** 21.06** 16.85 16.88 21.96 22.56 22.36 45.69 70.48* 68.52* 112.0**  
 (3.17) (3.22) (2.23) (1.05) (1.05) (1.20) (0.94) (0.94) (1.54) (1.84) (1.79) (2.54)    
UW rank -2.612* -2.668* -2.871 0.416 0.590 -1.490 1.191 1.136 1.398 1.213 1.638 -1.697    
 (-1.79) (-1.85) (-1.47) (0.13) (0.18) (-0.39) (0.24) (0.23) (0.23) (0.15) (0.21) (-0.19)    
Newcomer01_perc 15.57* 15.46* 15.80                          
 (1.87) (1.88) (1.42)                          
Newcomer02_perc    48.45** 48.90** 58.07**                       
    (2.40) (2.43) (2.51)                       
Newcomer03_perc       63.74** 60.69* 35.91                    
       (2.04) (1.94) (0.92)                    
Newcomer04_perc          173.2*** 160.1** 150.0**  
          (3.41) (3.15) (2.57)    
             
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 700 700 699 700 700 699 700 700 700 700 700 700    
R-square 0.125 0.148 0.080 0.164 0.192 0.102 0.115 0.145 0.073 0.088 0.126 0.119    
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Panel D. Hot market 
 
AR0,1 
(market-
vw adj.)  
AR0,1  
(market-
ew adj.)  
AR0,1  
(size-BM 
adj.)  
AR0,2 
(market-
vw adj.)  
AR0,2 
(market-
ew adj.)  
AR0,2  
(size-BM 
adj.)  
AR0,3 
(market-
vw adj.)  
AR0,3 
(market-
ew adj.)  
AR0,3  
(size-BM 
adj.)  
AR0,4 
(market-
vw adj.)  
AR0,4 
(market-
ew adj.)  
AR0,4  
(size-BM 
adj.)  
Cycler -12.40* -13.09* -17.17* -22.98* -24.51** -32.25** -31.65* -33.13* -61.98** -21.85 -24.07 -55.40*   
 (-1.69) (-1.80) (-1.75) (-1.88) (-2.01) (-2.25) (-1.75) (-1.84) (-2.72) (-0.77) (-0.85) (-1.68)    
Hot market 43.19 42.44 68.12* 9.257 18.50 54.20 -17.49 15.32 58.02 -42.96 -1.184 68.59    
 (1.42) (1.40) (1.67) (0.18) (0.36) (0.91) (-0.23) (0.20) (0.61) (-0.36) (-0.01) (0.50)    
VC 9.139 8.651 20.70* 18.41 17.45 26.30 23.53 21.82 22.77 22.70 17.76 11.60    
 (1.09) (1.04) (1.85) (1.31) (1.25) (1.60) (1.14) (1.05) (0.87) (0.70) (0.54) (0.31)    
Ln(1+age) 2.766 2.596 2.846 8.749 7.866 6.688 11.04 10.19 1.264 6.651 5.198 -3.110    
 (0.64) (0.60) (0.49) (1.20) (1.08) (0.78) (1.03) (0.95) (0.09) (0.39) (0.31) (-0.16)    
Initial return -0.456*** -0.447*** -0.417*** -0.208* -0.207* -0.162 -0.319* -0.305* -0.385* -0.556** -0.563** -0.626**  
 (-6.48) (-6.40) (-4.44) (-1.77) (-1.77) (-1.18) (-1.84) (-1.75) (-1.75) (-2.03) (-2.06) (-1.97)    
Ln(market cap) 13.99*** 14.10*** 9.421* 5.771 5.286 2.084 14.08 15.12 8.588 12.94 13.68 6.226    
 (3.40) (3.46) (1.71) (0.84) (0.77) (0.26) (1.39) (1.49) (0.67) (0.81) (0.86) (0.34)    
Ln(Tobin's Q) 32.39*** 32.40*** 32.36*** 13.44 13.22 30.05** 9.125 9.390 41.96* 43.42 41.63 90.40**  
 (4.55) (4.59) (3.40) (1.13) (1.12) (2.16) (0.52) (0.54) (1.89) (1.57) (1.51) (2.81)    
UW rank -2.040 -2.119 -3.342 0.694 0.858 -1.545 1.723 1.648 1.404 1.502 2.145 -1.562    
 (-1.19) (-1.24) (-1.46) (0.24) (0.30) (-0.46) (0.41) (0.39) (0.26) (0.23) (0.32) (-0.20)    
Newcomer01_perc 17.59* 17.76* 32.12**          
 (1.92) (1.95) (2.62)          
Newcomer02_perc    41.06** 41.25** 52.69**                       
    (2.50) (2.52) (2.73)                       
Newcomer03_perc       54.92** 50.59** 36.58                    
       (2.17) (2.00) (1.14)                    
Newcomer04_perc          139.3*** 124.8** 122.4**  
          (3.45) (3.09) (2.61)    
             
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 884 884 883 884 884 883 884 884 884 884 884 884    
R-square 0.174 0.182 0.089 0.158 0.188 0.107 0.106 0.140 0.070 0.075 0.120 0.112    
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APPENDIX 12: Cumulative Abnormal Return 
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Figure 1. Cumulative buy-and-hold benchmark-adjusted returns for the full sample, 3,833 IPO firms, from 1985 to 
2007 with monthly rebalancing. The benchmarks are CRSP value-weighted index, CRSP equal-weighted index and 
a portfolio of non-IPO firms matched to IPO firms on size and market-to-book (style-matched firms). 
 
 
Figure 2. Cumulative buy-and-hold market-value-weighted-adjusted returns for firms with no innovation (2,949 
firms) and firms with innovation (884 firms) from 1985 to 2007 with monthly rebalancing. 
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Figure 3. Cumulative buy-and-hold market-equal-weighted-adjusted returns for firms with no innovation (2,949 
firms) and firms with innovation (884 firms) from 1985 to 2007 with monthly rebalancing. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Cumulative buy-and-hold style-adjusted returns for firms with no innovation (2,949 firms) and firms with 
innovation (884 firms) from 1985 to 2007 with monthly rebalancing. 
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Figure 5. Cumulative buy-and-hold market-value-weighted-adjusted returns for firms with cyclers (318 firms) and 
firms with no cyclers (566 firms) from 1985 to 2007 with monthly rebalancing. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Cumulative buy-and-hold market-equal-weighted-adjusted returns for firms with cyclers (318 firms) and 
firms with no cyclers (566 firms) from 1985 to 2007 with monthly rebalancing. 
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Figure 7. Cumulative buy-and-hold style-adjusted returns for firms with cyclers (318 firms) and firms with no 
cyclers (566 firms) from 1985 to 2007 with monthly rebalancing. 
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PART 3: INNOVATOR CEOS IN IPOS 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Innovation plays a critical role in promoting economic growth (Solow, 1957) and 
increases the probability of a firm’s survival (Cefis and Marsili, 2006). Lin (2018a) and Islam 
and Zein (2018) both find that firms led by CEOs with innovative ability spur firm innovation. 
Lin (2018a) finds that around 10% of public firms have CEOs with innovative ability from 1992 
to 2008.73 For example, Mark Zuckerberg, the CEO of Facebook, filed his first patent on 2006. 
Bill Gates, the former CEO of Microsoft, has nine patents to his name. Steve Jobs, the former 
Apple CEO, even has 141 patents. The importance of innovation is also reflected on the initial 
public offering (IPO) market. Technology IPO firms have dominated he IPO market. Technology 
IPO have averaged 58% of total IPOs each year from 1980 to 2016. This leads to the question do 
tech-firms with innovator CEOs perform better during the IPO process than tech-firms with non-
innovator CEOs. Do firms led by CEOs with innovative ability experience less underpricing and 
higher stock returns post-IPO period? Do firms led by CEOs with greater innovative ability spur 
more innovation after the IPO?  
Over the past 40 years, many empirical studies document that IPOs are underpriced (i.e. 
the average first-day stock return is positive).74 Specifically, Loughran and Ritter (2004) find the 
average first-day return for 8,254 IPOs approximates 18% between 1980 and 2016, suggesting 
                                                 
73 Islam and Zein (2018) also find that one-in-five U.S. high-technology firms are led by CEOs with innovative 
ability.  
74 See, for example, Ibbotson (1975), Ritter (1984) and Loughran and Ritter (2004). 
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$155.16 billion left on the table.75 Prior literature offers many explanations for this underpricing. 
For example, underwriter price support (Ruud, 1993), firms backed by venture capitals (Lee and 
Wahal, 2004), and investment bank reputation (Beatty and Ritter, 1986) may explain IPO 
underpricing. In addition to underpricing at issue, IPO firms experience long-run 
underperformance. Ritter (1991) finds that IPO firms have lower stock return for up to three 
years post IPO. Research finds that the reputation of underwriters and venture capitals (Brav and 
Gompers, 1997; Carter, Dark and Singh, 1998; and Dong, Michel and Pandes, 2011), accounting 
accruals in the IPO year (Teoh, Welch and Wong, 1998), and firm acquisition activities within a 
year of going public (Brau, Couch and Sutton, 2012) might explain the IPO long-run 
performance. Other research has found that the CEO can explain IPO underpricing and long-run 
underperformance. Fan, Wong and Zhang (2007) find that firms with CEOs who are former or 
current government bureaucrats have lower first-day stock return and underperform firms with 
non-politically-connected CEOs. Research also finds that IPOs with CEOs who are also the 
founders have larger underpricing (Certo, Covin, Daily and Dalton, 2001) and greater long-run 
stock returns (Gao and Jain, 2011). Given CEOs characteristics impact IPO outcomes and 
innovation matters (Solow, 1957), a natural question arises whether CEOs with innovative ability 
impact the firm’s IPO. Bernstein (2015) and Aggarwal and Hsu (2012) both document that the 
quality and quantity of a firm’s innovation decrease after going public, suggesting that private 
ownership promotes firm innovation and public ownership inhibits it. If a firm has a CEO who is 
interested in and has the ability to do the innovation, whether the firm’s innovation will decrease 
                                                 
75 The updated table can be found in the website. 
https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/files/2017/05/IPOs2016Underpricing.pdf  
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is unclear. In this paper, I examine the effects of a CEO with innovative ability on IPO 
underpricing, long-run performance and post-IPO firm innovation. 
Using a sample of 717 IPOs from 1976 to 2010, I find that 12.1% of IPOs are led by 
CEOs who are also patent inventors (innovator CEOs). Examining the impact of innovator CEOs 
on IPO underpricing, I find that firms with innovators CEOs experience a lower first-day return 
(underpricing), suggesting that CEO’s innovative ability can reduce the information asymmetry 
in the IPO market.  
Next, I study the impact of innovator CEOs on IPO long-run performance and post-IPO 
innovation. Firms that are led by innovator CEOs experience higher IPO long-run performance 
than firms that are led by non-innovator CEOs. Specifically, firms with innovator CEOs have 
higher long-run performance measured as calendar-time returns using Fama French three-factor 
and five-factor models. I also find that firms with innovator CEOs have greater buy-and-hold 
benchmark-adjusted returns for the holding period three years post-IPO after controlling for 
other factors. I do not find that CEO’s innovative ability is more important for high-tech firms 
for IPO long-run performance. However, CEO’s innovative ability is more valuable for the IPO 
long-run performance if the CEO’s patents and the firm’s patents are in the same technological 
class. Examining the impact of innovator CEOs on post-IPO innovation, I find that Firms led by 
innovator CEOs have a greater post-IPO firm innovation up to four years after the IPO compared 
to firms led by non-innovator CEOs. 
 This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, this paper extends the 
literature on IPO underpricing and long-run performance. Specifically, this paper adds to the 
literature that studies the effects of the CEO on IPO performance, such as CEOs’ political 
connection (Fan, Wong and Zhang, 2007), CEOs’ stock option (Lowry and Murphy, 2007; 
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Chahine and Goergen, 2011) and founder CEO management (Gao and Jain, 2011). Second, this 
paper contributes to the growing literature on the role of the CEO’s personality traits in the 
finance area. For example, Sunder, Sunder and Zhang (2017) study polite CEOs and firm 
innovation; and Malmendier and Tate (2008) investigate CEO overconfidence and firm 
acquisition activities. Third, this paper adds to the literature on firm innovation after an IPO. 
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II. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Prior literature documents that information asymmetry is one explanation of IPO 
underpricing.76 The information asymmetry is assumed to exist between informed and 
uninformed investors (Rock, 1986), between IPO firms and investors (Allen and Faulhaber, 
1989; Chemmanur, 1993), or between investment banks and IPO firms (Baron, 1982). 
Specifically, Rock (1986) proposes that when the IPO market has informed and uninformed 
investors, informed investors will crowd out the uninformed investors for allocations of 
profitable issues. The IPO firm must underprice their IPO in order to guarantee that the 
uninformed investors purchase the issue. Allen and Faulhaber (1989) assume that the IPO firm 
best knows its prospects and find that it is optimal for the firm to signal the market by 
underpricing its issue.  
Empirical studies find that reducing information asymmetry can decrease the 
underpricing. For example, if IPO firms have prestigious underwriters (Carter and Manaster, 
1990) or are backed by venture capitalists (Barry, Muscarella, Peavy and Vetsuypens, 1990; and 
Megginson and Weiss, 1991), underpricing may be reduced. Also, the quality of the top 
management team (Cohen and Dean, 2005) and the reputation of a CEO (Chemmanur and 
Paeglis, 2005) serve as signals to the market and reduce IPO underpricing. Conti, Thursby and 
Thursby (2013) construct a theoretical model and empirically test it. They find that IPO firms use 
                                                 
76 The other explanations of IPO underpricing include investment bankers caring about their reputation (Beatty and 
Ritter, 1986) and inducing asymmetrically informed investors to reveal information (Benveniste and Spindt, 1989), 
issuers’ demand for ownership dispersion (Booth and Chua, 1996). 
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patents to signal their quality and value to investors, suggesting that the firm’s patents can be a 
signal in the IPO market. Therefore, a CEO’s innovative ability as a signal to the IPO market can 
reduce the information asymmetry and in turn, reduce underpricing. Further, Heeley, Matusik 
and Jain (2007) use patents to measure firm innovation and find that when firm innovation and 
value appropriation is transparent, innovation can reduce information asymmetry, and therefore, 
underpricing will be reduced.77 However, when firm innovation and value appropriation is not 
transparent, innovation will increase information asymmetry, and therefore, underpricing will be 
greater. Therefore, when a CEO’s innovative ability is easy to interpret by the IPO market, 
underpricing will be reduced, and when a CEO’s innovative ability is difficult to interpret, 
underpricing will be greater. 
Hypothesis 1a: Firms with innovator CEOs experience less IPO underpricing (lower first-day 
return) compared to firms with non-innovator CEOs. 
Hypothesis 1b: Firms with innovator CEOs experience more IPO underpricing (higher first-day 
return) compared to firms with non-innovator CEOs. 
Prior literature finds that innovation positively impacts a firm’s market value (Pakes, 
1985; Austin, 1993; Nicholas, 2008; Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru and Stoffman, 2017). 
Specifically, Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2005) use patents and citations to measure innovation 
and find that innovation increases firm market value. Since the CEO is the most important person 
in a firm (Ireland and Hitt, 1999), and firms led by CEOs with innovative ability experience 
more innovation activities (Lin, 2018a; and Islam and Zein, 2018), a CEO’s innovative ability 
                                                 
77 They follow Cohen, Nelson and Walsh (2000) to identify whether an IPO was in a discrete or complex product 
industry. The industry with an ISIC code lower than 2900 is coded as discrete. The industry with an ISIC code of 
2900 or higher is coded as complex. If a firm is in a discrete product industry, the link between firm innovation and 
value appropriation is transparent. If a firm is in a complex product industry, the link between firm innovation and 
value appropriation is not transparent.  
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should be important to a firm. Moreover, Lin (2018b) finds that the outflow of talent post-IPO 
can explain IPO long-run underperformance, suggesting the importance of employees’ 
innovative ability to an IPO firm’s long-run performance. Therefore, if a firm has a CEO with 
innovative ability, I expect the firm to have higher post-IPO stock returns compared to a firm led 
by CEOs with non-innovative ability. However, Lin (2018a) finds that firms led by innovator 
CEOs spend more money on research and development (R&D) but with lower efficiency, 
suggesting that innovator CEOs also result in overinvestment problems to the firm. This 
overinvestment is recognized by the stock market as there is a negative return when a new 
innovator CEO is hired (Lin, 2018a). Therefore, I expect firms led by innovator CEOs to have 
lower post-IPO long-run performance compared to firms led by non-innovator CEOs. 
Hypothesis 2a: A CEO’s innovative ability has a positive effect on an IPO firm’s long-run 
performance. 
Hypothesis 2b: A CEO’s innovative ability has a negative effect on an IPO firm’s long-run 
performance. 
Bernstein (2015) and Aggarwal and Hsu (2012) both compare firms that go public with 
firms that withdrew from IPO filing and find that the firm’s innovation decreases after going to 
public. Bernstein (2015) finds that the decreasing innovation after IPO is due to the outflow of 
patent inventors and the declined productivity of the remaining inventors. Since firms led by 
innovative CEOs have greater firm innovation compared to firms led by non-innovative CEOs 
(Lin, 2018a; and Islam and Zein, 2018), IPO firms led by innovative CEOs will not have a 
decline in firm innovation post-IPO.  
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Hypothesis 3: A CEO’s innovative ability has a positive effect on a firm’s post-IPO firm 
innovation.
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III. SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION, VARIABLE MEASUREMENTS AND SUMMARY 
STATISTICS 
SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION 
Using Securities Data Corporation (SDC) New Issues Database, an initial sample of 
9,173 IPOs from 1975 to 2016 is collected. CEO characteristics are collected from ExecuComp; 
however, ExecuComp covers only S&P 1500 firms, thus I exclude 8,196 IPO firms not in the 
ExecuComp database. Firm patent data is provided by Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru and Stoffman 
(2017) from 1975 to 2010. Since the patent data ends in 2010, 69 IPOs are excluded from 2011 
to 2015. Following IPO literature (e.g. Brau, Couch and Sutton, 2012), I remove 143 IPOs 
offered by financial firms (Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes between 6000 and 
6999), foreign issuers, real estate investment trusts (REITs), unit offers, close-end funds, and 
limited partnerships. Firm financial information is obtained from Compustat. Stock returns are 
from the daily returns file of the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). I further exclude 
7 IPO firms with offer price under $5 per share and 41 IPO firms with missing financial 
information. The resulting sample consists of 717 IPO firms from 1976 to 2010. 
 
VARIABLE MEASUREMENTS 
 This subsection describes the measurements of dependent variables, independent 
variables and control variables. The variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
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INNOVATOR CEOS 
An innovator CEO is identified by merging the CEOs’ names from the ExecuComp 
database and inventors’ names from the Harvard Business School (HBS) patenting database 
constructed by Li, Lai, D’Amour, Doolin, Sun, Torvik, Amy and Fleming (2014).78 The data of 
innovator CEO and the detailed process of identifying the innovator CEO is from Lin (2018a).79 
Innovator CEO is a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO has at least one patent during 1975 
to 2010. In the sample, 87 firms are led by CEOs who are patent inventors, and 630 firms are led 
by CEOs who are not patent inventors. 
 Following Lin (2018a), I measure CEOs’ innovative ability in six ways. The first 
measure (variable: CEO patent) counts the number of patents for which the CEO applied at the 
IPO year. The second measure (variable: CEO citation) counts the number of citations received 
by the patents applied at the IPO year. The third measure (variable: CEO avg. citation) is the 
ratio of CEO citation to CEO patent at the IPO year. The fourth measure (variable: CEO 
cumulative patent) counts the number of patents for which the CEO applied up to the IPO year. 
The fifth measure (variable: CEO cumulative citation) counts the number of citations received by 
the patents up to the IPO year. The sixth measure (variable: CEO cumulative avg. citation) is the 
ratio of CEO cumulative citation to CEO cumulative patent up to the IPO year. Since the quality 
                                                 
78 HBS patenting database provides unique identifiers (variable: Invnum_N) for each patent’s inventors from 1975 
to 2010. 
79 The process of identifying the innovator CEO is as follow. First, I merge CEOs’ name with patent inventors’ 
name by their first, middle and last name. Second, in order to make sure that I accurately matched the inventor and 
the CEO, I hand collect the CEOs’ biographical information based on the information from the company’s website, 
Bloomberg CEO Biography, Wikipedia, Notable Names Data Base, news information, LinkedIn, and Forbes 
website. 
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of the patent is reflected on the patent citations, and these citations capture the technology and 
economic importance, I focus on the results using CEO avg. citation and Innovator CEO.80  
 
IPO UNDERPRICING 
 IPO underpricing is measured as the first-day stock return of the IPO firm (also called 
initial retur). Following Lee, Lochhead, Ritter and Zhao (1996), the initial return equals the 
closing price one day after the offering date (SDC variable: PR1DAY) divided by offering price 
(SDC variable: P) minus one. If the closing price one day after the offering date is missing, the 
closing price two days after the offering date (SDC variable: PR2DAY) is used to calculate the 
initial return. 
 
BUY-AND-HOLD ABNORMAL RETURNS 
Following Ritter and Welch (2002), I measure buy-and-hold abnormal returns using stock 
monthly raw return minus the benchmark monthly raw return for the corresponding month 
starting the month of IPO to three years after an IPO. One month is considered as a successive 
21-trading-day period, so the first month return does not include the first-day return of the IPO 
firm. The buy-and-hold abnormal return is calculated using three benchmarks: (1) CRSP value-
weighted index, (2) CRSP equal-weighted index, and (3) style-matched firms which are a 
portfolio of non-IPO firms matched to IPO firms based on size and market-to-book. The style-
matched firms are constructed following Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) and Ritter and Welch 
                                                 
80 Results using the other measures are quantitatively similar to innovator CEO and available upon request. 
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(2002). First, the matching non-IPO firms are required to be listed on CRSP for at least five 
years with no equity issuances within last five years. Second, the matching non-IPO firms are 
required to have a market capitalization equal to ±30% of the IPO firms’ market capitalization. 
Third, the matched non-IPO firm is the one with the closest market-to-book ratio to the IPO firm. 
If the matched firm delists before three years post-IPO, I splice in the next closest market-to-
book matching firm. 
Equation (1) expresses the calculation of the buy-and-hold abnormal stock return: 
𝐴𝑅0,3
𝑖 = ∏(1 + 𝑟𝑡
𝑖)
36
𝑡=1
− ∏(1 + 𝑟𝑡
𝑏)
36
𝑡=1
,                                                                                                     (1) 
where 𝐴𝑅0,3
𝑖  is the buy-and-hold benchmark-adjusted return for firm 𝑖 for months 1-36 after the 
IPO, 𝑟𝑡
𝑖 is stock raw return for the firm 𝑖 in month 𝑡 after the IPO, and 𝑟𝑡
𝑏 is the benchmark return 
in month 𝑡. If an IPO firm is delisted before three years post-IPO, I follow Ritter (1991) and 
Loughran and Ritter (1995) and use their truncated abnormal return at the delisting date as the 
buy-and-hold abnormal return.  
 
FIRM INNOVATION 
The data for firm innovation is from Kogan et al. (2017), including all utility patents 
issued by U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).81 The patent database provides patent 
                                                 
81 According to U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), “a utility patent protects the way an article is used and 
works”. Specifically, the utility patent is a trademark protection that makes sure a person has full control over his or 
her invention.   
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assignee’s CRSP unique identifier (PERMNO), the application and grant date of the application, 
the citation received by the patent, the patent class, and the estimated market value of the patent. 
Firm innovation is measured five ways. The first measure (variable: Firm patent) is the 
count of the number of patents for which the firm applied in a given year. The second measure 
(variable: Firm citation) is the count of the number of citations received by the patents for which 
the firm applied in a given year, capturing the importance of the patents’ technology. The third 
measure (variable: Firm avg. citation) is the ratio of firm citation over firm patent in a given 
year. The fourth measure (variable: Citation-weighted firm innovation) adjust for the citation 
truncation lags (Hall, Jaffe, Trajtenberg, 2005). Following Kogan et al. (2017), I calculate the 
fourth measure by first constructing 𝜔𝑖,𝑡, which is the sum of the weight of citations for each 
patent for firm 𝑖 in time 𝑡: 
𝜔𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ (1 +
𝐶𝑗
𝐶?̅?
) ,
𝑗∈𝑃𝑖,𝑡
                                                                                                                                (2) 
where 𝐶𝑗 is the number of citation received by patent 𝑗, 𝐶?̅? is the average number of citations 
received by the patents that were granted in the same year as patent 𝑗, and 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is the set of patents 
applied for firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡. Then, 𝜔𝑖,𝑡 is scaled by book assets due to the fact that 𝜔𝑖,𝑡 is 
increasing in firm size (Kogan et al., 2017), 
𝑊𝑖,𝑡
𝑐𝑤 =
𝜔𝑖,𝑡
𝐵𝑖,𝑡
 ,                                                                                                                                              (3) 
where 𝐵𝑖,𝑡 is the book assets of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡, and 𝑊𝑖,𝑡
𝑐𝑤 is the citation-weighted innovation for 
firm 𝑖 firm in time 𝑡. To further capture the value added of patents to the firm, I construct a fifth 
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measure (variable: Market-value firm innovation) using the dollar value of the patent calculated 
by Kogan at el. (2017) based on the stock return response to news about the patents: 
𝜃𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝑥𝑗
𝑗∈𝑃𝑖,𝑡
 ,                                                                                                                                               (4) 
where 𝜃𝑖,𝑡 is the total dollar value of the patents applied by the firm 𝑖 in time 𝑡, and 𝑥𝑗 is the 
dollar value of patent 𝑗. Market-value firm innovation is calculated by using 𝜃𝑖,𝑡 divided by book 
assets:  
𝑊𝑖,𝑡
𝑚𝑣 =
𝜃𝑖,𝑡
𝐵𝑖,𝑡
 ,                                                                                                                                                  (5) 
where 𝑊𝑖,𝑡
𝑚𝑣 is the market-value firm innovation, and 𝐵𝑖,𝑡 is book assets of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡. 
 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
I control for firm characteristics and CEO characteristics that may affect IPO long-run 
performance, underpricing, and post-IPO firm innovation. Following the IPO literature, firm 
characteristics include venture capital backing defined as a dummy variable equal to one if the 
firm is VC-backed, and zero otherwise, the rankings of lead underwriter obtained from Loughran 
and Ritter (2004), Tobin’s Q defined as the natural logarithm of market value of assets over the 
book value of assets, firm age at the IPO year obtained from Loughran and Ritter (2004), and the 
IPO proceeds raised at the IPO. 82 I also control for firm innovation using the number of patents 
                                                 
82 The rank of leading underwriter is from 0 to 9, and 9 stands for the highest rank. 
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the firm applied during the stock return period. CEO characteristics include CEO tenure defined 
as the number of months a CEO is in the firm and CEO age in years. 
 
SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Table 1 presents the distribution of IPO firms with innovator CEOs and non-innovator 
CEOs by year and by industry. Panel A shows the year distribution of IPOs with innovator CEOs 
in the sample from 1976 to 2010 by year. In the sample, 87 IPOs are led by innovator CEOs and 
630 IPOs are led by non-innovator CEOs. On average, there are 12.1% IPO firms with innovator 
CEOs in the sample. The percentage of IPOs with innovator CEOs is highest in 1990 (31.6%). 
Panel B displays the percentage of IPO firms with innovator CEOs by Fama and French 12 
industry groups excluding financial firms and utility firms.83 The consumer durables industry has 
the highest percentage of innovator CEOs (25.0%), the health industry is the second highest 
industry (22.0%), and the business equipment industry has the highest number of innovator 
CEOs (36). The manufacturing industry and the telephone and television transmission industry 
have no IPO firms with innovator CEOs. Panel C tabulates the distribution of innovator CEOs by 
high-tech and non-high-tech industries based on the categorizations in Loughran and Ritter 
(2004)84. In the high-tech industry, 18.2% of IPO firms have innovator CEOs, which is higher 
than 9.6% in the non-high-tech industry. However, the number of IPO firms with innovator 
                                                 
83 The categorization of Fama and French indsutries are in Fama’s website. 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html#Research   
84 In Loughran and Ritter (2004) appendix D, high-tech stocks are defined as those in SIC codes 3571, 3572, 3575, 
3577, 3578 (computer hardware), 3661, 3663, 3669 (communications equipment), 3671,3672, 3674, 3675, 3677, 
3678, 3679 (electronics), 3812 (navigation equipment), 3823,3825,3826,3827,3829 (measuring and controlling 
devices), 3841, 3845 (medical instruments), 4812, 4813 (telephone equipment), 4899 (communications services), 
and 7371, 7372, 7373, 7374, 7375, 7378, and 7379 (software).   
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CEOs is higher in non-high-tech industry (49) than in the high-tech industry (38), suggesting that 
innovator CEOs are important for both high-tech and non-high-tech industries.  
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of CEO characteristics and firm characteristics 
for the full sample, IPOs with non-innovator CEOs and IPOs with innovator CEOs. The table 
reports the mean, median, and standard deviation for the variables in each of the samples. T-tests 
are also conducted to test for differences between the means for IPO firms with innovator CEOs 
and IPO firms with non-innovator CEOs. Examining innovator CEOs’ innovative abilities, I find 
that on average, innovator CEOs have 0.58 patents, 32.59 citations, and 16.46 citations per patent 
during the IPO year, and cumulative 6.76 patents, 280.20 citations, and 38.21 citations per patent 
up to the IPO year. I also find that the tenure for innovator CEOs are 76 months on average, 
which is significantly higher than the 61 months tenure of non-innovator CEOs. On average, the 
age of innovator CEO is 48 years, and the age of non-innovator CEOs is 49 years, and the 
difference is not significant. 
Comparing the firm characteristics between IPOs with innovator CEOs and IPOs with 
non-innovator CEOs, I find that although IPO firms with innovator CEOs and IPO firms with 
non-innovator CEOs have no significant difference in firm patents at the IPO year, IPO firms 
with innovator CEOs have more citations and average citations per patent and invest more in 
R&D projects than IPO firm with non-innovator CEOs. The results suggest that the quality of 
patents in IPO firms with innovator CEOs is higher than that of IPO firms with non-innovator 
CEOs. I also find that IPO firms with innovator CEOs have significantly more venture capital 
backing and younger than IPO firms with non-innovator CEOs. In the full sample, on average, 
the initial return is 25.54%, Tobin’s Q is 3.99, the underwriter rank is 7.47, and the proceeds 
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raised at the IPO firms is 109.20 million. There are no significant differences in these variables 
between IPO firms with innovator CEOs and IPO firms with non-innovator CEOs.
       
188 
 
 
 
IV. IPO UNDERPRICING 
This section presents the effects of innovator CEOs on IPO underpricing. The regression model 
follows: 
Initial return𝑖
= 𝛼1 +  𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽3Ln(Firm age)𝑖 +  𝛽4Tobin’s Q𝑖
+  𝛽5UW rank𝑖+ 𝛽6𝐿𝑛(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑠)𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐵𝑢𝑏𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽8𝐻𝑖_𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖
+ 𝛽10𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽11𝐿𝑜𝑔 (1 + 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒)𝑖 + 𝛾𝑘 +  𝛿𝑡
+  𝜀1𝑖,                                                                                                                                               (6) 
where Initial return𝑖 is the first-day stock return of firm 𝑖, 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 is the number of 
patents the CEO applied at the IPO year and all the other variables are as previously defined. 
Table 3 shows the results of equation (6). I find that firms with innovator CEOs have lower first-
day return, indicating that firms with innovator CEOs experience lower IPO underpricing than 
firms with non-innovator CEOs. The results suggest that CEOs’ innovative ability serve as a 
signal of the quality of the firm and can reduce underpricing, which is consistent with Hypothesis 
(1a). Examining the control variables, I find that firms with greater growth opportunity and firms 
in the tech-bubble years have higher IPO underpricing, which is consistent with Ljungqvist and 
Wilhelm (2003).I also find that firms in the high-tech industry experience lower IPO 
underpricing.
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V. IPO LONG-RUN PERFORMANCE 
This section presents the univariate results for buy-and-hold abnormal returns, the 
methodology and results of calendar-time factor model results, and the cross-sectional regression 
analysis controlling for other factors that may affect IPO long-run performance between IPO 
firms with innovator CEOs and IPO firms with non-innovator CEOs. Since buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns can better represent a long-term investor’s experience but pose overlap 
problems (Brav, 2000), and calendar-time factor models can mitigate this problem as 
recommended by the researchers (Lyon, Barber and Tsai, 1999), I follow the IPO long-run 
performance literature and use both methods. 
 
UNIVARIATE RESULTS 
Table 4 presents the buy-and-hold abnormal returns for the full sample, IPO firms with 
non-innovator CEOs, and IPO firms with innovator CEOs for up to five years after the IPO from 
1976 to 2010. The average market-value-weighted-adjusted and style-adjusted returns are 
significantly positive for the holding periods up to five years post IPOs for the full sample, IPO 
firms with non-innovator CEOs, and IPO firms with innovator CEOs. The results are surprising 
since prior IPO literature (e.g. Ritter, 1991) documents a significant negative buy-and-hold 
abnormal return post-IPO. The positive abnormal returns in my sample are possibly due to the 
IPOs from the ExecuComp database covering the S&P 1500 firms. Comparing the buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns between IPO firms with innovator CEOs and IPO firms with non-innovator 
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CEOs, I find that the abnormal returns are higher for IPO firms with innovator CEOs than that of 
IPO firms with non-innovator CEOs, but are not significant for the holding period up to four 
years post IPOs. For the five year holding period, IPO firms with innovator CEOs significantly 
outperform IPO firms with non-innovator CEOs. The mean market-value-weighted-adjusted 
(style-adjusted) return for five years post IPO is 207.51% (252.68%) for IPO firms with 
innovator CEOs and 112.25% (119.70%) for IPO firms with non-innovator CEOs, and the 
difference test is significant at 10% (5%) level. 
 
CALENDAR-TIME FACTOR MODEL REGRESSION 
In the calendar time approach, I calculate the time series of monthly portfolio returns for 
IPO firms with innovator CEOs and IPO firms with non-innovator CEOs and estimate the three-
factor Fama and French model (1993) and five-factor Fama and French (2014). I estimate the 
five-factor model as follows: 
𝑅𝑝𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝑏(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) + 𝑠𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑟𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝑐𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡,                          (7) 
where 𝑅𝑝𝑡 is the monthly return for an equal-weighted calendar-time portfolio of IPOs in month 
𝑡, 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the monthly return on the CRSP value-weighted market index in month 𝑡, 𝑟𝑓𝑡 is the 
monthly return on the three-month Treasury bills in month 𝑡, (𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) is the market risk 
premium 𝑀𝑅𝑃, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 is the monthly return on a value-weighted portfolio of small firms minus 
the return on a value-weighted portfolio of large firms in month 𝑡, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 is the monthly return 
on a value-weighted portfolio of high book-to-market stocks minus the return on a value-
weighted portfolio of low book-to-market stocks in month 𝑡, 𝑟𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 is the monthly return on a 
value-weighted portfolio of high operating profitability stocks minus the return on a value-
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weighted portfolio of low operating profitability stocks in month 𝑡, and 𝑐𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 is the monthly 
return on a value-weighted portfolio of conservative investment stocks minus the return on a 
value-weight portfolio of aggressive investment stocks. The intercept (𝑎) represents the 
abnormal performance. 
Since Brav, Geczy and Gompers (2000) document that the misspecification problem of 
the three-factor model for predicting returns on small firms with high growth rate can lead to the 
findings of IPO underperformance, I follow Loughran and Ritter (2000) to address this concern. 
Specifically, I use the Fama French three-factor model after purging the factors of new issues.85 I 
estimate the three-factor model as follows: 
𝑅𝑝𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝑏(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) + 𝑠𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡,                                                                 (8)  
where 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 is the monthly return on a value-weighted portfolio of small firms minus the return 
on a value-weighted portfolio of large firms in month 𝑡 purged of IPO and SEO firms, and 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 
is the monthly return on a value-weighted portfolio of high book-to-market firms minus the 
return on a value-weighted portfolio of low book-to-market stocks in month 𝑡 purged of IPO and 
SEO firms. Again, the intercept (𝑎) represents the abnormal performance. 
 Table 5 presents the results of Fama French three-factor model, five-factor model, and 
Fama French three-factor model after purging the IPO and SEO firms for the full sample, IPO 
firms with innovator CEOs and IPO firms with non-innovator CEOs for the period of 0-36 
months after an IPO. For the full sample, IPO firms have a significant positive monthly abnormal 
return of 0.90% in the Fama French three-factor model and 0.99% in the Fama French five-factor 
                                                 
85 The three-factor after purging the IPO and SEO firms is from Ritter’s website for the period of 1973 to 2003. 
https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipo-data/   
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model, while the magnitude and the significance of the abnormal returns decreases in the Fama 
French three factor model after purging IPO and SEO firms. Comparing the abnormal return for 
firms with innovator CEOs and firms with non-innovator CEOs, I find that firms with non-
innovator CEOs have no abnormal return in both Fama French three-factor model and Fama 
French five-factor model, while firms with innovator CEOs have significant positive returns in 
Fama French three-factor model (1.502%), Fama French five-factor model (1.775%), and Fama 
French three-factor model after purging IPO and SEO firms (1.192%). The results support 
Hypothesis (2a) that a CEO’s innovative ability has a positive effect on an IPO firm’s long-run 
performance. 
 
CROSS-SECTIONAL REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
In the cross-sectional regression, I control for other factors that may affect the buy-and-
hold returns of the IPO firms in order to investigate the effect of the innovative ability of the 
innovator CEOs on firm long-run performance. Specifically, I conduct the following multivariate 
cross-sectional regression: 
𝐴𝑅0,3
𝑖 = 𝛼1 +  𝛽1𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑎𝑣𝑔. 𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 +  𝛽2𝑉𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽3Ln(Firm age)𝑖 + 𝛽4Initial return𝑖
+  𝛽5Tobin’s Q𝑖 +  𝛽6UW rank𝑖+ 𝛽7𝐿𝑛(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑠)𝑖 + 𝛽8𝐵𝑢𝑏𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖
+ 𝛽9𝐻𝑖_𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑖 + 𝛽10𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽11𝐿𝑜𝑔 (1 + 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒)𝑖
+ 𝛽12𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛03𝑖 +  𝛾𝑘 +  𝛿𝑡 +  𝜀1𝑖,                        (9) 
where 𝐴𝑅0,3
𝑖  is the buy-and-hold benchmark-adjusted return for firm 𝑖 from the IPO year to three 
years after the IPO, 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑎𝑣𝑔. 𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 is the average citations per patent for the CEO in firm 𝑖 
at the IPO year, 𝐵𝑢𝑏𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 is a dummy variable equal to one if the IPO year of firm 𝑖 is in 
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1999 or 2000 and zero otherwise, 𝐻𝑖_𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑖  is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is in the 
high-tech industries based on Loughran and Ritter (2004)’s categorizations and zero otherwise, 
and 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛03𝑖 is the average citations per patent for firm 𝑖 during the three years 
after the IPO year. Other variables are as previously defined. I also control for industry fixed 
effects (𝛾𝑘) and year fixed effects (𝛿𝑡). I expect 𝛽1 to be positively significant, suggesting that 
CEOs’ innovative ability has a positive effect on IPO long-run performance. 
Table 6 column (1) to (3) presents the results of the effects of innovator CEOs on IPO 
long-run performance. I find that the coefficient of 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑎𝑣𝑔. 𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 is positive and 
significant in all the three regressions, suggesting that CEOs’ innovative ability positively 
impacts the three year buy-and-hold abnormal returns. Again, the results support Hypothesis 
(2a). 
 Since innovation is more important for high-tech firms (Brown, Fazzari and Peterson, 
2009), I expect high-tech industries would benefit more from CEOs’ innovative ability. 
However, if innovator CEOs pursue their own interests and invest more on R&D projects, 
innovator CEOs might bring over investment problems to the firm (Lin, 2018a). In order to study 
the impact of CEOs’ innovative ability on high-tech industries, I include the interaction of 
𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑎𝑣𝑔. 𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 and 𝐻𝑖_𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑖 as an additional independent variable in equation (9). Table 6 
column (4) to (6) shows the results. I find that the coefficients of the interaction term between 
𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑎𝑣𝑔. 𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 and 𝐻𝑖_𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑖 are negatively significant, suggesting that in high-tech 
industries, CEOs’ innovative ability hurts the IPO long-run performance.86 The results are 
                                                 
86 The negative effects of CEOs’ innovative ability disappears  
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unexpected since the negative impacts of CEOs’ innovative ability in high-tech industry 
contradicts the traditional point of view that innovation is important for high-tech industries.  
Further, I investigate the usefulness of CEOs’ innovative ability on IPO long-run 
performance. When CEO’s expertise is in the same area of the firm’s main business, I define 
CEOs’ innovative ability as useful for the firm. I include two additional independent variables in 
equation (9), 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖 defined as a dummy variable equal to one if the CEOs’ patents 
technological class is the same as the firms’ patents technological class, and the interaction of 
𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑎𝑣𝑔. 𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 and 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖. Table 6 column (6) to (9) presents the results. The 
interaction term between 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑎𝑣𝑔. 𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 and 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖 is positively significant, 
suggesting that when CEOs’ innovative ability is useful and beneficial to the firm, CEOs’ 
innovative ability positively impact IPO long-run performance. I also find that VC involvement 
is positively and significantly related to the buy-and-hold benchmark-adjusted returns, consistent 
with Brav and Gompers (1997). Further, firm proceeds raised at IPO and growth opportunities 
are negatively related to the IPO long-run performance, while firm innovation over the three year 
holding period is positively related to the IPO long-run performance. 
 Next, I study why CEOs’ innovative ability hurts IPO long-run performance for firms in 
high-tech industries. If the negative impacts of CEOs’ innovative ability on IPO long-run 
performance in the high-tech industry are caused by innovator CEOs’ overinvestment problem, I 
expect innovator CEOs in the high-tech industry to hold less cash and invest more in R&D 
projects.87 I estimate the regression as below: 
                                                 
87 According to agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), holding more cash allows the CEOs to invest in 
projects that benefits the CEO but jeopardize shareholders’ value. For innovator CEOs, holding more cash allows 
them to invest more in innovative projects leading to the overinvestment problem in the firm.  
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(𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ/𝑇𝐴)𝑖,𝑡+3 𝑜𝑟 (𝑅&𝐷/𝑇𝐴)𝑖,𝑡+3
= 𝛼1 +  𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝐶𝐸𝑂 ∗ 𝐻𝑖_𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑖_𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑖
+ 𝛽4𝑉𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽5Ln(Firm age)𝑖 + 𝛽6Tobin’s Q𝑖
+  𝛽7UW rank𝑖+ 𝛽8𝐿𝑛(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑠)𝑖 + 𝛽9𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽10𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽11𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖
+ 𝛽12𝐿𝑜𝑔 (1 + 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒)𝑖 +  𝛾𝑘 +  𝛿𝑡 +  𝜀1𝑖,                     (10) 
where the (𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ/𝑇𝐴)𝑖,𝑡+3 is the cash holdings divided by total assets for firm 𝑖 in the three years 
after the IPO, (𝑅&𝐷/𝑇𝐴)𝑖,𝑡+3 is the research and development expenditures divided by total 
assets for firm 𝑖 in three years after the IPO, 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖 is firm 𝑖 sales at the IPO year, and 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 is 
the ratio of net income to total assets for firm 𝑖 at the IPO year. Other variables are as previously 
defined.  
 Table 7 presents the results of equation (10). Comparing IPO firms with innovator CEOs 
and IPO firms with non-innovator CEOs, I find that IPO firms with innovator CEOs do not hold 
more cash three years after the IPO (in Column (1)), and that IPO firms with innovator CEOs 
spend more on R&D projects (in Column (3)). However, the interaction term between 
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖 and 𝐻𝑖_𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑖  is negatively significantly related to (𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ/𝑇𝐴)𝑖,𝑡+3 (in Column 
(3)) and (𝑅&𝐷/𝑇𝐴)𝑖,𝑡+3 (in Column (5)), suggesting that innovator CEOs in the high-tech firms 
hold less cash after the IPO but do not spend the cash on R&D projects. The results suggest that 
the negative impacts of CEOs’ innovative ability on IPO long-run performance in the high-tech 
industry is not due to overinvestment by innovator CEOs. 
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VI. POST-IPO FIRM INNOVATION 
This section examines the effects of innovator CEOs on post-IPO firm innovation. Since 
highly innovative firms are more likely to hire innovator CEOs, the regression model has 
endogeneity problem. To deal with this problem, I use two-stage least square (2SLS). A selection 
of the instrumental variable (IV) is required to conduct the 2SLS regression. Following Lin 
(2018a), I use CEO coauthors’ ability as an IV since people with greater innovative ability are 
more likely to work with people with greater innovative ability. Therefore, CEO coauthors’ 
innovative ability can impact firm innovation only through CEOs’ innovative ability. I estimate 
the follow regression as the first-stage: 
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖
=  𝛼1 +  𝛽1𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑠′ 𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 +  𝛽2𝑉𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽3Ln(Firm age)𝑖
+ 𝛽4Tobin’s Q𝑖 +  𝛽5UW rank𝑖+ 𝛽6𝐿𝑛(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑠)𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐵𝑢𝑏𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖
+ 𝛽8𝐻𝑖_𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽10𝐿𝑜𝑔 (1 + 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒)𝑖 +  𝛾𝑘 +  𝛿𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖  ,                                                                           (11) 
where 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑠′ 𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 is defined as firm 𝑖 CEOs’ coauthors average citations that the 
coauthors have shared with other authors to average patents that the coauthors have shared with 
other authors, and all the other variables are previously defined. This sample only includes CEOs 
with single authors. Examining the first-stage results, I find that 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑠′ 𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 is 
positively related to 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖, which is consistent with my prediction. The IV also pass 
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the overidentification test and underidentification test. Therefore, 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑠′ 𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 is a 
valid IV.  
The second-stage regression estimates the impacts of the predicted value of innovator 
CEO on post-IPO firm innovation: 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡
=  𝛼1 +  𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝐶𝐸𝑂̂ 𝑖 +  𝛽2𝑉𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽3Ln(Firm age)𝑖 +  𝛽4Tobin’s Q𝑖
+  𝛽5UW rank𝑖+ 𝛽6𝐿𝑛(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑠)𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐵𝑢𝑏𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽8𝐻𝑖_𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑖
+ 𝛽9𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽10𝐿𝑜𝑔 (1 + 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒)𝑖 +  𝛾𝑘 +  𝛿𝑡
+  𝜀𝑖 ,                                                                           (12) 
where 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝐶𝐸𝑂̂ 𝑖 is a predicted value from equation (11), 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 as defined 
early is measured in five ways: firm patent, firm citation, firm averaged citation per patent, 
citation-weighted firm innovation and market-value firm innovation. Firm innovation is 
measured in both two and three year periods post-IPO. All other variables are as previously 
defined.  
Table 8 reports the second-stage regression results. I find that IPO firms with innovator 
CEOs experience greater firm innovation two years after the IPO compared to firms with non-
innovator CEOs. These results are consistent with Hypothesis 3. The impacts of innovator CEOs 
on firm innovation decreases three years after the IPO since innovator CEOs impact firm 
innovation only when firm innovation is measure by firm average citation per patent and 
citation-weighted firm innovation, and the magnitude and significance of the coefficients of 
innovator CEOs decrease slightly. The effects of innovation CEOs on firm innovation disappear 
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five years after the IPO.88 The control variables are consistent with the literature. IPO firms with 
venture capital backing experience greater post-IPO firm innovation, consistent with 
Chemmanur, Loutskina and Tian (2014). I also find that younger firms, firms with greater 
growth opportunity, bigger firms, firms with reputable underwriter, and high-tech firms 
experience greater post-IPO firm innovation. Firm innovation before the IPO also positively and 
significantly impact post-IPO firm innovation. 
                                                 
88 The results for five years after the IPO do not tabulated on Table 8 but are available upon request.  
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VII. ROBUSTNESS 
I first employ a propensity score matching procedure following Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983) to reexamine the effects of innovator CEOs on IPO underpricing and post-IPO firm 
innovation. Propensity score matching allows me to construct a group of control firms that are 
led by non-innovator CEOs based on CEO and firm characteristics. Therefore, the differences on 
firm innovation between firms with innovator CEOs and the control firms with non-innovator 
CEOs should be only due to the innovator CEO. There are two steps to implement this 
methodology. First, I conduct the logit regression to calculate the probability (propensity score). 
I construct a nearest-neighbor matched sample for innovator CEOs using all the control variables 
in equation (10) or equation (12) and choose the firms with non-innovator CEOs with propensity 
scores closest to those of each innovator CEO. Second, I run ordinary least square (OLS) 
regression controlling for CEO and firm characteristics, year fixed effects, and industry fixed 
effects. 
 Table 9 reports the propensity score matching results. Again, I find that firms with 
innovator CEOs experience less IPO underpricing (in Column (1) and (2)), which is consistent 
with Hypothesis (1a). I also find that firms with innovator CEOs have more firm innovation three 
years after the IPO (in Column (3) to (10)), which is consistent with Hypothesis (3).  
I also define the innovator CEO in two different ways. First, a CEO is defined as an 
innovator CEO if the CEO has at least one patent application before becoming the CEO of the 
firm. I find 29 CEOs who are innovator CEOs. Second, a CEO is defined as an innovator CEO if 
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the CEO has at least one patent application before the IPO year. According to this definition, 
there are 61 CEOs who are innovator CEOs. The results of using those two different definitions 
of innovator CEOs are generally consistent with the previous results presented in this paper. The 
only difference is that when the innovator CEO is defined by the second alternative definition, 
the first-day return of firms with innovator CEOs is not significantly different from that of firms 
with non-innovator CEOs. This could be because CEOs use power to enforce their name on 
patents and the market only values the CEO’s patents before becoming the CEO, which reflect 
the true innovative ability of the CEO.89
                                                 
89 I also define innovator CEO if the CEO has at least one patent application between the year of becoming the CEO 
and IPO year. I find 32 innovator CEOs according to this definition. The first-day return of firms with innovator 
CEOs is not significantly different from that of firms with non-innovator CEOs. Again, this results suggest that the 
stock market does not value the CEO’s patent after becoming the CEO. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
 This paper studies the effects of innovator CEOs on IPO underpricing, long-run 
performance and post-IPO firm innovation. Specifically, I find that firms that are led by 
innovator CEOs experience lower IPO first-day stock return (lower underpricing) compared to 
firms that are led by non-innovator CEOs, suggesting that CEOs’ innovative ability can reduce 
information asymmetry in the IPO market. I also find that firms with innovator CEOs have 
greater IPO long-run performance in both the calendar-time factor model using Fama French 
three-factor and five-factor models, and the cross-sectional regressions using buy-and-hold 
benchmark-adjusted return. Bernstein (2015) finds that firm innovation decreases after the IPO. I 
examine if innovator CEOs can alter the outcome. I find that innovator CEOs experience greater 
post-IPO firm innovation for up to four years after the IPO, suggesting that innovator CEOs can 
alleviate the decreased firm innovation after the IPO.  
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Table 1 
Year and Industry Distribution 
This table provides the breakdown of the number of non-innovator CEOs, number of 
innovator CEOs, and the percentage of innovator CEOs in the sample by year (Panel A) 
and by industry excluding financial firms and utilities (Panel B and C). The sample of 
CEOs is from ExecuComp for the period of 1976-2010. 
Panel A: Distribution by Year 
Year Non-Innovator CEOs (#) Innovator CEOs (#) Innovator CEOs (%) 
1976 1 0 0.0% 
1980                                    1  0 0.0% 
1982                                    4  0 0.0% 
1983                                  13  3 18.8% 
1984                                    5  1 16.7% 
1985                                    6  1 14.3% 
1986                                  25  4 13.8% 
1987                                  28  5 15.2% 
1988                                  11  3 21.4% 
1989                                  13  0 0.0% 
1990                                  13  6 31.6% 
1991                                  43  6 12.2% 
1992                                  48  9 15.8% 
1993                                  54  3 5.3% 
1994                                  31  8 20.5% 
1995                                  35  6 14.6% 
1996                                  49  6 10.9% 
1997                                  35  5 12.5% 
1998                                  26  2 7.1% 
1999                                  40  1 2.4% 
2000                                  19  5 20.8% 
2001                                    6  1 14.3% 
2002                                    8  2 20.0% 
2003                                    7  0 0.0% 
2004                                  18  4 18.2% 
2005                                  23  2 8.0% 
2006                                  21  0 0.0% 
2007                                  23  2 8.0% 
2008                                    2  0 0.0% 
2009                                  13  2 13.3% 
2010                                    9  0 0.0% 
Total                                630                                87  12.1% 
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Panel B: Distribution by Fama-French 12 Industry Groups 
Industry 
Non-Innovator 
CEOs (#) Innovator CEOs (#) Innovator CEOs (%) 
Consumer NonDurables 30 3 9.1% 
Consumer Durables 3 1 25.0% 
Manufacturing 53 8 13.1% 
Enrgy 24 0 0.0% 
Chems 13 1 7.1% 
Business Equipment 164 36 18.0% 
Telephone and Television Transmission 13 0 0.0% 
Shops 98 5 4.9% 
Health 71 20 22.0% 
Other 161 13 7.5% 
Total                           630                           87  12.1% 
    
    
    
Panel C: Distribution by High-tech industry following Loughran and Ritter (2004) 
Industry 
Non-Innovator 
CEOs (#) Innovator CEOs (#) Innovator CEOs (%) 
High-tech 171                          38  18.2% 
Non-high-tech                           459                           49  9.6% 
Total                           630                           87  12.1% 
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Table 2 
Summary Statistics 
This table presents summary statistics of the variables used in this study at the IPO year. T-tests are conducted to test for differences between the means for firms with innovator 
CEOs and non-innovator CEOs. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  Full sample   Non-Innovator CEOs   Innovator CEOs 
Variable   N  Mean Median Std. Dev.   N  Mean Median Std. Dev.  N Mean Median Std. Dev. 
CEO characteristic               
  CEO patent 717 0.07 0.00 0.49  630 0.00 0.00 0   87 0.58*** 0.00 1.32 
  CEO citation 717 3.95 0.00 59.18  630 0.00 0.00 0   87 32.59*** 0.00 167.96 
  CEO avg. citation 717 2.00 0.00 29.55  630 0.00 0.00 0   87 16.46*** 0.00 83.83 
  CEO cumulative patent 717 0.82 0.00 5.63  630 0.00 0.00 0   87 6.76*** 2.00 14.96 
  CEO cumulative citation 717 34.00 0.00 212.12  630 0.00 0.00 0   87 280.20*** 51.00 552.11 
  CEO avg. cumulative citation 717 4.64 0.00 31.17  630 0.00 0.00 0   87 38.21*** 15.50 82.40 
  Tenure (months) 659 62.48 48.00 67.48 
 
580 60.58 36.00 68.34  79 76.41* 72.00 59.39 
  CEO age (years) 710 48.66 48.00 7.76 
 
624 48.77 48.00 7.76  86 47.83 47.00 7.79 
Firm characteristic               
  Innovator CEO 717 0.12 0.00 0.33  630 0.00 0.00 0   87 1.00 1.00 0.00 
  Initial return 658 25.54 12.29 57.44  577 25.71 12.20 57.54  81 24.29 12.38 57.06 
  Firm patent 717 1.90 0.00 6.69 
 
630 1.77 0.00 6.93  87 2.83 1.00 4.50 
  Firm citation 717 49.61 0.00 183.60 
 
630 41.79 0.00 166.34  87 106.21** 4.00 273.15 
  Firm avg. citation 717 8.36 0.00 25.54 
 
630 6.85 0.00 21.72  87 19.30*** 2.00 42.94 
  Citation-weighted firm innovation 717 1.53 0.00 8.03 
 
630 1.46 0.00 8.26  87 2.05 0.00 6.11 
  Market-value firm innovation 717 2.55 0.00 19.43 
 
630 2.35 0.00 17.73  87 3.98 0.00 29.01 
  R&D / total assets 717 0.04 0.00 0.07 
 
630 0.03 0.00 0.07  87 0.07*** 0.06 0.08 
  Venture capital backed 717 0.41 0.00 0.49 
 
630 0.40 0.00 0.49  87 0.54** 1.00 0.50 
  Firm age 662 18.65 9.00 24.49 
 
583 19.92 10.00 25.69  79 9.24*** 8.00 7.55 
  Tobin's Q 717 3.99 2.62 6.02 
 
630 3.90 2.55 5.97  87 4.61 3.19 6.39 
  Underwriter rank 717 7.47 8.00 2.50 
 
630 7.45 8.00 2.55  87 7.59 8.00 2.08 
  Proceeds 717 109.20 48.00 597.59 
  
630 117.59 51.00 636.92   87 48.46 32.00 43.55 
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Table 3 
Innovator CEOs and IPO Underpricing 
Table 3 presents the results of the effect of the CEO's innovative ability on IPO underpricing from 1976 to 2010. 
Innovator CEO is defined as a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO has any patents during 1975-2010. Initial 
return is defined as the closing price one day after the offering date (SDC variable: PR1DAY) divided by offering 
price (SDC variable: P) minus 1. If closing price one day after the offering date is missing, closing price two days 
after the offering date (SDC variable: PR2DAY) is used. Firm patent is the number of patents the CEO applied at 
the IPO year. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
  Initial return (Underpricing) 
Innovator CEO -6.091* -4.381*** -4.237** 
 (3.511) (1.623) (1.985) 
VC 3.186 3.378 3.881 
 (2.475) (3.080) (3.445) 
Ln(firm age) -0.780 -0.536 -0.660 
 (1.173) (0.551) (0.639) 
Tobin's Q 6.212*** 6.014*** 5.980*** 
 (0.194) (0.164) (0.161) 
Underwriter rank 0.0853 -0.0614 -0.0167 
 (0.494) (0.494) (0.521) 
Ln(proceeds) 0.469 0.106 0.139 
 (1.179) (0.888) (0.930) 
Bubble year 17.72*** 7.334 9.949 
 (4.037) (8.293) (8.404) 
High-tech industry 0.0243 -4.638* -4.580 
 (2.519) (2.324) (2.800) 
Firm patent  0.925 1.062 1.287 
 (1.446) (1.126) (1.138) 
CEO age    -0.0643 
   (0.127) 
Tenure    0.00136 
   (0.00949) 
    
Year fixed effects NO Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects NO Yes Yes 
R-square 0.719 0.732 0.735 
Observations 613 613 570 
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Table 4 
Buy-and-hold Abnormal Returns  
Table 3 presents the buy-and-hold abnormal returns for the full sample, firms with non-innovator CEOs and firms with innovator CEOs. The 
benchmark returns are CRSP value-weighted index (marke_vw adj.), CRSP equal-weighted index (market-ew adj.) and a portfolio of non-
IPO firms matched to IPO firms on size and market-to-book (size-MB adj.). T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3)   
  
Full sample 
(n=717) 
Non-innovator CEOs 
(n=630) 
Innovator CEOs 
(n=87) 
(2)-(3) 
Difference 
test 
Variable Mean p-Value Mean p-Value Mean p-Value   
AR0,1 (market-vw adj.)  32.55% <.0001 34.01% <.0001 21.99% 0.0136 12.02 
AR0,1 (market-ew adj.)  17.31% <.0001 19.09% <.0001 4.46% 0.6188 14.63 
AR0,1 (size-MB adj.)  26.70% <.0001 28.33% <.0001 14.94% 0.2253 13.39 
AR0,2 (market-vw adj.)  64.42% <.0001 61.48% <.0001 85.68% 0.0400 -24.20 
AR0,2 (market-ew adj.)  26.64% 0.0044 23.97% 0.0076 45.93% 0.2722 -21.96 
AR0,2 (size-MB adj.)  63.34% <.0001 59.79% <.0001 88.98% 0.0404 -29.19 
AR0,3 (market-vw adj.)  87.17% <.0001 82.17% <.0001 123.32% 0.0070 -41.15 
AR0,3 (market-ew adj.)  22.58% <.0001 18.35% 0.1316 53.19% 0.2400 -34.84 
AR0,3 (size-MB adj.)  99.14% <.0001 92.61% <.0001 146.31% 0.0031 -53.70 
AR0,4 (market-vw adj.)  123.28% <.0001 120.33% <.0001 144.63% 0.0023 -24.30 
AR0,4 (market-ew adj.)  17.05% 0.3516 15.19% 0.4443 30.53% 0.5082 -15.34 
AR0,4 (size-MB adj.)  137.66% <.0001 130.31% <.0001 190.86% 0.0002 -60.55 
AR0,5 (market-vw adj.)  123.82% <.0001 112.25% <.0001 207.51% 0.0034 -95.26* 
AR0,5 (market-ew adj.)  -35.57% 0.0458 -45.19% 0.0113 34.03% 0.6272 -79.22 
AR0,5 (size-MB adj.)  135.85% <.0001 119.70% <.0001 252.68% 0.0008 -133.0** 
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Table 5 
Calendar-Time Factor Model Regressions Innovator CEOs and Non-innovator CEOs 
Table 4 presents the calendar-time factor model regressions using Fama-French three-factor model (1993), Fama-French five-factor model (2016), and Fama-
French three-factor model (1993) purged IPO and SEO firms for IPO firms. The five-factor model is 𝑅𝑝𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝑏(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) + 𝑠𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 +
𝑟𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝑐𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡, where 𝑅𝑝𝑡 is the monthly return for an equal-weighted calendar-time portfolio of IPOs in month 𝑡, 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the monthly return on the 
CRSP value-weighted market index in month 𝑡, 𝑟𝑓𝑡  is the monthly return on the three-month Treasury bills in month 𝑡, (𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) is the market risk 
premium 𝑀𝑅𝑃, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡  is the monthly return on a value-weighted portfolio of small firms minus the return on a value-weighted portfolio of large firms in 
month 𝑡, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  is the monthly return on a value-weighted portfolio of high book-to-market stocks minus the return on a value-weighted portfolio of low book-
to-market stocks in month 𝑡, 𝑟𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 is the monthly return on a value-weighted portfolio of high operating profitability stocks minus the return on a value-
weighted portfolio of low operating profitability stocks in month 𝑡, and 𝑐𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 is the monthly return on a value-weighted portfolio of conservative investment 
stocks minus the return on a value-weight portfolio of aggressive investment stocks. The intercept (𝑎) represents the abnormal performance. I calculate the 
returns for the portfolio of IPO firms for the period of 0-36 months after IPO. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
                  
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Full sample Non-innovator CEOs Innovator CEOs 
 
Three-factor 
model Fama 
and French 
(1993) 
Five-factor 
model Fama 
and French 
(2014) 
Fama-French 3-
factor model 
purged IPO and 
SEO firms 
Three-factor 
model Fama 
and French 
(1993) 
Five-factor 
model Fama 
and French 
(2014) 
Fama-French 3-
factor model 
purged IPO and 
SEO firms 
Three-factor 
model Fama 
and French 
(1993) 
Five-factor 
model Fama 
and French 
(2014) 
Fama-French 3-
factor model 
purged IPO and 
SEO firms 
MRP 1.231*** 1.191*** 1.346*** 1.111*** 1.098*** 1.245*** 1.394*** 1.298*** 1.589*** 
 (0.0681) (0.0731) (0.100) (0.104) (0.107) (0.140) (0.0719) (0.0801) (0.0989) 
SMB 0.968*** 0.982*** 1.059*** 1.317*** 1.283*** 1.399*** 0.839*** 0.756*** 0.920*** 
 (0.101) (0.108) (0.136) (0.178) (0.185) (0.233) (0.105) (0.113) (0.130) 
HML -0.438*** -0.290** -0.358** -0.413** -0.386* -0.308 -0.850*** -0.629*** -0.805*** 
 (0.101) (0.136) (0.164) (0.169) (0.226) (0.288) (0.107) (0.143) (0.163) 
RMW  -0.00958     -0.210    -0.337**  
  (0.134)     (0.312)    (0.145)  
CMA  -0.349     -0.176    -0.373*  
  (0.213)     (0.363)    (0.213)  
Intercept 0.900*** 0.990*** 0.764* 0.648 0.760 0.282 1.502*** 1.775*** 1.192*** 
  (0.298) (0.309) (0.399) (0.436) (0.462) (0.576) (0.329) (0.341) (0.400) 
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Table 6 
Multivariate Regression Explaining IPO Long-Run Performance 
Table 5 presents the results of the effect of the CEO's innovative ability on IPO long-run performance from 1976 to 2010. CEO avg. citation is defined as the ratio 
of CEO citation over CEO patent at the IPO year. AR0,3 is the buy-and-hold abnormal returns for 3-year holding period after IPO. The benchmark return is CRSP 
value-weighted index, CRSP equal-weighted index, and style-matched firms return based on size and book-to-market ratio. High-tech industry is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the firm is in the high technological industry. The definition of high technological industry follows Loughran and Ritter (2004). Variable 
definitions are provided in the Appendix. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and 
*, respectively. 
  AR0,3 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  
Market-
vw adj. 
Market-
ew adj. 
 
Size-BM 
adj. 
Market-
vw adj. 
Market-
ew adj. 
 
Size-BM 
adj. 
Market-
vw adj. 
Market-
ew adj. 
 
Size-BM 
adj. 
CEO avg. citation 3.000*** 2.987*** 3.101*** 3.077*** 3.063*** 3.175*** -3.102* -2.842* -2.875** 
 (10.80) (10.71) (12.25) (12.89) (12.73) (14.32) (-1.88) (-1.74) (-2.34) 
High-tech industry -34.27 -34.29 -49.51 -18.61 -18.78 -34.28    
 (-1.18) (-1.17) (-1.23) (-0.63) (-0.63) (-0.86)    
Same class         -40.19 -40.33 -78.68 
         (-0.78) (-0.77) (-1.37) 
CEO avg. citation * High-tech industry     -7.262** -7.191** -7.061**    
     (-3.20) (-2.93) (-3.21)    
CEO avg. citation * same class         6.201*** 5.927*** 6.126*** 
         (3.87) (3.73) (5.03) 
VC 44.45** 46.05** 36.71 42.33** 43.95** 34.65 41.88* 43.63** 34.64 
 (2.11) (2.16) (1.27) (2.04) (2.10) (1.23) (1.98) (2.05) (1.22) 
Ln(firm age) -7.955 -7.291 -0.752 -8.905 -8.231 -1.675 -9.348 -8.619 -1.990 
 (-0.67) (-0.61) (-0.06) (-0.73) (-0.67) (-0.13) (-0.78) (-0.71) (-0.16) 
Initial return 0.746 0.773 0.811 0.785 0.811 0.848 0.770 0.795 0.826 
 (1.20) (1.26) (1.28) (1.28) (1.35) (1.37) (1.28) (1.34) (1.32) 
Tobin's Q -8.432** -8.560** -7.540* -8.574** -8.700** -7.677* -8.429** -8.548** -7.352* 
 (-2.16) (-2.22) (-1.93) (-2.21) (-2.27) (-1.97) (-2.20) (-2.26) (-1.86) 
Underwriter rank -0.748 -0.958 -4.854 -0.847 -1.057 -4.951 -0.590 -0.800 -4.617 
 (-0.16) (-0.21) (-1.15) (-0.19) (-0.23) (-1.18) (-0.13) (-0.17) (-1.08) 
Ln(proceeds) -51.81** -50.34** -75.63*** -51.17** -49.70** -75.00*** -51.97** -50.54** -77.08*** 
 (-3.14) (-3.11) (-4.24) (-3.00) (-2.97) (-4.07) (-3.03) (-3.01) (-4.32) 
Bubble year 49.40 -35.01 27.61 50.21 -34.21 28.40 51.48 -32.90 33.36 
 (0.67) (-0.49) (0.45) (0.67) (-0.47) (0.45) (0.70) (-0.46) (0.50) 
CEO age  -0.856 -0.923 -1.135 -0.801 -0.868 -1.081 -0.895 -0.963 -1.241 
 (-0.40) (-0.44) (-0.49) (-0.39) (-0.43) (-0.48) (-0.44) (-0.48) (-0.56) 
Tenure  -0.149 -0.161 -0.165 -0.140 -0.152 -0.156 -0.144 -0.155 -0.151 
 (-0.99) (-1.09) (-1.05) (-0.97) (-1.07) (-1.03) (-1.06) (-1.17) (-1.03) 
Firm innovation03 2.322* 2.331* 1.799* 1.550 1.560 1.499* 1.609 1.617 1.626** 
 (1.85) (1.89) (1.68) (1.38) (1.38) (1.87) (1.41) (1.41) (2.12) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-square 0.130 0.155 0.136 0.219 0.244 0.230 0.217 0.242 0.230 
Observations 569 569 569 569 569 569 569 569 569 
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Table 7 
Innovator CEOs, High-tech Industry, and Firms Post-IPO Performance 
Table 6 presents the results of the effect of the CEO's innovative ability on IPO long-run performance from 1976 to 2010. 
Innovator CEO is defined as a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO has any patents during 1975-2010. Capital 
expenditure / total assets is defined as capital expenditures divided by total assets. Cash / total assets is defined as cash 
holdings divided by total assets. R&D / total assets is defined as research and development expenditures divided by total 
assets. If R&D is missing, R&D  is equal to zero. High-tech industry is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is in the high 
technological industry. The definition of high technological industry follows Loughran and Ritter (2004). Variable definitions 
are provided in the Appendix. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is 
denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
  Cash / total assets (t+3) R&D / total assets (t+3) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Innovator CEO -0.00902 0.0449 0.0283*** 0.0480*** 
 (0.0259) (0.0363) (0.00972) (0.0135) 
Innovator CEO * High-tech industry  -0.106**  -0.0396** 
  (0.0504)  (0.0189) 
High-tech industry 0.0361 0.0594* 0.0172 0.0261** 
 (0.0321) (0.0338) (0.0122) (0.0128) 
VC 0.0871*** 0.0906*** 0.0196*** 0.0207*** 
 (0.0197) (0.0196) (0.00731) (0.00730) 
Ln(firm age) 0.00814 0.00936 0.00332 0.00362 
 (0.00995) (0.00991) (0.00359) (0.00357) 
Tobin's Q 0.00519** 0.00551** 0.000111 0.000230 
 (0.00238) (0.00237) (0.000903) (0.000900) 
Underwriter rank -0.00114 -0.000611 1.66e-05 0.000214 
 (0.00367) (0.00366) (0.00139) (0.00138) 
Ln(proceeds) 0.0181 0.0184 0.00663 0.00678 
 (0.0147) (0.0146) (0.00550) (0.00548) 
Ln(sales) -0.0606*** -0.0590*** -0.0102*** -0.00966** 
 (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.00382) (0.00381) 
Ln(ROA) 0.0245*** 0.0238*** 0.00402 0.00383 
 (0.00723) (0.00719) (0.00273) (0.00272) 
CEO age  -0.00144 -0.00138 -0.000310 -0.000291 
 (0.00122) (0.00121) (0.000453) (0.000451) 
Tenure  1.67e-05 4.51e-05 -4.13e-05 -3.17e-05 
 (0.000139) (0.000139) (4.69e-05) (4.68e-05) 
     
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-square 0.582 0.588 0.500 0.507 
Observations 357 357 373 373 
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Table 8 
Innovator CEOs and Post-IPO Firm Innovation 
Table 6 presents the results of the effect of the CEO's innovative ability on IPO long-run performance from 1976 to 2010. Innovator CEO is defined as a dummy variable equal 
to one if the CEO has any patents during 1975-2010. Firm patent is the number of patent the firm applied two or three years after the IPO. Firm citation is the number of 
citations subsequently received by the patents the firm applied two or three years after the IPO. Firm avg. citatio is defined as the nature log of the ratio of firm citation over 
firm patent two or three years after the IPO. Citation-weighted firm innovation is the sum of the weight of citations on each patent plus one for firm i divided by book assets of 
firm i two or three years after the IPO. Market-value firm innovation is total dollar value of innovation produced by firm i divided by book assets of firm i two or three years 
after the IPO. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by 
***, **, and *, respectively. 
  Two years after the IPO Three years after the IPO 
 
  Log (1 + 
Firm patent) 
  Log (1 + 
Firm citation) 
Log (1 + Firm 
avg. citation) 
Log (1 + 
Citation-
weighted firm 
innovation) 
Log (1 + 
Market-value 
firm 
innovation) 
  Log (1 + 
Firm patent) 
  Log (1 + 
Firm citation) 
Log (1 + Firm 
avg. citation) 
Log (1 + 
Citation-
weighted firm 
innovation) 
Log (1 + 
Market-value 
firm 
innovation) 
Innovator CEO 0.193** 0.568*** 0.440*** 0.208* 0.0388 0.0268 0.258 0.297** 0.211* 0.0478 
 (0.0920) (0.215) (0.156) (0.118) (0.128) (0.0986) (0.215) (0.147) (0.123) (0.145) 
VC 0.183*** 0.517*** 0.372*** 0.168** 0.0818 0.215*** 0.443*** 0.318*** 0.195** 0.234** 
 (0.0651) (0.152) (0.110) (0.0834) (0.0904) (0.0697) (0.152) (0.104) (0.0871) (0.103) 
Ln(firm age) -0.0525* -0.106 -0.0508 -0.120*** -0.104** -0.0454 -0.0928 -0.0431 -0.0939** -0.0967** 
 (0.0310) (0.0725) (0.0526) (0.0398) (0.0431) (0.0333) (0.0727) (0.0496) (0.0415) (0.0490) 
Tobin's Q 0.0318*** 0.0630*** 0.0331*** 0.0114* 0.0256*** 0.0342*** 0.0552*** 0.0215*** 0.0296*** 0.0296*** 
 (0.00493) (0.0115) (0.00836) (0.00633) (0.00685) (0.00529) (0.0116) (0.00789) (0.00661) (0.00779) 
Underwriter rank 0.0164 0.0271 0.0105 0.0189 0.0328* 0.0267** 0.0446 0.0210 0.0246 0.0316 
 (0.0125) (0.0293) (0.0212) (0.0161) (0.0174) (0.0134) (0.0293) (0.0200) (0.0168) (0.0198) 
Ln(proceeds) 0.0638* 0.167* 0.0949 0.0418 0.110** 0.0493 0.115 0.0669 0.0776 0.129** 
 (0.0375) (0.0876) (0.0636) (0.0481) (0.0521) (0.0402) (0.0878) (0.0600) (0.0502) (0.0592) 
Bubble year 0.0881 0.327 0.280 0.0447 -0.0934 0.167 0.299 0.207 0.364 0.152 
 (0.210) (0.490) (0.356) (0.269) (0.291) (0.225) (0.491) (0.335) (0.281) (0.331) 
High-tech industry 0.355*** 1.018*** 0.728*** 0.435*** 0.416*** 0.361*** 0.974*** 0.686*** 0.487*** 0.498*** 
 (0.0665) (0.155) (0.113) (0.0852) (0.0923) (0.0713) (0.156) (0.106) (0.0890) (0.105) 
CEO age  -0.00140 0.000618 0.00180 0.00827 0.00354 -0.00627 -0.00650 0.000873 0.00838 0.00298 
 (0.00402) (0.00938) (0.00681) (0.00515) (0.00558) (0.00431) (0.00941) (0.00642) (0.00538) (0.00634) 
Tenure  5.73e-05 0.000234 0.000376 -0.000182 -0.000242 -0.000141 -0.000363 -0.000113 0.000541 0.000528 
 (0.000442) (0.00103) (0.000749) (0.000567) (0.000614) (0.000474) (0.00104) (0.000707) (0.000592) (0.000698) 
Firm patent one year before IPO 0.106*** 0.151*** 0.0478*** 0.129*** 0.154*** 0.104*** 0.132*** 0.0366*** 0.127*** 0.148*** 
 (0.00654) (0.0153) (0.0111) (0.00839) (0.00908) (0.00701) (0.0153) (0.0105) (0.00875) (0.0103) 
  Yes     Yes    
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-square 0.556 0.476 0.379 0.479 0.508 0.543 0.441 0.358 0.485 0.460 
Observation 612 612 612 612 612 612 612 612 612 612 
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Table 9 
Innovator CEOs, Underpricing, and Post-IPO firm innovation--Propensity score matching results 
Table 10 presents the effects of innovator CEOs on underpricing, post-IPO firm innovation from propensity score matching results. Initial return is defined as the closing price one day after the 
offering date (SDC variable: PR1DAY) divided by offering price (SDC variable: P) minus 1. If closing price one day after the offering date is missing, closing price two days after the offering date 
(SDC variable: PR2DAY) is used. Firm patent is the number of patent the firm applied two or three years after the IPO. Firm citation is the number of citations subsequently received by the patents 
the firm applied two or three years after the IPO. Firm avg. citatio is defined as the nature log of the ratio of firm citation over firm patent two or three years after the IPO. Citation-weighted firm 
innovation is the sum of the weight of citations on each patent plus one for firm i divided by book assets of firm i two or three years after the IPO. Market-value firm innovation is total dollar value of 
innovation produced by firm i divided by book assets of firm i two or three years after the IPO.Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
  
Initial return 
(Underpricing) 
  Three years 
    Log (1 + Firm patent)  
  Log (1 + Firm 
citation)  
Log (1 + Firm avg. 
citation)  
Log (1 + Citation-
weighted firm 
innovation)  
Log (1 + Market-
value firm 
innovation) 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (9) (10) 
Innovator CEO -4.634 -6.232*  0.450*** 0.483***  1.165*** 1.240***  0.843*** 0.888***  0.698*** 0.720***  0.531** 0.573** 
 (4.039) (3.496)  (0.165) (0.164)  (0.403) (0.403)  (0.266) (0.267)  (0.265) (0.267)  (0.231) (0.233) 
Nearest matching 1 2  1 2  1 2  1 2  1 2  1 2 
Other control variables Y Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
Industry fixed effects Y Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
Observations 570 570   612 612   612 612   612 612   612 612   612 612 
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 2017 Financial Management Association (FMA) Annual Meeting  
 2017 Eastern Finance Association (EFA) Annual Meeting  
 Submitted to the Journal of Banking and Finance (August 2018) 
 
3. Talent Cycling in IPOs 
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4. Momentum and Information 
 2017 Southwestern Finance Association (SWFA) Annual Meeting 
  
 
Work in Progress 
1. Innovator CEOs in IPOs  
 
2. Patent-backed Financing (with Seong Byun) 
 
3. M&A and the Outflow of Talent (with Sean C. Cao) 
 
4. Horserace of CEOs or CTOs with Innovative Ability (with Sean C. Cao) 
Teaching Experiences 
University of Mississippi, University, MS 
Instructor  
FIN 361 Quantitative Financial Analysis (online) 
o Fall 2018                
Scheduled 
FIN 331 Business Finance I 
o Fall 2018                
Scheduled 
o Summer 2018 (2 sections)                                        
Scheduled 
o Summer 2017                       Teaching evaluations: 5/5 
o Spring 2017                       Teaching evaluations: 4/5 
o Fall 2016                       Teaching evaluations: 4/5 
o Summer 2016                       Teaching evaluations: 4/5 
o Summer 2015                       Teaching evaluations: 5/5 
FIN 334 Investments 
o Spring 2018 (2 sections)          Teaching evaluations: 4/5  
o Fall 2017 (2 sections)                                Teaching evaluations: 4/5  
 
Teaching Assistant 
FIN 361 Quantitative Financial Analysis (online)                             2016 – 2018 (9 times) 
FIN 334 Investments       2015 – 2016 (2 times) 
 
University of Massachusetts-Boston, Boston, MA  
Teaching Assistant 
AF 335 Student Managed Fund      2013 – 2014 (2 times) 
AF 499 College of Management Honors Thesis Seminar                             Fall 2013 
MKT 301 Principles of Marketing                                                                     Spring 2013 
 
Teaching Technology 
Blackboard, Pearson MyLab, Aplia, MindTap 
 
Presentations 
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1. “CEOs with Innovative Ability”, Financial Management Association (FMA) Annual 
Meeting, San Diego, California, 2018.  
2. “CEOs with Innovative Ability”, University of Mississippi and University of Memphis Joint 
Seminar, 2018.  
 
3. “Do IPO Costs Affect Innovation?” (with Kathleen P. Fuller), Financial Management 
Association (FMA) Annual Meeting, Boston, Massachusetts, 2017. 
 
4. “Do IPO Costs Affect Innovation?” (with Kathleen P. Fuller), Eastern Finance Association 
(EFA) Annual Meeting, Jacksonville, Florida, 2017. 
 
5. “Canceled Orders and Executed Hidden Orders” (with Bonnie Van Ness and Robert A. Van 
Ness), Eastern Finance Association (EFA) Annual Meeting, Jacksonville, Florida, 2017. 
 
6. “Canceled Orders and Executed Hidden Orders” (with Bonnie Van Ness and Robert A. Van 
Ness), Southwestern Finance Association (SWFA) Annual Meeting, Little Rock, Arkansas, 
2017. 
7. “Momentum and Information”, Southwestern Finance Association (SWFA) Annual Meeting, 
Little Rock, Arkansas, 2017. 
Conference and Service 
2018 Financial Management Association (FMA), Annual Meeting                Discussant 
2017 Southwestern Finance Association (SWFA), Annual Meeting        Discussant/Session Chair 
2017 Eastern Finance Association (EFA), Annual Meeting                        Discussant 
2016 Financial Management Association (FMA), Annual Meeting         Discussant/Session Chair 
 
Awards and Scholarships  
Graduate Teaching and Research Assistant            University of Mississippi    2014-present 
Graduate School Travel Grant         University of Mississippi    2016-present  
Graduate Achievement Award for Ph.D. Degree   University of Mississippi                 2017 
Graduate Teaching and Research Assistant       University of Massachusetts-Boston  2013-2014 
Beta Gamma Sigma Honor Society Member       University of Massachusetts-Boston            2013 
Merit-based Scholarship Recipient        Guangdong University of Foreign Studies  2008 
 
Non-Academic Experience 
Treasurer, Graduate Student Assembly, University of Massachusetts-Boston                    2013 
Intern, Department of Trade Finance, Head Office of China Everbright Bank      2009 
 
Programming, and Language Skills 
Programming: Stata, SAS, Matlab, R (elementary) 
Language: English (fluent), Chinese (native) 
 
 
 
 
 
